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Pre-sentiment  
And herein lies the tragedy of the age: not that 
men are poor,—all men know something of 
poverty; not that men are wicked,—who is good? 
Not that men are ignorant,—what is Truth? Nay, 
but that men know so little of men (Du Bois, 
2007:118) 
 
The struggle for life in South Africa is so grim 
that I could scarcely remember whether I owe 
you a letter or the way around... (Plaatje, 
1996:367). 
Perhaps life in South Africa is grim, unbearable – owing to our faint speech, the South 
African difficulty of assigning life-death processes a proper name. Properly speaking: reading 
a grim life seems an effort of fear and trembling, the tragic fear of knowing, of naming the 
present South Africa. It is the fear of tracing the becoming of blackness. This tracing requires 
a reading of South Africa in its immediacy, its immediate relation to a multitude of blacks, 
the living or the dead. And it matters little whether the black lives to die in sleep a ‘quite 
death’, or badly dies of disease or at the hand of the state machine. Less significant if he/she 
lives-to-die at the hand a fellow ‘South African’: death by knife, by gun, by poison, by 
psychic/physical hunger. The present may well be an endless chain of onto-historical 
‘misfortunes’….  
My immediate concern is what happens when misfortune in the present becomes an 
object of political commentary, becomes thinkable through a democratic dis-order of South 
African occurrences, for instance. What happens when the present misfortune is a means of 
representation, representing South Africa’s immediate past: ‘apartheid’? What should it 
matter that the apartheid past, for a Nostalgic Native for example, is a mix bag of sociological 
this or that (spectacular or ordinary black suffering)? So that it seems inappropriate to 
discourage a “nostalgic native” (say, the suffering or disappointed black in the present) to 
reflect fondly on the ‘fact’ that blacks in the apartheid past suffered not in “the same way” 
(Dlamini, 2009:18). Such reflections, says a commentator, is “a reflective contemplation on 
the ordinary humanity” of black South Africans under apartheid (Jones, 2014:114). It is an 
index of yearning for an “order in an uncertain world” and, by extension, not a prop of 
apartheid (14).  
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Still: should a Nostalgic Native engage in tautologies (blacks experience life 
differently)? Should the native draw a balance sheet of pain, so he can remedy the so called 
‘master narrative’ of black homogenous suffering? Inversion of terms – heterogeneity against 
homogeneity of experiences – gets us nowhere. The Nostalgic Native’s reflections seem an 
occasion for conceptual trial and error, a trial which always is an error, since the ‘emerging 
concept’ (nostalgia) expresses a will-to-sophisticated-empiricism (or psychologism), a case of 
epistemic incoherence.    
Another way of thinking the present misfortune is through the scandal of black 
murmuring. “When asked at the TRC what they wanted from their enemies”, writes Ato 
Quayson, “many of the victims of apartheid violence responded that all they required was 
knowledge (about lost ones, about the causes of the violence, about why the perpetrators of 
violence failed to recognize them as human, etc.). What they asked for was not the reason but 
the rationale. They sought to look beyond the appearance that masks itself as truth. The 
essential point, however, is that tragic events of apartheid cannot ever be understood in terms 
of reason; they are completely unreasonable” (2003:94).  
Perhaps the victim of apartheid only wished to know the causes of violence, a 
rational, the perpetrator’s subjective determination of the causes of his/her sorrow. “When 
these people [the victims] interrogate the past, they are doing this not solely for its own sake 
but for how this interrogation might help them exist in the present”. And yet: to say “the 
tragic events of apartheid cannot ever be understood in terms of reason; they are completely 
unreasonable” seems (if I am reading Quayson correctly) unreasoned. In Quayson lies a 
hermeneutic of obscurantism, put another way: the crisis of explanation, of the hesitance (or 
incapacity perhaps) to trace, to account for the coming of the black in South Africa. 
So: searching for reasons for the causes (of rationales) of apartheid ought to be our 
point of departure, since a departure from anywhere else is a slippery slope to (mis)apprehend 
the present (the national/the black’s misfortune), to misread the black in a democratic dis-
order. It is a slippery slope to evaluate blackness through a South African democracy, say, as 
if blackness and democracy (the supposed space of ‘race/class/sex/gender’ articulation) are 
necessarily commensurable categories of interpretation. A slippery slope leading to obscure 
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calls for negative political projects (the dissolution of a ‘raced society’ or the emergence of 
the non-racial fraternity)1. 
 Consider, in passing, the seriousness of Ivor Chipkin’s commentary, its anxious plea 
for the ideal of non-racial fraternity – the moment of mutual accountability (the site of 
“ethical values”), of self-responsibility. On this plea, the black ought to forget Pan 
Africanism or Negritude, and follow Fanon’s version of nationalism instead, “the dissolution 
of blackness”, of a ‘national subjectivity’ (a determination and an expression of Black 
Nationalism). Chipkin’s Fanonian beings ought to become “South African merely by 
choosing to be so” – in the same way that Fanon (at one point, for Chipkin) willed and chose 
“to be Algerian” (Chipkin, 2007:60)2.  
If Chipkin on Fanon (his becoming Algerian by ‘will’ alone) is correct, if it is true 
that Fanon’s nationalism is “dissolution of blackness”, did Fanon in Algeria manage to 
dissolve his blackness? What, really, will it take to dissolve one’s blackness? Chipkin’s black 
is quite remarkable (a miraculous figure), since this black (the national subject) could at night 
(of the revolution) drag him/herself to bed and in the morning wake up a not-black (a happy 
South African), simply because the black chooses so. A further point of concern and most 
crucial: Chipkin’s conflation of national subjectivity and becoming national (blackness itself 
for our purposes). The former, I make a distinction, is an ideological determination 
(expressive of Black Nationalism, as Chipkin correctly sees it), perhaps a determination of 
imminent disappointment, of failure – a “dead end” (supposing nationalism is movement). 
The latter emerges beside nationalism (the latter is at once in and outside nationalism, the 
very condition of blackness itself). So that these two processes (becoming national vs. 
becoming a national subject) are commensurable in some way. Commensurable, jointly 
necessary for thinking– as I intend in the following pages – the significance of becoming 
black and of living ethically.  
                                                          
1 Whether (and in what way) race and the state of affairs it represents are merely a moment in historical time 
(and thus a mere moment to bloat off the South African historical time) depends on the paradigm of 
conception. For instance, a scienticism of race may prefer to usher in a South African non-racial era (by way of 
transforming racists), since to be racialist (and racist) is according to this scientism a labour of essentialism, the 
irrational (as if the fault lies with the individual racist). This scientism forgets another side of the story: 
blackness itself is an onto-political (social) fact, exceeds the mere individual racist.  
 
2 Now, Chipkin would do well if he interrogates Fanon’s readily available work (he merely relies on a few 
quotes from Fanon’s biographer, David Macey). His failure to do so is quite exasperating...  
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Here, then, emerges my key concern: how is the ethical-in-black thinkable? Here 
begins our negativity: anti-empiricism, our attitude, our method: a phenome-national reading 
of life-in-black, the bracketing of nationalist talk/behaviour (though this talk/behaviour is the 
very condition of apprehending the national, the black as such). Anti-empiricism: peering 
through the window, a look into the nature of evil. Evil: the object of contemplation, for 
blacks. This is a method of rounding the “Problem” of problems (Du Bois)/the problem of 
blackness (and not so much the black problems themselves: hunger or ‘criminality’, for 
instance), the event of objective sorrow, a perpetual struggle against the definitive evil. 
Peering through the window is akin to listening to gypsy music, the gypsy that always (in 
Husserl’s contemptuous talk) hovers the European landscape, albeit outside its Time – since 
Europe is a spirit and not a geographical space per se (Husserl,1965:160). A look into the 
nature of evil is, of course, a teeter on Husserlian temperament3: it is a search for the national 
(the black) time, I suggest – a search through the rubble, the national landscape and its 
artefact, a wounded ‘animal-man’. A look into the nature of evil enfolds thinking the 
(non)significance of the national, the ‘animal-man’ (the fact of the black angst before the 
Supreme Court of European time), the (non)significance of the national alongside the animal-
man.  
But a look through the window of evil is smell of the rotten, the re-emerging colony: 
the Union of South Africa. Anti-empiricism is a method of the dramatic (is not the problem 
of problems, after all, the site of the blackness a site of drama), of the tragic ending, the 
method against the “tragedy of the age: not that men are poor,—all men know something of 
poverty; not that men are wicked,—who is good? Not that men are ignorant,—what is Truth? 
Nay, but that men know so little of men” (Du Bois, 2007:138). So that anti-empiricism, 
perhaps to reiterate in different words, is anti Grand Theory, grand Truths and Grand 
Goodness, in a related way that C.Wright Mills’s sociology self-constitutes. Social theory is a 
calling for me, following Mills – a calling I wish to reject outright, unless it permits for play: 
a kind of a hyperbolic dis-play: dancing on my head (in the manner of Marx’s dancing tables 
in Capital). Dancing on my head, since Blackness is a diss-play, a sign “below the line”, 
beneath the social4.  
                                                          
3 Torres’s ‘de-colonial reduction’ moves in a similar fashion: it is a type of meta-phenomenological measure, 
says Gordon, a measure making transparent a phenomenological critique of phenomenology itself (See 
Gordon, 2011). 
4 Of course, a sociologist could try hard to apprehend black life, albeit unsatisfactorily. Bozzoli (1991), for 
example, goes as far as imputing agency to black Women of Phokeng’s consciousnesses, at the same instant 
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The dance is a “case of blackness” in black studies, Fred Moten’s “black optics…an 
auditory affair: a night vision given in and through voices that shadow legitimate discourse 
from below, breaking its ground up into broken air…” (2008:1473). The dance marks a daily 
ritual (through a night-by-night vigil) in the white Light, the moment and the possibility of 
black poesies through an analectic attitude5: apprehendingly listening to a black time: story 
(oral or writerly) here, a myth and fable there, an old Marabi shout everywhere. 
Apprehedingly doing ethics in politics, aesthetically.      
 
      *** 
Shireen Alley, you took great care of me and my work. I am grateful. Bhekisizwe Peterson, 
your wisdom is noteworthy (there are too many fools in the ‘University’).  
I acknowledge the financial assistance from National Research Foundation (NRF). However, 
my ideas should not be attributed to NRF. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distancing herself from ‘pure’ phenomenological enquiry of these lives. She remains within the 
phenomenological purview, though – only to defend black intentionality (a condition of the possibility of self-
knowledge). Still, I fail to understand why Women of Phokeng elides any reading of, say, Du Bois, Fanon or 
Manganyi or any ‘well-meaning’ scholar of black life, a scholar whose work borders on a phenomenological 
enquiry of blackness. I do not suggest we appropriate phenomenological enquiries with a happy conscience. 
For what would Husserl’s phenomenological reduction (anti-empiricism, the bracketing of the empirical for the 
sake of understanding the truth of being of things and consciousness in its confrontation with things in the 
world) mean in sociological terms? What would Husserl’s phenomenology mean if blackness lives outside the 
social?  
5 I propose an analectic reading (see Dussel, 1988) of blackness. An analectic logic (a cross interrogation of 
seemingly unrelated notions/ideas) makes possible apprehending the coming of ‘black poesy’ alongside the 
truth-in-black.  
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On Friendship 
 
A way of thinking the ethical-in-black is through the problem of the (im) possibility of 
Friendship. Friendship, put differently, is possibly an infinite, indeterminate event, a process. 
Not all hope is lost, though. We may think friendship alongside the possible goodness/evil-
ness of the nation form6. Benedict Anderson considers the possible goodness of ‘democratic’ 
South Africa, for instance. The goodness of South Africa, insists Anderson (2011:113), is 
quite possible, since in it move worthy ancestors, since in it lives the innocence of the future. 
The possible goodness of the nation form in Anderson entails an articulation of memories, the 
memory of the national dead (the treasured  heroes) on the one pole, and the memory for the 
national unborn on another. In this articulation Anderson perceives the sign of the present, an 
incomplete now, fresh and stale at the same instant. The present, in Anderson, is an object of 
concern for the living, a bridge into the innocence of the future.  
The living in Anderson, then, ought to defend (and self-efface for) the innocence of the 
unborn: “for between us and the unborn there is a central difference”. The unborn: nothing 
like us or the people many of us dislike, the “die-hard racists, super-violent tsotsis, merciless 
corporate bosses, corrupt politicians”. The unborn: those for whom we (in the present) should 
sacrifice our immediate interests, since (implies Anderson) to leave the unborn to their 
devices is a labour of evil (a fragmentation of a future). The innocence of the future is the 
basis for national unity, on Anderson’s account, despite the possibility that we “imagine 
among them [the innocent] descendants of those” we currently despise (Anderson, 2011:113; 
See Renan, 1996).   
If Anderson broaches the articulation of future and past, he is a sign-post to his text, Imagined 
Communities. Anderson there has us read in the notion of time a national category, has us 
read in time a constitutive of the emergence of Euro nation-ness (national consciousness). For 
instance: the emergence of a German nation-ness is, he would say through Walter Benjamin, 
a determination of “homogenous, empty time”, in which members (the nationals) of the 
                                                          
6 Manu Goswami, in her reading of Anderson’s Imagined Communities, makes a case for thinking nationalism 
through the modern nation form as a ‘social form’, “at once universal and particular, objective and subjective” 
(2002:785). The dual nature of the nation form allows Goswami to read nationalisms as structural-historical 
determinations and as determinations of consciousness. More, she pays “attention on the global articulation 
of the nation as a social form rather than the particularistic content of specific nationalist movements” (785). If 
Goswami is correct, I wish (as I propose in this dissertation) to think the nation form and becoming a national 
independently of any nationalism. Put negatively, becoming national and nationalism are not the same thing, 
though the former constitutes a possibility of the latter. 
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would-be German nation inter-relate ‘transversely’, ‘cross-timeously’, “marked 
by…temporal coincidence, and measured by clock”. A time in which, what is the same thing, 
the unfolding of social events is simultaneous rather than contiguous (a case sequence of past, 
present and future). In this time all German drama (the becoming of a nation) occurs as 
though in a rudimentary novel, in which the reader and the reader alone is god-like 
(omniscient), in which the reader alone knows and sees in its entirety the unfolding of a plot7.   
That time constitutes nation-ness probably is saying the obvious – Anderson is aware of this, 
I hope. Time as a form of consciousness is a longstanding problematic in the history of 
metaphysics8, and the history of metaphysics is beyond the scope of my concerns here. More 
useful, though, is Anderson’s notion of time as a national category when we read it alongside 
the idea of an archive, the national uses of it (the archive) in forgetting and remembering the 
past, the future and the present. An archive – its contents, in Stoler’s words – is not just a 
collection of stories in history, but rather “active, generative substances with histories”, and 
much like ghosts they have “itineraries of their own” (2010:2). We see in an archive a quasi-
substance, a kind of monad of a nation form – a monad if, however transient or transformable 
the archive seems, remains imperishable.  
Though imperishable, archives are contentious, of course. The South African archive remains 
for instance an over-determination of ‘coloniality’, since ways of thinking the past in the 
present, ways of thinking the innocence of the future now already subtends the colonial 
episteme9 (See Lalu, 2009). At stake in reading an imperishable, albeit an epistemically 
indeterminate, archive is the seeming dialectic of corrupt and incorruptible accounts of the 
past. This dialectic informs, Anderson may well say, how the living live through the nation-
form. So that if nation time (an ethical intuition) is a good or evil, the nation form is 
determination of ethics10. In turn the nation form regulates meanings of the ‘goodness’ of 
forgetting or remembering the past, the present and the future. The nation form informs what 
                                                          
7 Goswami critiques and clarifies Anderson’s appropriation of Banjamin’s notion of homogenous, empty time. 
At stake here is the notion of progress in capitalist/oppressive relations of production. For Goswami, Benjamin 
is concerned with historical development as dialectical (riddled with tension), so that Anderson ought to see 
the emergence of the modular nation form as also dialectical in real terms 
8 Time as form structures the possibility of subject-object dialectic, the possibility of knowledge of the world.    
9 In The Deaths of Hintsa, Premesh Lalu shows how readings of the black past in the present border on a false 
start – in the measure that one always confronts or is a product of a colonial archive.   
10 To the extent that the nation form structures, as Goswami (2002:785) has it, “collective identity” and 
political aspirations, Goswami will agree to think this form as national-temporally determined (determined 
through the coming of nationals); a form national-temporally determined, where national time is, I will add, an 
ethical intuition. This is to say a nation form is an ethical form, a determination of ethics.  
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aspect of the past is worth remembering or repressing, and even disavowing, for the sake of 
the nation present and its possible discontents.  
      *** 
Remembering the past is the mode of South African public deliberations, unsurprisingly. 
South Africans in general can choose what to remember of the past to ensure in the present 
the goodness of “reconciliation, development and social cohesion” (See Hamilton, 2011:119). 
South Africans can choose what to remember of the past to realise the innocence of the 
future. Hence Anderson will have us recall a South African ritual, the 1999 commemoration 
of a past, the commemoration of the ‘South African war’ to be precise. We ought to take 
seriously Thabo Mbeki’s participation in this commemoration, suggests Anderson. In 
Anderson Mbeki is aware of South Africa’s incomplete past. Mbeki knows of the past that 
often erects “hatred and rage” and all passions that are antithetical to the innocence of the 
future (Mbeki, 1999:1). Hence the necessity “to contain the destructive force of these 
passions”, for Mbeki. South Africans, on Mbeki’s account, “took the collective decision that 
we will manage all our pains by admitting the wrongs we had done [and] would acknowledge 
that the wrongs we had done were wrongs” (Mbeki, 1999:1).  
Mbeki parades the vital pronoun ‘we’, invaluable for the coming or a possibility of 
‘friendship’, of ‘human solidarity’. Invaluable in the coming of friendship “with HRH the 
Duke of Kent, as well as representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and 
other countries that supplied some of the fighting forces of the British Empire”. ‘We’ is 
friendship, reconciliation with the world. Friendship in the midst of all, “the lingering pain 
some of us might still bear”, the memory of “a terrible conflict in which many perished”. The 
coming friendship (which is now) is “born of mutual respect and a common adherence to the 
vision of freedom and human dignity for all” (Mbeki, 1999:1).  
Is Mbeki simply shrewd (a politician doing what is necessary to achieve nationalist goals), 
repressing the irrepressible (disavowing ‘a past’ as such)? Anderson says nothing on this 
score. Save to see in Mbeki’s extension of friendship to the world “a time in the future (two 
generations?) when even apartheid will be remembered as a ‘national tragedy’, which must 
be simultaneously remembered and forgotten by all South Africans” (Anderson, 2011:113). 
Anderson may well be reading Ernest Renan, that “the essence of a nation is that all 
individuals have many things in common and also that they have forgotten many things” 
(1996:3). In Mbeki, for Anderson, friendship (of) with the world is a case of “concord”, in 
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Aristotle’s terms, a sphere of “common interest and what is important for life” (1962:257). 
Friendship, implies Anderson, is a necessary, mediate position (median value) towards 
responsibility for the innocence of the future.  
Whether Mbeki’s gesture of friendship with the world is a play of politics need not over-
burden us. Still, we ought to consider vigorously the ideal of friendship, quite vigorously 
when friendship is begotten of “common adherence to” a notion (or idea) of freedom. The 
ideal of friendship must, of course, provoke the age-old problematic of who and what  has 
capacity for friendship. Is it the human that has capacity for friendship? What about the 
animal?’ Could it be that a way of thinking friendship is an interrogation of human-animal 
relations? Perhaps becoming a national is another way of reading oneself alongside the 
animal. The ritual of animal sacrifice anchors after all the very possibility of humans having, 
consecrating the innocence of a shared future. The trick of course is what constitutes the 
‘idea’ of an animal or a human being and, by implication, what/which animal is worth 
sacrificing or preserving. At issue is what constitutes human-animal relations, what 
constitutes in Foucault’s parlance the significance of reason, of ‘life’, ‘labour’ and ‘language’ 
(Foucault, 1970). Supposing humans have the capacity for reason (life, labour and language), 
this capacity may well become an index for reading the human-animal complex.  
This complex (the constitution of the human-animal complex), suffice it to say, is a 
motif in the dramatic emergence of the white settler in seventeenth century South Africa. It is 
a settler’s rallying point of debate, the measure of natives resembling animals against 
humans. In the first instance, then, the settler-native ‘relation’ is an expression of a subject-
object dialectic – the subject determining the object (the native), or the subject becoming a 
determination of the object – in which determining an object may express a will or desire to 
know it – or, in Nietzsche’s phrase, a “will to power” (Nietzsche, 1968). What, then, does 
determining an object or a subject in a settler colony entail? What does it entail when we 
wish to understand the nature of human-animal ‘relation’? Can we, following Quayson, say 
the terror of colonial violence “counts for both the perpetrators as well as the victims of 
violence because there is a sense in which the perpetrators were themselves pawning their 
humanity on behalf of the then dominant order?” I name and interrogate the conditions of 
subject-object determinations’ possibility. Interrogate and determine whether these conditions 
are epistemic or politico-economic and so on. Determine how these conditions ought to 
inform our readings of a human-animal complex in a colonial situation. 
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My concern, properly speaking, is a formal elaboration on the object (the native-cum-
black), through Marx’s commodity-form in Capital. I read in the black a kind of commodity, 
whose life-form (time as such) in the Union is an index and a determination of white (the 
Subject’s) labour time. This labour time is indefinite, I contend, and thus occasions in 
blackness (the coming of the slavery, the colony, apartheid, and post-apartheid) a place of/for 
sorrow. The Union black is in anguish11, in short, and must choose either to “shout-hoarse” or 
remain silent. He could confront the terror of Union (white labour) time, to the point of death 
– failing which his/her confrontational efforts betray mere sublation (the simultaneous 
destruction and preservation) of this terror. The place of sorrow is quite ineffable, though an 
expressive line of critique of vulgar (white) humanism. The place of sorrow expresses what I 
call the longing for an ethical-in-black.  
     *** 
How is the ethical-in-black thinkable, though? And where is the place of morality in 
this thinking? The ethics/morality matrix is traceable in western Philosophy, say by way of 
Hegel. We may locate a similar matrix in liberation philosophy (and theology), through 
Enrique Dussel, from whom I benefit more. Dussel reads in morality a moment of the 
contingent, the arbitrary (the merely functional), a mere determination of the social. “By 
ethics (”the ethical, and so on – of Greek derivation”, on the other hand, he  “denote[s] the 
future order of liberation, the demands of justice with respect to the poor, the oppressed and 
their project of salvation” ((1985:28). Right/Good or Wrong/Evil, on this account, betrays the 
balance of un/just forces (bourgeoisie against the poor in the case of bourgeois sociality). 
Goodness (holiness) is a determination of the Godhead, expressive of the poor, their struggle 
against the “praxis of domination” (18). Evil on the other hand is originary sacrilege, the 
moment of envy, the event of spilling the blood of a brother, the manner of Cain spilling the 
blood of Abel in the Hebrew Bible. Evil is the “praxis of domination”, the production of 
death), and marks the being of the “prince of this world”.  
     *** 
Evil is the place of the political in the Union of South Africa. The Union black sees in 
the Union a form of evil, through which the Union becomes the realisation of the white 
Godhead, for whom the native is the mark of sin. Evil, for the Union black, loses its ethical 
                                                          
11 See Mudimbe (1994) 
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purchase, mutates into the realm of the political. What is goodness, though, for the Union 
black? Justifiably, the Union black – I contend – could suspend the category of goodness 
itself, since goodness is conceptually unfruitful (evil cannot determine goodness), so that life-
in-black in the Union becomes a non-object of mere ethical evaluations. Blackness in the 
present (in the Union) is beyond goodness as such. The ethical in the present is a question of 
the political, is an object of his/her longing, the possibility of (the struggle against) political 
evil. The Union black does not do way with ethics, however. Ethics is a space of deliberation, 
of speech, of soul elaboration, possible by way of the black (the national), the measure of 
moral (rational) instinct. Morality, for our purposes (we depart from Dussel), is pre-
discursive. Union black is a meta-ethicist, a moral critic of the ethical.  
     ***  
I return to the problem of human-animal relation, alongside natives becoming black/national. 
Becoming national is partly-unthinkable outside the notion of publicness12. Consider Anton 
Lembede in the 1940s, for instance. Lembede ‘shouts’ at the white world (the Union of South 
Africa), publicly disbelieving a possible realisation of universal brotherhood in a colonial 
time. Lembede demands freedom in his ‘life time’. Or, in what is a related thing, Lembede 
demands the beginning of meat eating (the radicalisation of anti-vegetarianism) in the 
Union’, a critique of mere bone-eating if he is not dog (Lembede in Edgar and Msumza, 
1996:100). I single out Lembede for one reason. Possibly, he is near-a perfect exemplar of 
‘black shouting’ (black public/political voice) in the Union of South Africa in the first half of 
the twentieth century. He emerges at the cusp of the so called elite nativism (African 
nationalism) in the colonised world. So that to think Lembede’s political thought (my key 
concern in In the colony (Either/or)) is in some ways akin to evaluating native nationalist 
thought, its significance on my reading a human-animal relation in a colonial situation.  
Now: often, post-colonial evaluations of ‘elite’ nativism are a case of thinking missionary-
educated ‘natives’, their angst under colonial conditions. A case of a crisis in ‘native’ self 
expression, the crisis of expressing natives’ political aspirations (yearning for ‘freedom’ and 
so forth) (See Spivak, 2012; Lazarus, 1999); a case of whether elite natives have the people’s 
best interest at heart, or whether we should see in native ‘elite’ politics a reproduction of 
colonial relations of power, namely the re-creation of bourgeois social formation. So, in the 
                                                          
12 The notion of publicness should for our purposes here presuppose an open expression of a people’s political 
interests in a socio-political formation. 
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immediate I have no intention of simply subjecting Lembede to this question (whether or not 
he reproduces colonial relations of power), important though the question may be. Rather, I 
will tarry with Lembede’s notion of ‘freedom in our life time’ and read in his meat-eating 
metaphor a critique of a white union orgy (a festivity of having the native, the animal-man, 
for an object of sacrifice). Lembede’s meat-eating (sorcery) is endless, if the Union orgy 
continues ad infinitum. In fact, the orgy would continue: for if the orgy abates, “its demise 
will not be credited only to the account of moral standards -- because moral stan-dards should 
not count or keep accounts, to be sure, but also because, on the scale which is that of a 
worldwide computer, the law of the mar-ketplace will have imposed another standard of 
calculation” (Derrida, 1985:296). Lembede’s sorcery, I argue, is revenge against white ethics, 
Utilitarianism (the doctrine of usefulness, the use of the black skin, a basis for the production 
of greatest amount of happiness in the world). Lembede’s revenge (meat-eating), of course, 
betrays in the Union black a possible moment of blood-spilling, of sacrificing animals in the 
Union. A non-vegetarian moment, what is more, of sacrificing oneself for one’s freedom, for 
one’s brothers. These acts of sacrifice could index the Union black’s struggle against political 
evil (the praxis of white self-justification). And yet this struggle is neither a measure of 
ethical good nor evil (Lembede in Edgar and Msumza, 1996).  
I am interested in the significance of Lembede’s meat-eating metaphor when we read it 
alongside the blacks/ethics matrix13. The native becoming national regulates my thinking of 
this matrix in politics. So that blacks do ethics if these ethics articulate, inter-alia, a 
friendship-freedom axis. Let us return to Mbeki: Friendship is “born of mutual respect and a 
common adherence to the vision of freedom and human dignity for all” (1999:1). Thinking 
friendship constitutes, in a phrase, a hermeneutic of freedom. Since at a basic level friendship 
is “sharing” (despairing: remembering and hoping for) “all in common”, reading a blacks-
ethics matrix – we should say – is interrogating the notion of the ‘common’ (the idea of 
publicness), its articulation of freedom.  
A concrete path of thinking the freedom-friendship complex is reading a black auto-
biography, life-in-black in the Union of South Africa. Peter Abrahams’s Tell Freedom merits 
a mention. If Lembede wants freedom (to eat meat) in his life time, Abrahams longs to tell 
and taste freedom – as if it were here and not there, beyond the horizon. Abrahams indexes 
his ‘long walk to freedom’, the scale of his friendship – the possibility of friendship with 
                                                          
13 Ethics, I reiterate, is what blacks do, while the ethical-in-black is an expression of longing. 
16 
 
blacks or whites (Abrahams, 1954). If, put differently, longing for friendship (living in the 
common) is a moral determination, a qualitative measure of friendship and its (im)possibility 
becomes necessary in our reading of the blacks-ethics matrix. I outline in The Violence on 
Love the (im)possible types of friendships in a colonial situation, a way to specify how 
becoming black (national) is an index of longing for the ethical, a way to show the conditions 
of possibility of blacks doing ethics.  
Longing, of course, is a labour of soul-styling. So that thinking a national is at once an 
aesthetic practice. Becoming national may well be an aesthetic determination, then. At once 
we must ask how longing articulates the possible beauty of or sublime nature of voice or 
black speech (black shouting), and how soul-styling is possibly vehicular, a source-courier of 
shouting itself. What of silence, though? In a black shout (in Peter Abrahams and Anton 
Lembede) you will possibly hear a type of voice, a male voice. What is the nature of this 
voice? How does it articulate forms of black silence? And how do speech and silence inform 
our understanding of friendship and freedom? Is silence necessarily female, since male voices 
in the first half of the twentieth century seem to monopolise the ‘public sphere’, the 
newspaper for example?  
And if silence or shouting is a sexed category, it may well be that black longing is a moment 
of ‘bodily’ (sexed) movement. To shout or keep silence is a movement (or stillness) of the 
black-skin. How we imagine this stillness, this movement and the idea of publicness ought to 
be our concern. An aesthetic reading of longing (longing: a source of shouting in Lembede 
and Abrahams, an articulation of black-skin movements in the Union of South Africa) ought 
to explore, I make clear in Gnos-thetics unto Death, a coupling of song and dance. And such 
a reading helps us fiddle with the gender/race/class discourse, helps rethink (in passing) the 
modern concepts of social analysis. This chapter interrogates the interstices of 
sound/dance/black and sound/dance/sex. In defence of longing for the ethical-in-black, it 
moves beyond dated race-class conceptual debate. My point: originary sociology (in its 
concerns with industrial society) fails to grapple with black shouts and silences.  
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In the colony (Either/or)  
 
If I am confronting a false father who has imposed 
a false word on me, what sort of memory am I 
rejecting? This has long been the case in 
colonised Black Africa: having been drilled from 
textbooks that speak of our ancestors, the 
“Gauls,” what happens when you wake up and 
discover that your ancestors were not the Gauls? 
Do you remain silent – or shout yourself hoarse 
(Mudimbe, 1994:192)? 
For the colonised black, waking up is neither late nor timely. Always, his/her sleep is 
half. He senses, at once to wake up to, the pressing (if immediate) presence of horror, the 
terror of a “false father”. Waking up is the apprehension of political immediacy, 
apprehension of danger. Waking up forms the mediate-ness of black gnosis: a way of ‘living’ 
(thinking) through danger.   
In this wakefulness the black has two options. Wakefulness, says Mudimbe, is a 
moment of shouting hoarse or remaining silent. For Mudimbe, shouting hoarse, confronting a 
false father – becoming, say, fugitive – is a labour of “negative knowledge (sorcery)”. 
Negative knowledge (for blacks) is insufficiently constitutive of doing ethics, though: for the 
black must search further still, the whereabouts of the “true father”. Or, gestures Mudimbe by 
way of Bernadette Cailler, the black must posit, run and turn to the “love” and “power” of the 
grandmother. This love, this power functions properly when in the grandmother the black 
recognises a “sign of play”: “the depository and matrix of the memory of the family, the 
social group, and the community” (197).  
A sign of play: structures the black’s memory of the grandmother’s speech, becoming 
a bridge to “positive knowledge” (“wisdom”), the “re-actualisation of what was and what will 
be again, at one and the same time as testimony and as a game of history” (197). “Positive 
knowledge” is a determination of Maternal Care, in other words. It is a play on history, 
makes possible the tarrying with African sediments (African everyday practices, creeping 
into a colonial situation, for better or worse) to regulate apprehensions of danger.   
African sediments (myths and fables, say) suffer epistemic indeterminacy, of course 
(Positive knowledge is not a case of certitude about everything past). Hence, in myths and 
fables, Mudimbe (1991) reads things without a truth value, things relatively autonomous from 
(though constituent of) any social formation. Hence Mudimbe finds comfort in “Husserl’s 
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radical doubt [anti-historicism]...the acceptance that the affirmation of truth [in relation to the 
past] is merely an assertion of a subjective proposition that only reflects our individual 
experiences – and, consequently, that its normative force is only a mirage” (195). “Mere 
reflections of individual experiences”, or knowledge of the past pouring into now, is not the 
basis for an ethical (normative) life. And yet, they betray the colonised black’s longing for a 
normative life. So that African sediments may regulate, for blacks, a longing for the ethical 
and, as such, regulate black gnosis.   
*** 
To reiterate, longing for an ethical-in-black is a determination of waking up, of an 
Either/or (a disjunctive conjunction). The black could shout hoarse or remain silent (or both). 
Or, what is the same thing, the black could, I argue in what follows, shout hoarse or keep 
silence at the same instant, non-contradictorily. For the shout and silence are quantitatively 
non-equivalent. On the other hand, though, either the black shouts or keeps silence – since 
doing both is qualitatively redundant, since shouting and remaining silent, I argue, are 
qualitatively equivalent. It is immaterial here whether the black shouts or keeps silence: he 
may well remain and find comfort in silence if he wants to, since shouting makes no 
difference – or vice-verse (shouting itself is silence and silence shouting). This dialectic 
(qualitative redundancy/equivalence and quantitatively non-equivalence), its significance, 
leads me to Kierkegaard’s Either/or, an algorithm of ethics.   
Either/or is an affair with despair, the darkest of all nights. How, asks Kierkegaard, is 
confronting despair possible? Two options. First. We may wallow in aesthetics, a case of 
living through unhappiness. In Book One (of Either/or), an unhappy person (a poet, author A 
in Either/or) “thinks” and “lives aphoristically”, fears life and not death. For life is the 
“greatest misfortune”, the misfortune of living in finitude (in worldly time). Though hopeful 
for a ‘future’, the poet hopes not for it in the present: for, hoping presently is non-poetic – is 
to hope in nothing. This poet likens himself to a “voluptuously beautiful woman in a harem, 
reclining on a sofa in her allure, not caring for anything in the world” (50), presently 
remembering or hoping for nothing. He hopes for eternity, since such is hoping outside time 
itself (where time is still) (47). He will not remember the past, since the past is yet to come. 
And if the past is yet to come (hence worth hoping for), his future already is past (not worth 
hoping for). The poet lives in eternal irony. 
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The poet mocks the merely ‘happy individual’, the idiot. The idiot – always unaware 
of his finitude – becomes “comical”: labouring, gaining him/herself to lose him/herself in 
turn (necessarily). The idiot self-commits, say, either to marriage or bachelorhood, ignorant 
of the fact, namely: all commitment is a bridge to utter regret. All commitment is the mere 
ethical, mere ephemeral, a moment in wakefulness. Hence the poet prefers sleep over 
wakefulness. Waking “up in the morning” he goes “straight back to bed”, for “when I sleep I 
never dream”, since “that would be pity, for sleeping is the highest of genius” (48). Dreaming 
and wakefulness are one and the same form of living. So that, in the poet, a dreamless sleep is 
synonymous with perfection (a still moment, eternal movement). In Book One then, 
dreaming as living in finitude, for the poet, is a kind of hoping and remembering presently. 
Hence dreaming is the sphere of the ethical.  
So, should ‘humans’ cease dreaming (leading an ordinary existence) so that a poetic 
(an aesthetic) life might abound? No, says Author B in Book Two of Either/or, a warning 
letter (an alternative option of dealing with despair) to the poet, the aesthetician in Book One. 
For B, a letter is an ethical form, medium of confronting good and evil. In his letter, B recoils 
from the poet’s mere aesthetics, complicity with evil. The non-ethical poet in Book One, says 
B, nearly swallows himself up (ceases living), since all he longs for is a dreamless sleep, care 
for nothing – save wallowing in mere despair (reflected sorrow, “a doubt of personality”), 
imagining the unrealisable beauty of eternity. Hope in eternity, for B, is not antithetical to 
ethics. To live ethically, to hope in the future in the present, is to be eternally valid. In B, a 
good life (living in eternal validity) is a question of choice (historical necessity/force aside). 
A question of choice, deliberately (absolutely) choosing oneself, running in despair’s 
direction, as if to a long slope – only to cross over it into a space of personal “validity”, a 
place of clarity. Wallowing in despair (perpetual regret in spite of oneself) borders on 
spiritual cowardice, purposeless “relativity” (living for mere “possibilities”). Borders living 
in a kind of purgatory, leading nowhere near a happy unhappiness.   
The poet, for B, ought to choose himself if he longs for a happy unhappiness. For, 
already, (before the beginning of his subjectivity) the poet exists absolutely. Choosing 
himself, the poet would choose what exists already, would choose true happiness (a happy 
unhappiness), a determination of consciousness of his absolute existence. He would be 
happy, in spite of objective sorrow (an ontological misfortune, since objective sorrow 
structures social life). And in this dialectic of choice, of choosing himself amid objective 
sorrow, the poet ought to apprehend the self through sensing good and evil. Objective sorrow 
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is the very principle of being, of existence (a structure of becoming), and constitutes capacity 
for choosing good or evil. This capacity, a principle of will, in turn regulates the self’s 
apprehension of objective sorrow.  
Objective sorrow, then, conditions hoping absolutely, hoping in eternal goodness. By 
no means, though, does hoping in eternal goodness obviate an aesthetic existence, for B. 
Ethics constitute an aesthetic life. In B mere aesthetics is un-aesthetical, so to speak. Mere 
aesthetics is living in mere immediacy and lacks beauty – since it thrives on imagination, 
imagining eternity, but living not in its validity. Consider romantic love devoid of marriage, 
say. Love devoid of marriage is a movement in mere immediacy. Marriage, to be precise, 
validates love, concretises eternity and signifies the beautiful. Hence B will engage in “mortal 
combat” for the beautiful, only to safeguard his absolute hoping, hoping in goodness. 
Absolute hoping, although goodness is a state of being, beyond performance (beyond the 
realm of social action), beyond consequentialism, beyond Kantian duty. B will defend ethics 
at all costs.  
      *** 
Kierkegaard’s absolute hoping labours in the shadow of Hegel, whose system of 
Absolute Knowledge is (openly) an object of ridicule in Kierkegaard’s later works. 
Kierkegaard’s ridicule of Hegel is beyond the scope of this chapter. Still, here Kierkegaard 
gestures toward the possibility of ethical knowledge – Faith proper, knowledge of absolute 
freedom, similar to Hegel’s: you are free when, and only when, you know you are absolutely 
free. But what is this Kiekegaardian freedom?  
My reading of Kierkegaard is at once formal or substantive. Substantive, if 
Kierkegaard ethicises freedom, the (im) mortality of the European soul, the site and primacy 
of self-responsibility. Formal-methodical and substantive at the same instant, since 
Kierkegaard’s Either/or is a Concept, through which we may read the historical development 
of the world. Kierkegaard’s Either/or is a Concept (determination of being), rather than a 
mere a book title. 
     *** 
For my purposes, Either/or occasions a reading of Gaulian good and evil (Euro good 
and evil) and, by extension, a possible reading of Europe’s manifest destiny, the fulfilment of 
its “eternal validity”. Fulfilment of its eternal destiny, since (in Husserl’s parlance) Europe is 
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a ‘spirit’ and not a ‘geographical space’ per se. It is a spirit self-realising (self-manifesting) 
spatially, nonetheless. Not-accidentally, Kierkegaard ridicules Euro-Christendom, its 
bourgeoisie sensibility, its failure to take Faith seriously, its neglect of the Cross, its murder 
of Christ. Still, what does it matter if Christendom retained the cross? Will Christ obviate 
Europe’s manifest destiny? Idle questions, perhaps (for who knows who and what Christ is?) 
– save that I broach (through these questions) Euro-colonial ethics, an Either-or (to sacrifice 
or not sacrifice the African native, to enslave or to set him/her free and so on). Colonial 
ethics, I am saying here, produce at the same time a black Either/or: the black shouts hoarse 
or remains silent. The black Either/or (silence or a hoarse shout) is a principle, a logic-for-
black, a determination of a black objective (national) sorrow. It constitute (qualitatively) the 
very soul of the black folk, articulates (to reiterate) the longing for an ethical-in-black.   
Now: the qualitative significance of an Either/or (of shouting hoarse or remaining 
silent) – a gesture toward thinking black objective sorrow – merits a concerted elaboration. 
And I rely on Du Bois’s reading of black objective sorrow, its singularity in the Soul of the 
Black Folk. Thinking apprehensions of sorrow in the black is partly a formal concern for Du 
Bois, a critique of vulgar universality, whiteness as such. He asks: “Will America be poorer if 
she replaces her brutal dyspeptic blundering with light-hearted but determined Negro 
humility?” Will America substitute “the loving jovial good-humour” for “her coarse and cruel 
wit”? Or “the soul of the Sorrow Songs” for “her vulgar music”. For Du Bois, Black 
objective sorrow forms The Soul of Black Folk and its (dis) unity. Objective sorrow, in Du 
Bois, has passion – flaps the cover of blackness: a Veil. A veil Du Bois will raise, once and 
for all, “that you may view faintly its deeper recesses,—the meaning of its religion...and the 
struggle of its greater souls”.  
Black objective sorrow, then, becomes apprehendible when we examine sorrow’s 
black forms of expression, religious music in particular. Hence, beginning “each chapter [in 
The Soul of the Black Folk], as now printed, stands a bar of the Sorrow Songs,—some echo of 
haunting melody from the only American music which welled up from black souls in the dark 
past”. Du Bois in full:   
The Music of Negro religion is that plaintive rhythmic melody, with its 
touching minor cadences, which, despite caricature and defilement, still 
remains the most original and beautiful expression of human life and 
longing yet born on American soil. Sprung from the African forests, where 
its counterpart can still be heard, it was adapted, changed, and intensified 
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by the tragic soul-life of the slave, until, under the stress of law and whip, it 
became the one true expression of a people’s sorrow, despair, and hope. 
Finally the Frenzy of “Shouting,” when the Spirit of the Lord passed by, 
and, seizing the devotee, made him mad with supernatural joy, was the last 
essential of Negro religion and the one more devoutly believed in than all 
the rest. It varied in expression from the silent rapt countenance or the low 
murmur and moan to the mad abandon of physical fervour, —the stamping, 
shrieking, and shouting, the rushing to and fro and wild waving of arms, the 
weeping and laughing, the vision and the trance. All this is nothing new in 
the world, but old as religion, as Delphi and Endor. And so firm a hold did 
it have on the Negro, that many generations firmly believed that without 
this visible manifestation of the God there could be no true communion with 
the Invisible (Du Bois,2007:80).  
 
More precise, the music of the Negro religion expresses (regulate the sensing of) black 
objective sorrow. Anxiously, Du Bois erects a complex of form and truth, truth and violence: 
the madness of ‘joy’ (the Frenzy of Negro shouting), “under the stress of the law and the 
whip”, a true (authentic) form – true when it is an immediate (necessary) determination of 
violent America. Madness (a bodily-dramatisation as such), suggests Du Bois, mediates the 
slave’s communion with the invisible (the indeterminate), the slave’s encounter with “God”. 
Or, in a similar manner, brings the slave closer to the Idea of (im) possible freedom. In Du 
Bois, the more pronounced the madness (prior emancipation), the more extant thoughts of 
(un)freedom, as if Du Bois expresses the slave’s unequivocal suffering, the only gift to 
American civilisation.14   
Du Bois pre-echoes Mudimbe. He broaches the hoarse shout(Frenzy Shout)-silence 
(“the silent rapt countenance or the low murmur and moan”) matrix. As if to elaborate on the 
significance of Negro religious forms, their move from silence to shouting. He reads these 
forms alongside black ‘reflected sorrow’ (apprehensions of objective sorrow). Partly, then: 
                                                          
14 Elsewhere, I show the possible significance of this joy, the madness: in the new world, the slave celebrates 
(by way of Ring Shout) ‘incoherent bonds’ with his/her ancestor. The Shout posits “musical individuality within 
[slave] collectivity” (Floyd, 2002:52). It points to a common present – that of negativity, becoming a stranger in 
a foreign land. The Ring Shout: here the slave hops up, down in a trance, violently shifting his/her body 
sideways, turning around, leading, chanting, singing a spiritual (It seems to matter in some slave circles 
whether a clockwise or anti-clockwise Shout is an appropriate expressive form. What form gains an upper-
hand is possibly a carry-over [from West Africa, say] into the new world. In the new world, the carry-over gains 
new symbolism. For instance: to imagination, an anti-clockwise may well point to a critique of progress, of 
slavery in time, may well symbolise struggle – so that the magnitude of “madness of joy” in the slave is a 
determination of his suffering [new conditions of existence]). Another slave sings melancholically, as if wishful 
to forget Africa and possibly ‘make do’ with the New World. Over time, he/she may convert to Christianity, 
appropriates the Shout, give it a new a Christian significance (a form of communing with the invisible). 
Conversion to Christianity could intensify, of course, “the foundations of proto-nationalist consciousness and 
at the same time occasion “a universalist offer of forgiveness and ultimate reconciliation to white America” 
(Stuckey, 1987:24).    
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Du Bois’s reading of black apprehensions of objective sorrow is a methodical ruse. If slavery 
is the source of black (objective) sorrow, “what” then “did slavery mean to the African 
savage?” he asks. “What was [the slave’s] attitude toward the World and Life? What seemed 
to him good and evil,—God and Devil? Whither went his longings and strivings, and 
wherefore were his heart-burnings and disappointments?” Answer: you need only read 
“Negro religion as a development”, suggests Du Bois, “through its gradual changes from the 
heathenism of the Gold Coast to the institutional Negro church of Chicago”. 
Inquiring into a Negro religion and its development (from the “silent rapt” to the 
“mad abandon of physical fervour”), Du Bois gestures toward negative/positive knowledge 
axis – arrogating (it seems to me) to silence the black enquiry into Maternal Care, and to a 
shout the black negating the master. Recall our initial intention: we ought to see still, see how 
the black (living in objective sorrow) can shout hoarse and remain silent at the same instant. 
To see this possibility (shouting hoarse and remaining silent at the same instant), demands we 
read in a hoarse shout/or silence a critique of the colony, the colony’s creation of value. 
      *** 
A hoarse shout/silence is value (a return), in the first instance. It is a return from a 
method (to recall Du Bois’s wip and the law) of violating the native beyond suture, imposing 
a ‘false word’ on him/her. Let us put it another way: a shout/silence is return value, a 
determination of exchange value (the native becoming an object, a mere commodity). The 
shout-silence matrix, then, calls for a visit to Marx’s Capital (an exposé of ‘bourgeois 
philistinism’). In Capital, Marx tells of a materialist emergence of exchange value. The 
production of an object (and the market for its destination) is the emergence of exchange 
value (a property of a commodity form), for Marx. “If commodities could speak” [or shout], 
says Marx, “they would say this: our use value may interest men, but it does not belong to us 
as objects. What does belong to us as objects, however, is our value. Our own intercourse as 
commodities proves it. We relate to each other merely as exchange values...Riches are the 
attribute of man, value is the attribute of commodities. A man or a community is rich, a peal 
or a diamond is valuable as a peal or diamond” (Marx, 1990:176) 15 . In the other 
commodities, put another way, one commodity form (exchange value) expresses its relational 
status, its value-ness. 
                                                          
15 I owe the specificity of this quotation to Fred Moten (2003), whose work (blacks as speaking commodities) I 
engage in the penultimate chapter.  
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Properly speaking, though, exchange value is intelligible, for Marx – intelligible when 
we think its universal form. A commodity (say a table) must self-express in universal terms, 
in its universal equivalent, namely the money form. However: the money form (in its 
particular materiality) is, on Marx’s account, an arbitrary standard (representation) of the 
commodity’s ‘magnitude of value’ – since the money form could simply, materially self-
express in silver or gold, or any other object. There is nothing essential to silver or gold as a 
measure of exchange value.   
Aside the arbitrariness of the money form’s materiality, the money form is not merely 
“imaginary” (185), a contingent human invention. The money-form is beyond contingent, for 
Marx: the money form is a “necessary form of appearance of the measure of value...the social 
incarnation of human labour” (188/192). For all to see, Marx parades the commodity’s 
common descent, namely: labour time. So that the commodity form (if we return to the 
native-commodity and thus add to Marx) conditions our seeing in the violent colonial method 
the expending of the colony’s abstract labour power: a method in which the coloniser 
(subject) creates/determines the colonised (the native-object) 16, drags the object (with or 
without its consent) to the market place. The object acquires exchange status (false word, a 
name), by way of a universal equivalent (the money form). The money form measures the 
value of coloniser’s labour power itself: the condition for the production of the colonised, 
commodity-forms. More: the money form betrays all commodities’ qualitative equality17 
(commonality), if they are “realised human labour”, or (in our case) determinations of 
colonial labour time.  
The money form is value itself, however. In Marx, the money form is use value in its 
materiality (silver or gold, for example). Gold, says Marx, is use value, since you could with 
it patch a broken tooth, produce from (and by) it an exotic artefact and so on. Gold, however, 
becomes exchange value (commodity) when its producers drag it to the market place. Gold 
becomes exchange value when it is comparable to its universal equivalent, the money form 
(Gold takes on the money form {becomes value, a commodity}, when it is exchangeable for 
money itself, whose material base could in turn be gold or silver or any other metal). Gold 
                                                          
16 Needless to say: the colony produces/determines the colonised. This is true, since the predicate term is 
contained in the concept of the subject. Fanon has it as well: “It is the white man who creates the Negro” 
(1965:47). 
17 Marx: “The first main function of gold is to supply commodities with the material for the expression of their 
values, or to represent their values as magnitudes of the same denomination, qualitatively equal and 
quantitatively comparable. It thus acts as a universal measure of value, and only through performing this 
function does gold, the specific equivalent commodity, become money” (1990/188). 
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(taking on the money form), needless to say, is a determination of labour time. So that the 
money form this gold takes is a variable value, for Marx. This value fluctuates when the 
value of labour time (time of producing gold) fluctuates. Anything else constant, a decrease 
in the value of labour time (for producing gold) is, in Marx, a decrease in the value of gold 
(the value of the money form as such): it may take less time to produce gold, for instance, 
owing to (say) use of new mining techniques. Nonetheless: a decrease in the value of gold 
(the value of the money form itself) need not, cautions Marx, imply a decrease in the value of 
labour time (for producing another commodity, say, a table – for which the value of the 
money form is a universal equivalent). Need not imply a decrease in the value of labour time 
(for producing a table), in the same way that a decrease in the value of this labour time 
(owing to changes in production techniques, for example) need not lead to a decrease in the 
value of the money form.  
The variability of the money form, then, makes possible quantitative measure 
(pricing) of the commodity form. Commodity prices measure the value of labour time. They 
are not the value of labour time itself. So that, in spite of commodities’ qualitative equality 
(to the extent of their having labour time for common descent), two commodities (say a table 
and chair), could be worth different prices (could have unequal quantitative values), owing to, 
say, their differing use values. But, to recall Marx, commodities care little for their use values 
(use values after all are arbitrary: one could use a table for eating or sitting or dancing, 
etcetera). In short, prices in themselves do not bring the commodities into existence. What 
makes a commodity is – we said this already – the value of its producer’s labour time (which 
finds expression through the money form, its universal equivalent). What bring the 
commodity into existence are the immediate conditions of its production, labour power, to 
name one.  
Now: labour power in Marx is physical power: the human body in labour. Still, 
humans and not animals produce what already is in the mind. So that thinking power is a 
constituent of total labour power, so that total labour time (the condition of labour power) 
contains thinking time (a determination of the human soul, in which the creation of a 
commodity or any object of labour for that matter first finds expression). The money form 
(the universal equivalent of the commodity), then, ought to measure the value of thinking 
26 
 
time 18 as well. We could think thinking power (as constituent of thinking time) in this 
manner: consider a table producer imagining how to make a table-chair. The chair producer 
could stand still and think a table-chair (continuously, mentally work out a collection of 
simple and complex ideas which make up the ‘idea’ of a table-chair). He/she could take a 
while to work through the simplicity and complexity of these ideas, so that the matrix of 
simplicity and complexity of these ideas increase the duration of the thinking necessary to 
produce a table chair. In short, the actual production of a table-chair could require more time 
(duration) than the production of a mere table. In a related fashion, “it might seem that if the 
value of a commodity is determined by the quantity of labour expended to produce it, it 
would be the more valuable the more unskilful and lazy the worker who produced it, because 
he would need more time to complete the article” (Marx, 1990:129). The point is: the 
quantity of thinking (as part of labour power) is variable. Yet the quantity of thinking spent 
on a commodity production does not obviate commodities’ qualitative equivalence, to the 
extent that commodities have labour time for common descent.  
      *** 
How, then, do we think total labour time alongside the shout-silence matrix? Recall 
that a shout or silence comes (is a return) from the black (a commodity, an exchange value). I 
read in this matrix the coloniser’s thinking time (constituent of the total value of the 
coloniser’s labour time). Put differently, the native-commodity is partly a product of the 
coloniser’s psychic-mental labour power. The coloniser’s thinking time is a constituent of 
total labour time. By extension, the coloniser’s thinking power (power to project fantasies on 
the native) is a constituent of total labour power (including the power to create the native by 
way of physical violence). We know that in the native the coloniser (‘the human being’) sees 
an animal (what appears strange to them)19, whom he/she must violate.  
The notion of animality in colonial circles is a key point of discussion, a fundamental 
parameter, an organising principle of colonial violence. The notion of animality is the point 
                                                          
18 The fact that the labourer in Marx is alienated need not mean the labourer uses not his/her mind or is 
simply unskilled. “A commodity may be the product of the most skilled labour, but its value, by equating it to 
the product of simple unskilled labour, represents a definite quantity of the latter labour alone”, so that “for 
simplicity ‘sake we shall henceforth account every kind of labour to be unskilled, simple labour” 
(Marx,1990:136).    
19 See Mbembe (2001:236) on the native as an animal: “As an animal, the native is supposed to belong to the 
family of eminently mechanical, almost physical things, without language, even though endowed with sense 
organs, veins, muscles, nerves, and arteries through which nature, in its virginal power, manifest itself. Placed 
at the margins of the human, the native, with the animal, belongs to the register of imperfection, error, 
deviation, approximation, corruption, and monstrosity”.  
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of a ‘civilised’ talk: how to turn the animal into a commodity (alongside an ox20, a horse, a 
donkey, a dog and so forth), how best to drag the native to the market (how to consummate 
the native’s blackness), how best to determine the commodity’s price tag (a quantitative 
measure) – how, in simple terms, the coloniser quantitatively measures the value of the 
native. It seems necessary that the coloniser classifies the native-come-animal-come-
commodity. The coloniser ought to know: does the native appear strong or weak physically, 
does he shout hoarse or remain silent on his way towards the market? The coloniser may well 
measure the hoarseness of his shouts, if the native shouts. The coloniser may well measure 
the impact of the native’s silence, should the native remain silent. Asks the coloniser, what is 
more: Is this native a domestic or wild animal21, or hovers somewhere in between? Or, rather, 
can the native (has he the capacity to) ‘read’ or ‘write’ humanely? Only then will the 
coloniser appropriate the money-form (the native-come-animal-come-commodity’s universal 
equivalent), put on the native a price tag (the price tag does measure the use-type of 
commodity, to reiterate). In the last instance, the money form, by way of a price tag, is a 
“necessary form of appearance of the measure of value” (188/9) of his (the coloniser’s) 
labour time.  
However, the money form partially succeeds in representing the coloniser’s total 
labour time. Partially succeeds, since the money form represent total labour time, represents 
labour time only if labour time is finite. Under normal (general) conditions of production (the 
production of a table-chair, for instance), one could sell his/her labour power for a while (for 
                                                          
20 Observe a Bantustan kindergarten calypso (in Sepedi): 
 
Ke nna Tonki 
Ke as Soma 
Ga ke sa busa Moya 
Ditomo – Wa, Wa, Wa 
Samboko – Vu,Vu,Vu 
Hai!  
Kakata, Kakata, Kakata... 
    (my translation) 
A donkey, I am 
I work and work 
I hold no breath 
Reins on my back – Wa, Wa, Wa 
Sjambok – Vu, Vu, Vu 
Hai 
I gallop on end (Kakata, Kakata, Kakata...)  
21 Mbembe goes as far as suggesting that the domesticity or wildness of the animal (the native) is the basis for 
colonial conviviality, that is, “conviviality as an act of venality” – for the native’s wildness or domesticity 
justifies the coloniser’s attitude toward the native, the coloniser’s “appropriation” and “utilisation” of the 
native-animal.        
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a specified period of time for a wage/salary), since to sell it indefinitely will, in Marx, amount 
to selling him/herself into slavery. Nonetheless: there obtains (in a colonial situation) unique 
conditions of production (here we depart from Marx). The coloniser’s working life takes on a 
different turn when he produces the colonised. The coloniser must expend his/her labour 
power indefinitely, if he will satisfy his material and psychic needs, if she is to save herself 
and remain universally/eternally valid (or free, what is the same thing). He is enslaved to his 
future needs (material and psychical). He is enslaved to his eternal freedom. Hence the 
necessity of the coloniser’s future labour time.  
The money form (the wage and the surplus), then, cannot represent the total value of 
the coloniser’s labour time (of producing the colonised) – for, as we say following Marx, the 
money form (a universal equivalent) represents/values not future-labour time. We could, of 
course, represent the value of future labour time – only if, to recall Kierkegaard, the future is 
past. But the past in not past – the past is yet to come, says Kierkegaard. The money form 
cannot represent the value of labour time (the production of the colonised) as past time – 
since the past is yet to come. At first appearance, then, to have the money form represent the 
indefinite colonial labour time is to have the money form suspend sense, necessity. It is to 
have the money form perform signs and wonders.      
This performance (the money form’s defying of Aristotelian-logic) is not an illusion, 
sure. For, on some level, to represent the value of indefinite labour time is well within a 
horizon of possibility. The notion of the animal, you will recall, is input to (a parameter in) 
the violent method of producing the commodity (the black). This notion, of course, remains 
(post putting the native on the market) extant in the colonist’s consciousness. My point: The 
coloniser’s notion of the animal determines (in the coloniser’s mind) the fate of the native: 
whether the native remains a commodity (and what kind). Consider, for a moment, the native 
(animal in the coloniser’s mind) suddenly resembling a ‘human being’, perhaps owing to the 
native’s newly found faith in the coloniser’s doctrine of dignity of committed leisure 
(reading, writing, etcetera), or the dignity of purposive labour (see Coetzee, 1989; De cock, 
1996:9-10)22. The coloniser could grant the native voting rights, freedom of movement, teach 
the colonised how to read and write, teach the colonised how to shout ‘humanely’ or remain 
silent. The native, then, becomes a light-seeing native.  
                                                          
22 In the next chapter, in the fashion of Coetzee’s reading of the supposed native animality, I make sense of 
native responses to their supposed animality.        
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This native is an object of the coloniser’s enjoyment, perhaps an index of the 
coloniser’s cultural and spiritual achievement. Animality remains the criterion of indexing the 
native’s progress (cultural development). The native progresses (is ‘freer’), only if he/she is 
on the path of the coloniser’s humanity 23 . The native’s progression from animality to 
humanity indexes the coloniser’s vision of him/herself. Colonial (or the coloniser’s) humanity 
is eternally valid. It is the principle, an absolute standard24, the measure of the newly acquired 
native humanity. The coloniser is more indefinite than the indefiniteness of his labour time 
(the perpetual production of the native-commodity). So that the coloniser (his very thought) is 
the absolute-universal equivalent (he is the new money form25) and represents the value of 
his indefinite labour time.  
Now: you ought to undo (destroy) the coloniser to cancel the indefiniteness of her 
labour time. This way you negate the native’s colonial humanity itself (black objective 
sorrow), the determination of the coloniser’s indefinite labour time. 
      *** 
How, then, is destroying the coloniser’s indefinite labour and its determination (im) 
possible? First: the category ‘humanity’, its emergence and conceptual implications, merits a 
brief re-elaboration (nearly as we have done already, by way of colonial humanity). Let us 
read Carl Schmitt (2008). And we read him circumspectly. In Schmitt, humanity is an 
“eighteenth-century humanitarian concept”, and emerges through the liberal doctrine of 
universality. It emerges, discredits and vandalises the feudal ideological (the pre-1879 
revolution) infrastructure. And yet, humanity itself is a non-political category. It precludes 
political social groupings, precludes class struggles and so on. Humanity is possible, “only 
when the real possibility of war is precluded...”. Still: that humanity, for instance, grounds the 
                                                          
23 Appadurai makes a related observation on the commodity. An object is a commodity merely because, 
among other things, it is commodity phase in its social-life history (of course, whether or not it has social life is 
a question of disputation as many thinkers have adduced). Once a commodity, it can on first appearance cease 
being this or that kind of a commodity – in the sense that its seller (or buyer) can sell it for other purposes than 
its “accustomed” (path) purpose (can divert selling a table for sitting to something else, sell it as an exotic 
artefact for example). Diversion of a commodity confers new value on the object, so that the process of 
diversion itself is a de-commoditisation as it is potentially an “intensification” of re-commoditisation. For our 
purposes here, converting the slave (animality) to a human being is a case of diverting the slave, shifting 
him/her from an accustomed value path.            
24 This is justifiable scientific principle, for the coloniser – for first principles make easier the carrying out of 
philosophical experiments, Heidegger teaches us (1962:27).   
25 The coloniser is Value itself. The coloniser’s humanity, the new universal equivalent, needs a different labour 
time (cultural time, if you will) to re-produce this humanity, his Value. Whether this value decreases or not, the 
Value of his indefinite labour time (the production of the slave) remains intact.  Decrease in the Value of 
his/her humanity need not, necessarily, affect the Value of his labour time, the exchange Value of the slave.  
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French revolution smacks of irony, implies Schmitt. Smacks of irony, since this revolution is, 
by definition, nationalist. The humanistic principle of freedom, equality and fraternity, for 
Schmitt, is a functionary of the state and its apparatus.   
Bourgeois liberalism was never radical in a political sense...it remains self-
evident that liberalism's negation of state and the political, its 
neutralizations, depoliticalizations, and declarations of freedom have 
likewise a certain political meaning, and in a concrete situation these are 
polemically directed against a specific state and its political power. But this 
is neither a political theory nor a political idea. Although liberalism has not 
radically denied the state, it has, on the other hand, neither advanced a 
positive theory of state nor on its own discovered how to reform the state, 
but has attempted only to tie the political to the ethical and to subjugate it 
to economics. It has produced a doctrine of the separation and balance of 
powers, i.e., a system of checks and controls of state and government. This 
cannot be characterized as either a theory of state or a basic political 
principle [emphasis mine]. 
Declarations of freedom. A moment – a utilitarian moment of politicisation by other means: 
de-politicisation. So that humanity, less surprisingly, is a fine ruse of “imperialist expansion”, 
self-arrays in the ideological apparel of “ethical-humanitarian[ism]”, peddling a ship of 
“economic imperialism”. An appeal to humanity is will-to-cheat, says Schmitt through 
Proudhon. Same thing: “To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a 
term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being 
human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity”. The humanitarian forces the enemy 
(foe) to accept his definition of humanity, has the enemy learn what it entails to behave (to 
shout or remain silent, for instance) rightly or wrongly. The humanitarian projects an aura of 
neutral if naive normative ethics, repressing a crass reality: that someone somewhere 
(wittingly or unwittingly) in the modern world is already a foe or a “friend”.   
In Schmitt, a friend-foe antithesis is an antagonism, a disjunction devoid of 
conjunction. It is simply an Either-or (Either someone is your friend or foe) and not an 
Either/or. It is a political antithesis. For Schmit, this anti-thesis is incommensurable with 
ethical or aesthetic Either/or’s, namely good or evil; beautiful or ugly. This friend-foe 
antithesis is autonomous, absolutely autonomous from good and evil, beautiful and ugly. Of 
course, absolute autonomy is not a non-relationality of political and ethical anti-theses. Quite 
the opposite. In Schmitt, evil has a way of forcing a group of people to locate its source (say 
in another group), thereby perceiving the latter as a foe. But this – calling the source of evil a 
foe – is not necessary, for Schmitt. “The morally evil, aesthetically ugly or economically 
damaging need not necessarily be the enemy” and “the morally good, aesthetically beautiful, 
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and economically profitable need not necessarily become the friend in the specifically 
political sense of the word”. The converse is true, for Schmitt. A foe need not necessarily be 
evil or economically unfriendly, just as a friend need not necessarily be good or aesthetically 
pleasing. Let us put it positively: friendship with the morally evil is a possibility and 
permissible, politically speaking – in the same way as the possibility and permissibility of 
enmity with the morally good. 
If Schmitt is correct (that one can befriend the morally evil), I turn to the problem of 
evil in the colony, the native’s sinfulness and the black’s progression from evil (sinfulness) to 
colonial humanity through animality. If Schmitt is correct (that one can befriend the morally 
evil), it seems justified that the coloniser could simply ‘befriend’ the black (in his animality, 
sinfulness), the evil native. We know, of course, that the coloniser does not befriend the evil 
native. In the native the coloniser sees a foe worth enslaving. He could then civilise the 
native, his shouts and silences, could begin to see in this foe a semblance of humanity. Put 
another way, the coloniser wants a friendship-like relationship with a good-native, the 
colonised.  
What value is there in the coloniser’s befriending the good native, save celebrating the 
native’s progression from evil to goodness? What value is there in the coloniser’s befriending 
the good native, when the native (in the coloniser) possibly sees a foe (not a friend) and an 
appearance or the measure of evil? For: in reality no coloniser is good, says Sartre. The 
coloniser, his/her state of being (state of being is basis for goodness or evil, on Kierkegaard’s 
account), is a concentration (and concretisation) of Guilt, cannot produce a good action. 
Concretisation of Guilt – for all the coloniser works (transforming the native into a human 
being, say) is outside the realm of goodness. An idle task, then, is to impute goodness to the 
coloniser’s state of being, if his actions are already outside the realm of goodness (this, 
Kierkegaard would insist, is not to say actions are the basis of moral judgement). Justifiably, 
the native could see in colonialism (in the apprehension of objective sorrow) a melange of a 
foe and evil. For, on this native’s account (we depart from Schmitt), colonialism is an evil 
political content, since it is a foe, and is a foe since it is an evil content (whether or not the 
black finds colonialism and its [so called] symbols aesthetically pleasing is not the question 
here.  
      ***  
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The native (black), then, welcomes Schmitt’s political anti-thesis (the antagonism), 
save that he/she will not accept its absolute autonomy from ethics (good and evil). The black 
will impute evil to politics (evil becomes a political category). And this black, henceforth, 
will shout or remain silent, not because remaining silent or shouting hoarse (in their 
quantitative non-equivalence or qualitative equivalence) are good. This black will have little, 
if any, interest in his/her “goodness” – for his/her blackness is perversity writ deep. The black 
tip-toes on the shadow of ‘beyond good’ in Fredrick Nietzsche26. All calls to “transcendental 
good”, for the black, are a call for suspicion. For: what is good when colonial-ness is a 
determinate evil (a political category), a foe (evil with content) and begets perversity27 
(goodness cannot follow from an evil form, even if the black were to believe in post-
colonial/decolonial goodness28). The black, in other words, apprehends evil, where goodness 
is untraceable. From this evil proceeds a black imperative (a longing for the ethical), 
nonetheless: (Either/or): shout hoarse or remain silent: the case of a maroon-slave – of, say, 
Fanon (for whom, in Mudimbe, an escape from evil {a kind of shouting} is “honouring” a 
spiritual call) and Glissant (for whom an escape is “downstream or upstream [hopefulness]” 
expression of positive helplessness (in the failure of locating his historical roots) (Mudimbe, 
1994:193).  
Then: the black imperative (Either/or; a longing for an ethical life) expresses 
(non)freedom of choice, a condition of a theory of doing politics. The possible choice of 
shouting hoarse or remaining silent is not (on some level) a real choice, for a hoarse shouting 
and remaining silent are return values, you will recall, and are qualitatively equal in the first 
instance. Equal if they articulate black objective sorrow, equal if they are a determination of a 
commodity (have indefinite colonial labour time for common descent). The black imperative, 
on the other hand, gestures toward a living perversity (mediative perversity, mediative of 
sorrow). For, the possible choice of shouting hoarse or remaining silent is an ideal choice 
(not imaginary) – since the value of a shout and silence could be quantitatively unequal (we 
could put a price tag on them, depending on their use values). The black imperative, you will 
                                                          
26 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche (1966) ridicules Christianity and Platonism for fashioning Europe 
‘spiritual decadence. He mocks Plato’s dogmatic “invention of the pure spirit and of transcendental goodness”. 
Nietzsche likens this moment – the struggle against Platonic antics – as the task of “wakefulness” itself, as if 
anticipating Mudimbe’s colonised, waking up and suddenly discovering the false father in the Gauls.      
27 I follow up on Fanon’s assertion: that Whiteness (slavery/the colony/evil) creates Blackness and Blackness 
creates negritude. Which is to say, evil creates blackness; blackness can never produce political good.  
28 In Nietzsche: truth and, by extension, goodness per se cannot come from this world; and, I could add, the 
colonial world of Euro-Christendom. Possibly, truth could emerge from beneath the earth.      
    
33 
 
recall, is the content/moment of wakefulness, a moment of black gnosis, mediates the longing 
for an ethical-in-black: a way of ‘living’ through danger/evil. To shout hoarse or remain 
silent mediates the relation between negative (negation of the false father) and positive 
knowledge (determination of Maternal Care, the search of the true father).  
I wish to say more on qualitative nature of this search. It is near insignificant 
(qualitatively speaking) whether in silence or noisily the colonised searches for the true 
father. Near insignificant if a silent or a noisy search is merely a case of self-talk, a moment 
of remembering, of longing for lost (stolen) things (the self, say) and hoping (perhaps 
hopelessly) to find them. The false father need not feature in this self-talk, at least directly or 
immediately. However, the false father will feature when the search for the true father takes 
longer than expected. The false father features in the case of negative knowledge, the moment 
of cursing him – overtly or otherwise. More, silence or shouting (if quantitatively unequal) 
have direct effect on the false father (supposing the false father is right beside the child, the 
black). Silence or a shout may quantitatively matter, depending on the colonised’s political 
intentions (choosing to shout hoarse or to keep silence is purely a utilitarian29 move).  
We are far from disarticulating negative and positive knowledge. Otherwise we risk 
rejecting or valorising one for the other30, when in reality negative and positive knowledge 
are formally equivalent, similar mo(ve)ments or species of black gnosis (self-enquiry). Not 
only is negative knowledge an insufficient element of an ethic-in-black or a coherent longing 
for an ethical-in-black. Negative knowledge itself is constitutive of positive knowledge (and 
vice versa). This is to imply (needless to say, perhaps) negative thought and positive thought 
share in form (though never in force and direction). Any thought is negative after all 
(destructive), negative as it is positive (preservative, unification of itself with the negated 
(See Mudimbe, 1994)). In the black (the commodity), thought could sub-late its immediacy: 
negate (in wakeful shouts or silences) its immediate evil, a foe31, preserving it (through 
shouts or silences) at the same instant.  
                                                          
29 This has nothing to do with Utilitarianist kind of normative ethics. 
30 Negative knowledge (sorcery) frames Mbembe’s critique of Nativism. A critique of narrow nationalist 
thought (nationalism as political practice, it seems) (See, Mbembe, 2002). I wish to proceed in a different 
direction, and make a distinction between nationalist thought and national thought here. The former is an 
ideological/quantitative determination (of nationalism), while the latter emerges beside nationalism (the latter 
is an ontological/qualitative status, within which positive and negative knowledge are realisable; the latter is at 
once in and outside nationalism). 
31 There is no need for colonial goodness (positivity), says the colonised. Yes, the evil content of colonialism 
negates itself (by way of, say, anti-colonial struggle). When this evil (as absence of goodness), owing to 
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I take a leap: To destroy (if the black must) the coloniser’s indefinite labour time and 
its determination (the black’s colonially imposed humanity, objective sorrow as such) is to 
preserve this humanity and the coloniser’s indefinite labour time. Blackness, its recursive 
loop (negation and preservation of a foe), seem to survive near ad infinitum, then. At the 
same time, though: ‘analectically’, the black searches in struggle (a determination of the form 
of Maternal Care) for an opening (at time through indeterminate African sediments {his/her 
very soul}). Of course: finding in this form anything for comfort is not, to recall Mudimbe, a 
call for normative action. Maternal Care is merely a condition for doing ethics in black, for 
consummating a longing for an ethical-in-black. Or, what comes to the same thing: the black 
– though mired in perversity (a political notion) – necessarily (through love, an express 
moment of longing for an ethical life) strives against political evil.  
The following pages further address problem of love, its relation to commodity-hood 
(alongside the notion of personhood. First, however, I elaborate on the processes of colonial 
violence (the production of native) and native sublation of this violence, and its bearing on 
our thinking the idea freedom.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
necessity, negates itself (into a semblance of goodness), it merely preserves itself in its determinateness 
(nothing with content). If, in short, it creates a semblance of goodness, it is on its own terms, self-
perpetuation. Hegel (in the Science of Logic) will call this state of affairs (negation of negation as affirmative) a 
paradox for consciousness, albeit a trivial one for understanding (?). But a paradox is not necessarily a paradox, 
ethically speaking. For the colonised, the preserved content (evil) is but a rock to stand on (but not for long, 
since it must negate itself, by way of decolonial struggle), if only to look at this semblance of goodness and 
simply suspends it as mere meaningless.   
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The Utility of Meat-eating  
 
The following pages elaborate on national (black) morality in the Union of South Africa, a 
morality without the merely ethical. It is my bid to think a Lembedeian meat-wanting32 
(meat-eating)’, a metaphor for ‘Freedom in our life time’. Lembedeian meat-eating 
(sorcery/negativity) is endless, though – endless if Union whiteness constitutes an expression 
of the indefinite white labour time. Still: Lembedeian sorcery, I argue, is a critique of white 
ethics (ethicality), a condition for the production of greatest amount of happiness in the 
world. Lembede’s critique (meat-eating), of course, betrays in the Union black a possible 
moment of blood-spilling, of sacrificing animals in the Union. A non-vegetarian moment, 
what is more, of sacrificing oneself for one’s freedom, for one’s brothers. 
To be precise: sacrificing oneself for one’s freedom, for one’s brothers is a critique of a white 
union orgy (a white brotherhood festivity of having the native, the animal-man, for an object 
of sacrifice). Hence “we shall”, following Derrida, “ask ourselves, inevitably, what happens 
to the fraternity of brothers when an animal enters the scene. Or, conversely, what happens to 
the animal when one brother comes after the other, when Abel is after Cain who is after Abel. 
Or when a son is after his father. What happens to animals, surrogate or not, to the ass and 
ram on mount Moriah? (Derrida, 1998:12). What happens, put another way, when Cain 
murders Abel for sacrificing an animal, for appeasing Yahweh? What happens to Abel’s 
blood, its shout of innocence, pleading to Yahweh for revenge? What happens when 
Abraham, through Yahweh, substitutes a ram for Isaac, the child of promise? At stake here is 
animal life, animal suffering – the condition of enmity between brothers (and between man 
{Cain} and Yahweh), or a condition of friendship between man {Abel} and Yahweh, 
between a son {Isaac} and the father {Abraham}.  
What of the roaming ram, the animal-man (the black), roaming the South African 
landscape? What of this animal, when it enters or constitutes the ‘little white quarrel’ (when 
the English liberal is after the Boer)? Derrida does not say. But nineteenth century Anglo 
liberalism has an answer: you ought to “sacrifice” the animal-man (“‘the nigger’ absolutely”) 
and all is well (Milner in Magubane, 1996:235). Violently (we have said in the previous 
chapter), you banish the native from Union life, re-reduce him/her to commodity-hood, and 
                                                          
32 Lembede: “It appears that General Smuts is preparing for the next Uno session next September and he 
wants to convince the “prejudiced” “ill-informed” outside world as to how much the Union has done for the 
Natives, We maintain that the world must know the truth. We want no “bone to chew.” We want meant. We 
are not dogs” (Edgar & Msumza, 1996:117).   
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kill him/her if rebellious. Anglo whiteness could instead kill a white Briton, of course. In 
Britain, lest we forget, nineteenth century capitalism reaches a crisis of profitability, creating 
an unemployed Briton here and a homeless there, creating (in short) a surplus white, risking a 
possibility of English civil war (Magubane, 1979:13).  
 
White liberalism cannot afford to kill a surplus white, though. For that would amount 
to killing a being decked in a capacity for freedom, for self-consciousness. White liberalism 
ought to find a surrogate victim, the animal-man (the black). Hence, Anglo liberalism sails 
the cape, quarrels with a brother (originary Broederbond). Aside their intra-animosity, it is a 
matter of time before Broederbond and Anglo liberalism become a White political cult. A 
matter of time before the white cult sacrifices an animal-man, founding the Union South 
Africa and beginning the white orgy (festivities). Sacrificing an animal man: an act of 
destroying “what cannot be used [what is precious, of sacrificial value], and is really the 
preparation of the offering for a meal, the feast that cheats the act out of its negative 
significance” (Hegel, 1998:434). Sacrificing an animal-man is the destroying of white 
animality itself.  
 
Here begins the white séance. The animal-man is an offering to a divine Being. The 
act of sacrificing this animal is a moment of respect, of recognising divinity. A divinity 
devoid of animality, a free divinity – a condition of its perpetual joyfulness. This act is an 
achievement of a white divine status, a moment of loving death: “the source of his [the white 
cult member] anguish-and all the more so that he seeks it out, desires it and sometimes freely 
chooses it”, so that he will be a “man”, free and all (Battaile,1990:12). In this death there is 
individuality, ‘liberty’, the express case of a conscious onto-historical development, 
culminating in a white State, the white Right. This act is a “positive” moment, for divine 
Being. So that the “objective existence of the divine being is transformed into self-conscious 
existence” (Hegel, 1998:435), making possible the white awareness of its oneness with 
divinity itself.  
 
The divining of whiteness is far from peaceful, though. For the white memory of the 
dying animal-man confronts the white cult. Paranoid, it suspects of a botched sacrifice, that 
the animal-man (the black) is yet to die; and that, by extension, the cult has yet to 
consummate its divine status. Doubtless, its paranoia is justifiable – for, in reality the animal 
never dies, speculates Battaile. It has not a Language. It has not a ‘soul’ (See Coetzee, 2004). 
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The animal has not the capacity for self-consciousness, in Battaille, a capacity to think its 
future disappearance (death). Nothing dies if it knows nothing of its future death. And if 
Battaile is correct, the white cult’s paranoia is justified (it seems to me) to sacrifice the 
animal-man, over and over again. In reality the white orgy never ends.  
 
We need not rehash in detail the history of the coming Union divinity – save to recall 
its British-Afrikaner consummation. Save to recall, alongside Magubane, that “it is customary 
in liberal circles to see British actions toward the Afrikaners as a gesture of good will and to 
see the betrayal of Africans as the unforeseen price that had to be paid for such 
magnanimity”. And that, continues Magubane, “the ethical problem that faced Britain was 
less important than the political one, and far less so than the economic” (Magubane, 
1996:51). Magubane could add: imputation of the ethical to Afrikaner actions toward natives 
(the founding of Bantustans, for instance) is a misguided effort: the ethical (and morality) are 
less insignificant than political economy – insignificant in the Afrikaner Broederbond’s 
consummation of colonial-apartheid. So that “if one day apartheid is abolished”, in Derrida’s 
words, “its demise will not be credited only to the account of moral standards -- because 
moral stan-dards should not count or keep accounts, to be sure, but also because, on the scale 
which is that of a worldwide computer, the law of the mar-ketplace will have imposed 
another standard of calculation” (Derrida, 1985:296). We could – and this is the point – 
distinguish white moral standards from the standards (the law) of the market place, in the 
related way that Magubane’s sentiment (historiographical) on British economic actions, his 
distinction (of ethics, politics and economics), is permissible.   
 
The moral standard/market place standard distinction must remain an analytical ruse, 
however. In a reality, white moral standards could find expression through the law of the 
market place. How? Let us re-read Derrida’s caution on the possible demise of apartheid: “its 
demise will not be credited only to the account of moral standards -- because moral stan-
dards should not count or keep accounts, to be sure...” (296). It is unclear what kind of moral 
standards Derrida is thinking here, save that he has us recall the danger of following vulgar 
morality (a determination of a vulgar ethical system), a calculus-bound morality, say a kind 
of consequentialism. Derrida will not mention consequentualism by name. I will – for no 
reason, except for its practical value: a ruse to read Jeremy Bentham (Utilitarianism, specie of 
consequentialist ethics).  
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Reflect, for a moment, on Bentham’s philanthropy (consequentialist imperative), 
Bentham’s care for animals/black slaves in nineteenth century Britain. Bentham cares for 
animals and slaves for one reason and one reason only: animals and slaves have capacity for 
suffering. Hence animal rights activism or white abolitionism (allaying of slave’s suffering 
and sorrow33) is noble practice. Put another way, animal or slave suffering matters to white 
abolitionists, since suffering is a barrier to universal fraternity, limit to progress, limit to the 
production of the greatest amount of happiness (well-being) in the world.  
 
Bentham is a philistine, however – for Marx. Bentham subsumes extant human 
relations in mere “relation of utility”, mystifying the nature, the human relations of 
production and pity (pity for slaves and animals). For, says Marx: “To know what is useful 
for a dog, one must investigate the nature of dogs”. And knowledge of animal nature “is not 
itself deducible from the principle of utility”, for Marx. In fact: “Applying this (the futility of 
utilitarian principle) to man, he that would judge all human acts, movements, relations, etc. 
according to the principle of utility” is a mark of “dryest naiveté”. This principle “would first 
have to deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as historically 
modified in each epoch” (Marx, 1990:759). Would have to examine seriously the contingent 
“bourgeois epoch”, for instance: an epoch quite peculiar, melting solids “into air”, profaning 
all holiness in its “constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation” (Marx and Engels, 1970:224). The 
utility principle, then, ought to content with the nature of “bourgeois epoch” – and not merely 
frown on its obstacles (feudal remnants, slave masters, animal owners and so on), says Marx 
(1970). Until then, the bourgeois’ principle of use (utility) is quite idle, arbitrary – an 
ideological determination. Marx concedes: animals or slaves have capacity for suffering – 
and Britons are justified to allay animal/human suffering, save doing so in the shadow of 
Bentham. None can occasion the greatest amount of happiness (usefulness/utility) in the 
world, when he/she reproduces bourgeois relations of existence.  
     *** 
We may further think White bourgeois ethics, the regulation of the coming of the 
Union of South Africa. So that utilitarianism is partly the spirit, the vein of 
bourgeois/proletariat relations, the vein of white paternalism in the colony (the civilising 
mission). To desecrate the ideology of utilitarianism, the communist needs (by way of the 
                                                          
33 There is (in abolitionist circles) strong suspicion of slaves capacity for reflective sorrow.  
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International Communist League) a coordination of all proletariat national struggles in the 
Union, culminating in The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). What in the Union, 
though, is the significance of proletarian self-determination? What is its significance, read 
against or alongside Magubane’s phrases: “British actions toward the Afrikaners”, “the 
betrayal of Africans”, “unforeseen price”, “magnanimity”? Consider, at once, the CPSA’s 
early white proletarian struggle (a type of ‘betrayal’ of black Africans): white worker self-
determination: the unity of white workers and the defence of white South Africa. I read in 
these phrases – ‘action towards’ or ‘betrayal’ of or ‘price’ for a black African – a regulative 
moment for a becoming of a longing for the ethical-in-Black. And I think these phrases 
through Anton Lembede.  
Lembede’s recoil from white communism is on record. Lembede sees in white 
communism in South Africa a trace of European self-aggrandizement. In turn, communists 
see in Lembede a native separatist (a kind of ‘counter revolutionary’). Read, for a moment, a 
September 1944 Nkululeko editorial (“an organ of the Communist Party of South Africa”). 
The editorial sees in Lembede Hitler’s new convert. At a congress meeting in Orlando, 
Lembede “condemned every organisation which has Europeans in its ranks and lashed at 
Jews in the most vicious terms”, reports the editor (clearly in defence of communist 
infiltration in the African National Congress). To which Lembede replies: 
We cannot acquiesce in the political confusion occasioned by some white 
men who start or run some African political organisations which divide the 
Africans and render them helpless and impotent. It is immaterial whether 
such white men are English, Dutch, German or Jew. In the Orlando 
meeting I made mention of […]   Englishmen and Dutchmen and Jews. I 
was not conscious of the fact that mention of the Jew is taboo in this 
democratic country (Edgar & Msumza, 1996:117). 
Already, for Lembede, a white man is a suspect. The white man is a problem, in spite of his 
usefulness, in spite of Lembede’s walk on his/her discourses and, at times, on his/her 
temperament. Lembede sees in Hitler (to his ‘comrades’ discomfort) passion for self-
determination personified, for instance. He reads Hegel, Spinoza, Descartes. He accepts 
Marxian injunctions: a “full stomach” is better than a head-ful of English sonnets. He can 
read what he likes – since Europeans have not (for him) monopoly over forms of self-enquiry 
(political, scientific, artistic, philosophic or religious). Lembede goes as far as upholding 
Christianity, transfigures its axiology into an axiology of the black-Now. “We need 
Christianity for its sublime and lofty ethical values. Morality is the soul of society. Without 
sound morals a society must inevitability gravitate to low levels of beastly existence – So 
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History teaches… the essence of Christianity is cavalry, or the cross – the ready willingness 
to offer and sacrifice one’s life at the altar of one’s own convictions, for the benefit of one’s 
fellow men. This is a revolutionary doctrine” (113).   
Whether Lembede is justified to appropriate Christianity is not the question. Enquiries 
into the compatibility of black-Africanness and ‘Christianity’ are beyond the scope of our 
concerns. In any case I will defer such questions to ontologists of religion, save for reading in 
this Lembedeian shouting (appropriation of Christianity) a desperate moment: an expression 
of loss, of living through an ethical indeterminacy (through a desecrated or colonised ethical 
paradigm {it matters little what this paradigm is in its ante-colonial state}).  You will sense, 
at once, Lembede’s regret for the incalculable African defeat (at the hand of the European), 
the lost “glory” of an African past. Put another way: Lembede longs for a normative life, 
through an appeal to a glorious past (originary Maternal Care), betraying a crisis of 
national/moral life (a moral-national life destitute of the ethical).  
This longing (a determination of wisdom), in itself, has not (to think Mudimbe-
Husserl’s radical doubt) a normative force. Of normative force is the present itself (the Union 
time/the black’s political immediacy). Necessarily, the black must sublate the present.   
      *** 
So, let us see in Lembede’s Political Thought a refraction of distaste for Union times, 
the misery of the black, the “Ja-Baas mentality, which for centuries has been systematically 
and subtlety implanted into the minds of the Africans” (Edgar & Msumza, 1996:91). And let 
us read in Lembede a flow of aspirations for Africa’s future (“divine destiny”), a counting on 
African youth (and its vitality). Youth (a form of becoming national) ought to hope in Africa, 
its future. Hope after all, says Lembede through Alexandra Pope, “springs eternal in the 
human breast… … is our driving and unfailing force” (74). It is far from scandalous to count-
on, conjure up the future, implies Lembede, since “Man never is but always to be blest”. 
Counting-on is a mid-wife, a fact of permanent fantasie: Always there (springing forth from 
inside the heart), counting-on (hoping in) the future (a faculty of blessedness) must drive 
youth struggle and secure a national victory, Freedom in our Lifetime.  
Lembede is cautious, though. He leaves open the possibility of an uncertain future. He 
shuns predictive registers – black sibylline zeal (tendentious foretelling and foreclosures of 
the future, good or bad). To any black future-teller, Lembede retaliates: “I thought it was only 
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the Jewish race which excelled in producing prophets as the Bible shows. It appears, 
however, that the African race is strong rival of the Jews in this type of day-dreaming about 
what will happen in the future… [T]he future is a closed book for us”. The future, time as 
such, is transcendent (unknowable in itself), so that Africa’s future greatness (glory) falls 
within the sphere of possibility. It is worthwhile, still, to risk counting on an uncertain future: 
for although “we have so far achieved practically nothing, momentous tasks of vast 
dimensions and stupendous proportions still await us in the future” (74). We have done little 
in practice, implies Lembede. We are doing much in theory, nonetheless. We will get there, to 
our divine-destiny. Already we are there, in theory, we look no farther than in our breasts. 
We possess a hope-drive. Hence: “[w]e are not called to peace, comfort and enjoyment, but to 
hard work, struggle and sweat. We need young women and men of high moral stamina and 
integrity; of courage and vision…this means that we have to develop a new type of youth – 
not the pleasure-loving, frivolous, dissolute, light minded type – but youth of stoical 
discipline, trained to endure suffering and difficulties” (74). Lembede has us think a possible 
glory in black youth, and has us substitute this glory for Africa’s incalculable defeat.  
In youth, then, Lembede articulates a dialectics of history – an uncertain divine 
destiny. He gestures towards the sublation of the present (to reiterate), and that it is up to 
youth to decide on the method/form. Youth embodies a kind of Spirit, by implication. And 
this Spirit forms the movement of history. Lembede moves, it seems, on Hegel’s heels. I will 
read Hegel’s Philosophy of History, for a moment. The Hegelian Spirit has a ‘Past’, a 
moment of mere immediacy (the indeterminacy of Being itself). This Spirit lives as though in 
the absence of time, has a form of ‘Plantness’ (always vegetative), as if self-eating (in its 
immediacy) without dying. The Spirit, in its beginning, is an unconscious consciousness. 
Necessarily, though, the Spirit has a ‘Present’ – an egress from nature, a move toward mere 
animality. The Spirit (in its Present), not surprisingly, self-expresses (inter alia), by way of 
“antagonistic national Spirits who hate and fight each other to death and become conscious of 
specific forms of animals as their essence” (Hegel, 1998:420). Hence – Hegel could speculate 
– the world will have Russia (through Stalin) and the Nazi Germany (through Hitler): the 
(anti) heroes. Then: in Hegel we take (anti) heroes seriously, only to a point nonetheless. We 
may forgive their (mis)deeds, for they do not know what they do. Unbeknown to them, (anti) 
heroes serve a higher purpose: the universal Idea, the attainment of Freedom (1998,420). 
Mere subjects, (anti) heroes in the world have the Spirit realise their own universality, the 
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Spirit’s Freedom, its ‘Future’. The Spirt self-realises, through the inter-articulation of the 
‘absolute’ (the abstract) and ‘the special’ (human passions).  
So, the ‘Future’ of the Spirit is the ‘I’, Self-consciousness. Or, what is a similar thing, 
Freedom is the substance of the self-conscious Spirit, self-consciousness’s very condition of 
possibility. So that Freedom is a deferring to and a determination of Reason, necessity. 
Reason articulates universality – its own laws through laws of Nature – since “Nature [itself] 
is an embodiment of Reason” (Hegel, 2001:7). Reason moves the Spirit from a Past into the 
Future, a circular movement which already is complete. In Reason the Spirit was, is, and will 
be – at the same instant. Reason then, is the substance of world-universal history, has in itself 
the final purpose: the world’s attaining consciousness of Freedom, through the (anti) hero for 
instance.  
By no means, however, is the (anti) hero (the subject) in Hegel necessarily non-
rational. The subject is a rational will-in-passion, Thought itself (26). A rational will, the 
Hegelian subject is free. Rational will forms the idea of Freedom, by which the formation of, 
say, a State (the form of the Spirit, absolute form of Freedom34 ) is possible. ‘Man’ is free 
only if he/she knows he/she is free. Freedom is dependence on nothing outside (externality). 
Freedom is reliance on the self: self-accountability. The subject is only unfree in its 
singularity (the mere One) – in mere desire, destitute of itself, its own object, merely hopeful, 
waiting for some satisfaction in the ‘future’…. (Hegel, 1998). By way of rational will, then, 
Reason makes possible Man’s knowledge of his freedom – for how can Man know of his 
freedom if he has not heard of this freedom? Reason is the originary voice, the logos, 
“beyond definition”, an articulation of the finite (human passions) and the infinite. “Freedom 
(as such) is an infinite category”. Hence Hegel finds comfort in divinising Freedom (finds in 
the nature of God’s will the Idea, Freedom itself – for “all God only wills himself is his own 
Will” (Hegel, 2001:11). And God, Thought itself, constitutes human capacity for thought, for 
conceptual (non-empiricist) apprehension of the world. Hence Hegel, to take a leap here, 
rejects vulgar historiography, historisisation bereft of prior categories (the Concept).  
If Hegel is humble historicist, he is a proud idealist.  
    
                                                          
34 Absolute form of Freedom is the State, whose base is the notion of Revealed Religion (and not natural 
religion nor positive religion, like Christianity) (See Hegel, 1998; Lukács, 1977). To apprehend this relation – 
Religion as the substrate of the State, the State as a form of the idea Freedom – we need art. To apprehend 
and understand it, we need Philosophy.    
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       ***  
Reading Lembede’s hopes in black youth alongside the Hegelian Spirit is to betray 
(we have said this already, in some ways) a hapless longing for a language (an ante-black 
language), a holy language to write a feasible plan of combat, the struggle for Africa’s 
destiny. Lembede’s longing is thinking the possible development of youth as Spirit (in a 
related way that, suffice it to say, Du Bois traces the longing soul of the black folk through 
the development of Negro religions. In Negro spirituals, the soul of the black folk, you will 
recall, longs for an indeterminate freedom. The soul of the black folk is the critique of White 
American freedom itself). Lembede thinks an Africa finally free (in the youth’s life time), 
thus questioning/correcting the Hegelian notion of freedom itself: that freedom, for the black, 
is not knowledge of his freedom. Rather, freedom for the black is possible through necessity 
(sublation of the master {the present}). This necessity is the beginning of freedom ‘in our life 
time’ – so that this freedom rhetorically potent as it is, in fact, conceptually redundant. He 
takes this freedom seriously, in other words – and goes as far as symbolising it: it is time for 
Blacks to eat meat (and not crush bones), he says, since blacks are not dogs.  Meat-eating 
expresses a struggle for Africa’s destiny, a longing for the ethical-in-black (an articulation of 
regret for African defeat and the necessity of sublating the present).  
Meat-eating, for Lembede, may well have us think in black youth (passion-infused) a 
possible spectre of rational instinct (rather than the Hegelian rational will), haunting the 
colony, living outside the law (vandalising the white phallus). The black youth follows his 
rational instinct, since (we learn from Mphahlele’ Grieg on a stolen Piano) the white “Christ 
never explained what a black man should do in order to earn a decent living in this country” 
(Mphahlele, 1967:44). To eat meat is following one’s instinct (the necessity to 
sublate/vandalise white things, the Master) without becoming a dog (a mere animal) itself. 
The black youth follows his rational instinct: the great offense to the coloniser (since in this 
black rational instinct the coloniser simply sees an animal instinct).    
Still, should it matter that Lembede distinguishes himself from dogs and not any other 
animal? Sure: Lembede’s meat-eating metaphor is a responds to Smuts (who thinks blacks 
merit a treatment similar to that of dogs). Yet there is more to the Lembedeian fixation on 
dogs. I read, then, the time of the native dog in the Union, the so called ‘Africanis’. The white 
cult reduces the Africanis to a status of proto-dogness, a pariah in the land of its birth, an 
“outcast” (Gallant, 2002:44). An outcast (or the potentiality of becoming an outcast): a 
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question of value, akin a commodity. Africanis’ outcast status is a case of white affirmative 
preference, in favour of the ‘Boer-dog’ at the advent of the Union of South Africa. The Boer 
dog after all is one casualty in the Anglo-Boer (the little white) quarrel. In this quarrel the 
Boer-dog has sacrificial value (in a material sense of the term), lives not for its own sake. 
This dog is a representative of the Boer culture, and thus worth sacrificing, for the sake of 
British self-appreciation. So: rehabilitating the Boer-dog marks the rehabilitation of Boer 
culture.    
I will say nothing more of the Boer dog (or white dog in general), for I am concerned 
with the Africanis and its outcast status, its arbitrary life. What is the nature of this 
arbitrariness? Consider the magnitude of its (un)‘freedom’ of movement in the Union’s urban 
settlements. On the one hand, few native dogs could have it good (health), if their black 
owners feed them. The Africanis could have it bad, on the other – quite bad if it is destitute of 
a legal owner, if none in the Union pays its tax (possibly, the poor potential dog tax payer 
would rather use his/her money for other things, his/her food for instance).The potential dog 
tax payer could simply lack wherewithal to feed a dog. Destitute of owners, the native dog 
has a homeless home, starving – to the point of nearly puking its tongue. Starving, then, some 
native dogs simply die out. Others turn “feral and survive as [bone] scavengers on the 
fringes” of Orlando, Doorfontein, Vrededorp, Thulandivile or Sophiatown. These dogs turn 
feral, enlisting in the already feralled, the already “disenchanted” dog world (Gallant, 
2002:44).    
Turning feral, to return to Marx, betrays the dynamism of Africanis’ nature. Feral 
dog-life is unnatural, shows dog nature “as historically modified in each epoch” (Marx, 
1990:759). Marx pre-echoes Karabo in Mphahlele’s Mrs Plum. Karabo (a female domestic 
worker in the white Mrs Plum’s house) sees clever, purposeful animals in ‘native’ dogs, and 
that this is their glory – vis-a-vis ‘white’ dogs. “A [real] dog must look for its own food when 
it is not time for meals, not these stupid spoiled angels the whites keep giving tea and 
biscuits...the spoiled angels” the whites like to see eat “with fork and knife” (Mphahlele, 
173:1967). Karabo’s dislike for ‘white’ dogs is a self-preserving principle, staying clear the 
white things where possible. “Me”, she says, “I take a master’s bitch by the leg, me, and 
throw it away so that it keeps howling, tjwe – tjwe! ngo-wu ngo-wu! I don’t play about with 
them, me…”  (173)  
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Could Karabo’s principle be a critique of white vision, whites seeing in animals and 
animal-men lives destitute of embodied souls? In which case Karabo could bite the bullet: 
what does it matter if I am an animal-man (and embodies not a soul for white eyes)? At issue, 
she could say, I have alongside native dogs the capacity for clever and purposeful existent. I 
have my instincts, capacity to get my “own food when it is not time for meals” (173). Karabo 
is not an animal (a dog, for example), of course. For, although the dog is clever, purposeful 
and responds to its hunger, it may be a stretch to think it has conceptual intuition of its 
hunger.  The dog, I speculate following Derrida, has not an ethical apprehension of its hunger 
(in a related way that, already naked, a dog {or a cat} for Derrida has not a sense of its 
nakedness). The animal has not capacity for ethics (knowledge of good and evil), since it has 
not and cannot long for a Language (Derrida, 2008:380). 
All dogs might have souls (since all could have morals (opinion of right or wrong), a 
purpose), of course, though bereft of the capacity to apprehend sorrow. They have a past, 
though without attendant analytics of historiography. It may seem strange, then, that Karabo 
disgraces a thing (a ‘white dog’), originarily incapable of conceptually apprehending sorrow. 
For what does she gain, save the comfort of causing pain to the animal? Yet, it is more than 
being sadistic, for her. In the final analysis, her wish to disgrace white dogs is a wish to 
vandalise Mrs Plum herself, their Master, a wish to desecrate whiteness itself. She could 
destroy Mrs Plum herself, of course, given a chance. Could destroy her in a similar (related) 
way that, to bring it to our times, black boys in Coetzee’s Disgrace, violate a white woman’s 
dangerous dogs, only to disgrace (rape) her in turn.  
       *** 
Violating animals (in general) is non-scandalous, for Union blacks. The act of spilling 
blood in general, the blood of a sacrificial goat say (and possibly not eating its meat), 
appeasing the gods (for this or that reason), wagering a blessed life, is quite familiar to a 
Union black. Here I rely on Harriet Ngubane’s theological anthropology, and observe a 
possible case, one scenario of a Union Black’s animal sacrifice (beneficial for the recently 
dead, for instance). Animal Sacrifice in the Union black is a bridge, mythico-alchemically 
speaking. It consummates the recently dead’s immortality of the soul, the soul of the black 
folk: a shadow. A shadow, the union black could believe, leaves “the body when a person 
dies … .  A shadow in this sense can be seen as synonymous with a soul, in that it is believed 
to depart from the body in the form of the body, although invisible. A dead person is initially 
an isithunzi until a sacrifice is performed after a period of mourning”. The shadow is an 
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incorporeal corporality, a gesture toward an afterlife. An afterlife, realisable when, and only 
when, animal sacrifice concatenates the recently dead and the already dead, the “down below 
– beneath the earth…The sacrifice brings him back home as an idlozi (sing)”, an ancestor.  
Ante-sacrifice: the recently dead becomes a potential ancestor. Post-sacrifice: he 
procures a new capacity. He could look after the ‘still living’, the recently born in particular 
(having emerged from beneath the earth) – if and only if the still living (the elderly up the 
earth) spills goat-blood and pours beer on the floor, aligning the shadows of the ancestors and 
the recently born. Only if they spill the blood and then have the ancestor eat the meat and 
drink the beer. Hence, on Ngubane’s account, a black rural kraal in the Union has “the great 
hut”, in which “the upper part of the floor is marked off by an inch-high ridge forming a 
semi-circle as umsamo. No stranger may go beyond the ridge into the umsamo area, for it is 
here that the offering to the ancestors is made by burning incense; the beer set aside for 
ancestors is kept here and the sacrificial meat hangs here overnight – the beer is to be sipped 
and the meat licked or eaten by the ancestors. The ancestors are said to rest on the rafters”, 
here in “the great hurt” (Ngubane, 1977:57).  
There is the-here in the hurt. Where is the-there in this hurt, though? Ngubane is quite 
on this score, justifiably. For, what should the absence of a there in Ngubane’s account 
matter? It matters little if this space, the semi-circle, belongs to the ancestor in the last 
instance. The here-there distinction would be idle then (it seems to me), since the ancestor 
lives anywhere (which matters to him/her), walks beneath and hovers the earth. The ancestor 
blesses his/her suppliants, young and old, nearly indifferent to suppliants’ spacio-temporal 
location (their places of laboring, of ‘family’ life and so on). The ancestor, a sacred fact, may 
seem distant (transcendent). Nevertheless, the ancestor, you may recall, is invisibly sensuous, 
decked in an invisible body and, by extension, immanent (in the suppliant), immediately 
imposing (albeit transcendently) on the suppliant35.  
The mise-en-scène, the here (the not there), the sacred semi-circle unsamo area, is 
quite revealing, clearly – if, what is more, we imagine an ancestor resting there-as-here, on a 
rafter, meat eating. Meat-eating, resting inside-above everyone else (suppliants), seems at 
once an ancestral self-celebration, celebrating an ancestral capacity, responsibility for others 
                                                          
35 This is near-analogous social/moral facts (in Durkheim). Higher than a moral fact, though, the ancestor 
radically imposes him/herself on the suppliant. The ancestor is a universal singularity: concatenates body-soul 
above the earth (the damned of the earth, seeking recourse, redeeming a ‘cancerous’ present, the culture-
nature complex) and those beneath. The suppliant as such is a moral agent. And he believes (enquiringly) that 
the ancestor on the rafter, too, is a moral ‘agent’. 
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(or, same thing, self-responsibility) or – in a phrase, ancestral ‘freedom’ or morality (love and 
power, Maternal Care). This Care, seemingly transcendental, informs black manners 
(expressive of wisdom), only to a point. For, on the one hand, ancestral moral life (love and 
power/Maternal Care), is not the basis for union black’s normative (ethical) life36: since this 
moral life is at once immanent and transcendent. Since it is near-indeterminate, fractured and 
thus undependable. Is not the basis for union black’s ethical life, since it betrays (we return to 
Mudimbe-Husserl’s anti-historicism once again) phenomenology’s radical doubt (the fact 
that to appeal to ancestral moral life borders on a kind of native historicism). Is not the basis 
for union black’s ethical life, since (to take the doubt further) the Union black is in the first 
and last instance an object of national sorrow (an immediate determination and immediate 
condition of white ethics), which imposes itself on the Union black, severing the Union 
black’s consciousness. The severing of the Union black’s consciousness renders ‘black 
intentionality’near-indeterminate.  
National sorrow then (though a determination of white ethics {utilitarianism in the 
Union}, is quite spectral, self-expresses somatically, by way of the black’s state of 
wakefulness, a kind of self-sensing37. It auto-expresses through the black body-soul, the 
black body and its shadow. So that rafters in semi-circle unsamo area (the moment of black 
animal sacrifice {the concatenation of ancestral body and the supplicants’}) merits further 
reading. It suffices to reiterate one point here: ancestral moral life is a condition of wisdom 
and not an epistemic condition. It has not a constitutive bearing on the black ethical life. 
Aancestral moral life is sensible, nonetheless – sensible when the Union black (the suppliant) 
apprehends his/her reflexes: ‘somatic’ responses to, or expressions of, fear from present 
violence (a kind of political sickness) or violence to come for instance. Seeing the invisible 
ancestral body on the rafters is a moment of self-enquiry then, for this black suppliant, a 
moment of thinking his/her potential/actual sickness.   
Seeing the ancestral body on the rafters is moral moment of longing, clearly. Put 
another way: Sacrificial longing 38 is heteronomously determined (recall that the ancestor’s 
                                                          
36 See Mudimbe(1994) 
37 I rely on Derrida (2012) here. Witnessing a ghost, one need not merely bracket its phamtomacity. One must 
also confront the real body of the ghost, the constitution, the condition (not merely its causes) of the ghost’s 
appearance.  
38 In addition to Durkheimian desire – think Durkheimian desire here, for a moment, necessary for the 
possibility of becoming a moral agent, we may reflect an unconscious desire for that which is contra one’s long 
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morality imposes itself on the suppliant). Sacrificial longing is positively negative, an 
originary identificatory moment with a living-death (living absence): the living ancestor. It is 
a substratum of gnosis, the condition of its possibility. So that animal sacrifice, on the other 
hand, express the black suppliant’s shadow kind of longing, longing for an ethical paradigm. 
Longing in blackness, then: less a faculty of obligation (dutifulness towards this or that) than 
a mark of black’s state of abjection (a black’s speculative appropriation of the living 
absents/ancestral agency/Maternal Care). On the other, animal sacrifice indexes the black’s 
indefinite moment of violence against ‘nature’, whiteness itself. Longing articulates black 
negation of the notion of ‘nature’.  
We then sense why the black’s (Karabo’s, for instance) negation of white animals 
subtends a longing for an elusive ethical paradigm.  
       *** 
I return to the Lembedein moral moment of longing, the moment of meat-eating. 
Lembede is a spectacular suppliant, in other words: for he sacrifices an animal, only to eat its 
meat. Lembedeian animal-killing could be a non-sacrificial act, of course, could be a ritual 
(necessary) for feasting purposes – in which case freedom in his life time is an object of mere 
taste, of hunger, a mere ‘means to an end’. Lembede’s animal-killing is nonetheless a 
sacrificial act, I content, an object of incalculable longing. Recall, for a moment, Lembede’s 
desperate appropriation of a Christian axiology. In Lembede, “the essence of Christianity is 
cavalry, or the cross – the ready willingness to offer and sacrifice one’s life at the altar of 
one’s own convictions, for the benefit of one’s fellow men. This is a revolutionary doctrine”. 
Calvary, the cross, for Lembede, may well be a special site of animal-killing, the mark of 
(and perhaps a substitute for) his “ready willingness to” self-offer and self-sacrifice for his 
“fellow men” (113). Calvary, what is the same thing, becomes pseudo-metaphor for 
Ngubane’s “Great Hut”. The cross here, a desperate allegory, is a near-symbolic for Umsamo 
area beyond the ridge (the site of spectacular supplication, for Lembede, an affirmation of his 
longings and convictions: namely, the struggle for freedom in his life time).  
In the semi-circle area, then, Lembede and his fellow suppliants kill the animal and 
eat the meat themselves. They share it not with the ancestors or the divine, so that a mere 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
term interests, as in the black desire for whiteness, for instance. Desire, for the black supplicant, is an originary 
identificatory moment with a living death, the ancestor as such.   
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reading of Lembede’s sacrificial act, by way of Christian temporality/symbolism (only 
because Lembede appropropriates the Christian ethical), is mere desperation, unfruitful. 
Lembedeian sacrifice (constitutive of his longing for freedom in his life time) is partly 
possible within a quasi-messianic time, to be sure. Partly messianic, akin Benjaminian 
messianic time (in Anderson), stilled or stopped time, in which events unfold 
simultaneously”, all in the present. Time in which the spectator – he/she alone – is near god-
like (omniscient), knows and sees (as though trough a clock) the unfolding plot in its entirety. 
So that the Lembedeian national time (“the flow of thoughts” and “their arrest”, a moment for 
sacrifice) is neither susceptible to prophetic (soothsaying) hoping nor prophetic nihilism 
(recall that there are no black prophets {soothsayers}, for Lembede). Paradoxically, then, 
Lembedeian national time is partly non-messianic. The future (in the present) exists (albeit 
bereft of guarantees vis-à-vis messianic time {in which the actual messiah will come any 
time). The “future” in Lembede, you will recall, “is a closed book for us”.  
Lembedeian national time is non-messianic, since ‘freedom’ (meat eating) in his life 
time is not a question of longing for a future/afterlife (or longing to commune with ancestors, 
all beneath the earth). Lembedeian national time is non-messianic when at stake is the life-
here, the mise-en-scène of black morality (the expression of rational instinct). Black morality: 
the life-here, bereft of “peace, comfort and enjoyment”, the life-here of “hard work, struggle 
and sweat”, of “high moral stamina and integrity; of courage and vision”, by which life “we 
have to develop a new type of youth – not the pleasure-loving, frivolous, dissolute, light 
minded type – but youth of stoical discipline, trained to endure suffering and difficulties” 
(74). Precisely, the life-here (of the animal sacrifice) in Lembede articulates black longing, a 
longing for an ethical-in-black, the necessity of sublating the present. 
       *** 
Now, black longing is vehicular, the beginning of initialising a possibility of a 
‘national culture’, a possibility of thinking politically appropriate forms of animal sacrifice 
and meat-eating. We may, at once, enquire of any particular animal Lembede would sacrifice. 
We may think, too, his form (and style) of meat-eating. This is a difficult enquiry – since 
Lembede talks meat in general, meat in the abstract – betraying an indefinite indeterminacy 
of meat-eating, similar to (though incommensurate with) the form of the indefinite idea of 
Hegelian freedom. Lembede’s general talk, put another way, is of little help in thinking the 
kind of animal he would sacrifice and the manner of eating it. He would not, we could 
50 
 
speculate of course, sacrifice a dog, for instance. Lembede (and many a Union black), after 
all, does not eat dog meat. What is more, he is not a dog – suggesting, perhaps, that 
Lembede’s manner of eating in general need not resemble a dog’s. Lembede’s manner of 
meat-eating need not resemble the Africanis’s, for example – since the Africanis eats out of 
mere hunger, and possibly not out of longing (recall that an animal, we speculate, has not a 
conceptual intuition for its hunger, similar to the absence of its conceptual intuition for 
nakedness).  
A cue for the Lembedeian manner/form of meat-eating lies in Lembede’s life-here of “hard 
work, struggle and sweat”, of “high moral stamina and integrity; of courage and vision”, 
where “we have to develop a new type of youth – not the pleasure-loving, frivolous, 
dissolute, light minded type – but youth of stoical discipline, trained to endure suffering and 
difficulties” (74). Unwittingly, Lembede may well be asking black youth (Africa’s glory) to 
sense a possible political virtue of non-dog manners of eating, a possible virtuous form of 
meat-eating: an index of struggle for the ethical-in-black, a confrontation of political evil. 
Whether Lembede is asking too much of black youth is not my concern here. And we need 
not see in Lembede a kind of protestant ethic, if (for our purposes) we think ‘stoical 
discipline’ an ethical acme proper only to Protestantism. The Christian ethical, you will 
recall, is an object of mere appropriation, for the Union black. So that the Christian ethical 
betray the indeterminacy of the ethical, for blacks.  
My point: Lembedeian national time is a determination of white time, and white time 
is singular and heterogeneous, heterogeneously heteronomous, at once a present object of 
necessary sublation. This time hovers (independently of any individual black), self-inscribing 
at the same instant through a dynamic-heterogeneous array (random multiplicity) of blacks. 
Let us reiterate: the struggle for the ethical-in-black is possible, partly owing to blackness’s 
sense of political (colonial) evil – blackness and evil, after all, are partly of the same onto-
political type, negativity. A struggle for the ethical-in-black, the fact of animal sacrifice and 
meat eating for instance, is always a confrontation of evil (a political category). Lembedeian 
sacrifice and meat eating, in short, marks a black state of struggle, of longing, more than its 
being an object of mere ethical evaluation. Lembedeian sacrifice as such is beyond evil or 
goodness (as mere ethical categories39), although the sacrifice itself is possible by way of 
longing in and for the ethical-in-black.  
                                                          
39  For our purposes, evil is a politico-ethical category. 
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A violence on Love 
 
I gestured toward the problem of freedom in the previous chapter, by way of Hegel 
(Hegelian freedom, the realisability of which knowledge of one’s freedom is a pre-requisite. 
The realisability of which, in a Union formation, the moment of self-sacrifice and sacrificing 
the ‘animal’ (the black) is necessary). And I thought freedom through Lembede (Lembedeian 
“freedom”, the necessity of rational instinct, a critique of a Hegelianism itself.  
Now I am concerned with the problem of freedom, still – freedom and its articulation 
of the union black’s (in) capacity for love and friendship. Thinking freedom alongside love 
and friendship is a movement further, a move towards a reading of black (nation) time. A 
move with/through Peter Abrahams’s Tell Freedom, the telling of a freedom bereft of 
“beauty” (1954:248). A telling and feeling structured in romanticism, hovering within the 
hopelessness/hopefulness matrix, in which the difficulty of sexual taste (violated sexuality), 
for instance, marks a possible friendship with history itself.  
By no means, though, is Tell Freedom a total solution for Hegelian crisis. Suffice it to 
reflect on the political limits of the Hegelian system, once more. Perhaps a compelling 
western critique of Hegelian freedom is in Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas (in Time and the 
Other): none is ever free (completely) – or, rather, one is free and not free in the same 
moment. A being (existent) is a determination of existing (eternity), although being is 
relatively free (separate) from existing itself. A “free being is already no longer free, because 
it is responsible for itself (1987:55). And the capacity to “be responsible for oneself” (being-
determination) articulates an experience of being-in-solitude, a seamless (non-dictatorial) 
articulation of existent (being) and existing (eternity), where time is absent (1967:103).  
Freedom leads to solitude, fullness of joy.  
If solitude, Levinas seems to suggest, is an experience of fullness of joy, “all 
enjoyment is knowledge and light as such” (1987:67). More: “pain, sorrow and suffering… 
constitute solitude, fullness of joy” (69). And “in suffering there is an absence of all refuge, 
so that suffering is the impossibility of nothingness” (69). Suffering, then, marks a moment 
in/of Freedom. Freedom, put another way, is the very expression of the impossibility of being 
nothing. Freedom is the moment of self-responsibility, the condition (to reiterate) of 
joyfulness. Self-responsibility (being present): existing for being in existence: free (being) 
and dependent on existing (eternity).  
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Still more: always, death is present in suffering, for Levinas. And yet its presence 
“does not confirm solitude”. It desecrates (‘breaks’) solitude. So that death becomes the 
suffering subject’s real other, the real threat, the ultimate alterity. So that self-responsibility is 
a moment of being in death while un-dead. Self-responsibility marks the emergence of the 
subject, in a word. The subject or subjectivity emerges, for Levinas, “not at the level of its 
purely egoist protestation against totality, nor in its anguish before death, but as founded in 
the idea of death” (1967:26). The idea of Death (the subject’s ultimate alterity) is less 
profound, though. It is a non-absolute alterity. For death, though immanent, is undesirable 
(has little work with itself as a subject’s object of desire).  
At the same moment the subject emerges, by way of the idea of death, the subject 
determines/produces the idea of infinity. “Infinity”, says Levinas, “does not first exist, and 
then reveal itself. Its infinitude is produced as revelation, as a positing of its idea in 
me…produced in the improbable feat whereby a separated being faced in its identity, the 
same, the I, nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither contain nor receive solely by 
virtue of its own identity” (26). Then: the absolute, profound other, in Levinas, is Infinity 
itself. The subject desires the Other – infinity – without ever satisfying its desire. This subject 
does not and cannot negate the Other, the infinite (41). The subject-Infinity relation is, in 
Derrida, “neither mediate nor immediate”: it is “absolute proximity and absolute distance”.  
The Other is “the only one capable of opening the space of transcendence” (Derrida, 
1978:82). To desire the Other (which is religious-like process) marks an impossibility of 
possessing the infinite40, expression of the finality of equality between the same and the 
Other: a condition of Peace.   
The infinite is indefinitely an object of desire, so that Levinus will distance himself 
from western metaphysics in general – Hegel and Heidegger in particular, for whom being is 
a determination of Being, for whom totality is an object of desire, for whom the relation of 
being and Being is simply a forced or authoritarian expression or determination of Totality 
(40), where the “subject’s freedom comes from obedience to Being”, where “it is not man 
who possess freedom” but freedom man. (Levinas, 1967:2645, 47), where “freedom precedes 
justice”. Then: the pre-condition of freedom, for Levinas, is justice. Justice is the substratum 
of freedom, and freedom leads to solitude (of joyfulness, of knowledge and light). So that 
solitude (joy) marks a moment of desiring infinity, the Other.  
                                                          
40 See Derrida (1978). 
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How else, implies Levinas in all this, can we explain the Hegelian Spirit (Geist), its 
parade of a seemingly predestined Universal History, the history of war against Peace. How 
else can we explain Hitler’s National Socialism, for instance? Failure to achieve fullness of 
joy (“knowledge and light”), failure to commune seamlessly with the infinite may have the 
suffering western subject grope for socialism. Socialism here, in Levinas, becomes a 
compensatory form (a kind of replica) of joyfulness.   
     *** 
Who will deny ‘good’ intentions in Levinas’s efforts? Noble efforts, dripping of 
disappointment in the European light-cum-darkness, decadence (expressed through the 
Holocaust). But, says Derrida, the road to re-live Western decadence is paved with the noble 
intentions. Can Levinas, so to speak, substitute one light for another? How is the metaphor of 
light (contiguous to knowledge) in Levinas a critique of “the history of the light of Being” 
(Derrida, 1978:86). How is Levinas’s community in/of “light anterior to Platonic light”? How 
is it a “light before neutral light....the light of light beyond light” (82), how is it the condition 
of goodness beyond “neutral Goodness” put another way? Levinas’s light (or goodness) is 
not neutral, “since at stake is the creation of the other, and creation “can be only as paternity, 
and the relations of the father to son escape all the logical, ontological and phenomenological 
categories in which the absoluteness of the other is necessarily the same” (86). Derrida wants 
to say the history of the Other in Levinas escapes all the concept of history: the Other’s 
“eschatology” is irreducible, is outside the realm of history (88).  
And yet, Derrida is not convinced: Levinas’ light is an object of suspicion. For: “Light 
perhaps has no opposite; if it does, it is certainly not night. If all languages combat within it, 
modifying only the same metaphor and choosing the best light...Perhaps [Derrida echoes 
Borges] Universal history is the history of metaphors” (94). A play of metaphors, a will to 
hide or obfuscate the nature of things…..Herein lies the crisis. It seems Levinas cannot think 
the light of being before it calls him first. Always, then, one (the western critic) is named by 
Platonic sunshine, the coming of violence itself.  Levinas’s ethics (by way of the metaphor of 
light, infinity) mask or opens a possible re-creation of the platonic, Hegelian Other, totality. 
Levinasian infinity may well be a critique of Platonic sunshine, and yet: Platonic sunshine is 
Teflon.  
I will say at once: this light is the life of the indefinite white labour time in the Union. 
The re-creation of the commodity form, the black.  
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      *** 
I turn to Abrahams here, to see in Tell Freedom an artistic enunciation (specie of black 
babbling) in ethics, a way of thinking the Union black, and his /her moral anguish. A way of 
thinking an articulation of remaining silent/shouting within a Platonic light. I turn to see in 
Abrahams’s first portrait (Lee’s momentary solitude), for instance, an indefinite moral-
libidinal loop, longing and indefinite fantasy: a moralising method (its form and function of 
combat), a wager for an escape from political immediacy, a recoil from the Union light 
(time).  
Lee:   
I pushed my nose and lips against the pane and tried to lick a raindrop 
sliding on the other side. As it slid past my eyes, I saw the many colours in 
the raindrop…it must be warm in there. Warm and dry. And perhaps the 
sun would be shining in there. The green must be the trees and the grass; 
and the brightness, the sun…. I was inside the raindrop, away from the 
misery of the cold damp room. I was in a place of warmth and sunshine, 
inside my raindrop world (1954:1).  
Lee’s wager for ‘life’ – the sun, green grass and trees, the dry warmth – seems morally 
necessary, a determination of rational instinct. Still, what happens when this life is wagered 
on a vanishing object of taste (a rain drop), a vanishing moment of possible enjoyment (a 
state of joyfulness)? What happens when the wagered life (solitude in sunshine) already is a 
determination of platonic sunshine (Union time)? Lee’s wagered life in solitude (warmth in 
the sunshine) passes for a mirage. However permissible morally, Lee’s wager is scandalous, 
in a similar way that elsewhere in Tell Freedom the proverbial white civility is Lee’s object 
of non-achievable caress.   
Impelled by something I could not explain, I went, night after night, on long 
lonely walks into the whites areas of Johannesburg. Night after night, I left black 
Vrededorp and walked along broad, clean, tree-lined streets. I walked slowly and felt 
the cool breeze and heard the sweet silences of these streets … sweet silences of the 
streets…clean air…strong houses finely fashioned plates…chairs…big and 
comfortable…rooms had space…cheerful-looking little cafes. No visible sign was up. 
But I knew these, too, were ….RESERVED FOR EUROPEANS ONLY (163). 
RESERVED FOR EUROPEANS ONLY is a case of a vanishing rain drop, of Lee’s 
impossible nocturnal escape. An escape from what, though? This is a question of history, for 
Lee, the dialectic of the past and the present: the past in the present ad infinitum. So that a 
wager for a warm present (a mirage, an ‘objective’ falsehood) is wagering in the present (a 
wish to escape the present), a logical consequent of a past – in a related way that a wager for 
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a good past (always a mirage) is possible in the present (possible by way confronting the 
present). All this makes for a platitude: the present is in-escapable; or rather, all what-is is the 
present itself. Through his father, the present calls Lee out of a brooding: “Lee...Lee…”. And 
then follows Lee’s meditation: 
The sound jerked me out of my rain drop world. I was at the window, 
looking out, feeling damp. I sensed that that was the sound by which I was 
identified. I turned and looked at the man who made it. He was tall, thin 
and dark. He had a big head, wide forehead, and a long face that tapered 
down to a narrow chin. He eyes were big, round, and hooded. There was 
softness in them. He leaned back in a chair, his legs stretched in front of 
him, the right crossed over the left. He held his right hand out to the fire in 
the centre of the room. With his left he played with the hair of the girl who 
sat on the floor beside his chair. I knew that man. Although I seemed to be 
seeing him for the first time, he was no stranger to me. He belonged most 
naturally and intimately to me and my world. The man said. ‘Come, 
Lee. Tell us what you see and we’ll make it into a story’. The way he 
looked at me disturbed me. I felt tense and desperate suddenly. I was 
unsure of this man, unsure of what he wanted from me. I turned my eyes 
from his face […] I turned to the man again. And then I knew that he was 
my father (9) [emphasis mine]. 
The long face of the black man, the substrate of Union civility: taste for Johannesburg and its 
nice things – plump houses, broad and palm-leafy streets and so forth. A long black face, a 
miner without a Vote, awaiting the archetypical future – an unaccountable death41.  
Still, what is this sound Lee hears from his father, the sound that calls for a face-to-
face (a seeming conflictual) encounter? This may well be a call to move in the direction of 
Levinas, through Derrida – a case of seeing in this relationship of “paternity and the relations 
of the father to son” a possible displacement of “all the logical, ontological and 
phenomenological categories in which the absoluteness of the other is necessarily the same”. 
A case of thinking originary paternity outside world history.  
The sound, however, moves (and this is primary) beyond representation (beyond a 
Derriderean text) and is by extension, to lean on Paul Gilroy, a non-object of a literary 
criticism (1993). So that what displaces “all the logical, ontological and phenomenological 
categories” is the sound or the movement of love itself. The thing not everyone knows what it 
is, it seems, the thing whose movement could nonetheless proceed from father to son, so that 
                                                          
41 Lee knows this face, a man’s face with a past, Ethiopian by birth (a descendent of valorous slave owners, a 
descendent of struggle against Italian presence (9)). Lee here become a Garvey-ite  historian, meddles in a Pan 
Africanist struggles, so to speak, now self-pitying, now pitying his father, presently at the mercy of Union time. 
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the son (Lee), sensing it, is unsure of what is required of him: “I knew that man. Although I 
seemed to be seeing him for the first time, he was no stranger to me…The way he looked at 
me disturbed me. I felt tense and desperate suddenly. I was unsure of this man, unsure of 
what he wanted from me”.  
It is tempting to read in love a thing (an object) to give to, or perhaps share with, 
another. More: it is tempting to read in love a kind of a verb, if we read Derrida reading 
Aristotle (2005): love is what ‘humans’ do to/for others. So that love (an immaterial object) is 
un-knowable to one unless one acts it out. Derrida goes as far as seeing in the beloved the one 
who knows not what love is, unless he/she acts it out. All this (love-the-condition-of-joy) 
amounts to saying: forget or fret not about unrequited love, since in loving one loses nothing: 
one, in fact, is set to be a beneficiary of one’s loving. All this gestures toward the meaning of 
a friend, of friendship. The possibility of friendship itself emerges through loving another. To 
know love (since one loves) is the very condition of Friendship. The Friend, in Derrida: he 
that has capacity to love, he that loves me, though I may not know he is a friend unless I love 
him. The Friend is he that loves beyond death, he that can love the deceased with ease: for his 
joy depends not on requited love. This is the moment of “primary friendship” (possible 
between humans), from which every other kind of friendship, say friendship from a man to an 
animal, could emerge. Love as such (the moment of friendship) is a determination of human 
capacity: virtue. Knowledge of love is possible, Aristotle will say, between good men (1962).   
But our concern is the articulation of love and friendship in Tell Freedom. In the first 
place: love and friendship in Tell Freedom are expressive categories (non-representational), 
to return to Gilroy, a ruse for apprehending black longings. So that purely discursively-
mediated readings of Tell Freedom (and black life) are already a scandal.  
Consider Robert Ensor’s reading, for a moment. Tell Freedom merely is a mark of 
Abraham’s predilection for black liberal humanism, for Ensor. Love and friendship, 
alongside goodness or evil, are empty (ideological) categories. “It is these empty categories 
or silences (“goodness, ‘evil’, ‘alienation’, ‘authenticity’ and others) that Abrahams 
articulates the assertion of [black] petty bourgeois hegemony” (1992:182). Put another way:  
… early on in his writing Abrahams objected to what he understood to be a 
limited view of society and history of many Communist party members and 
committed Marxist revolutionaries--a view which in his opinion denied the 
role of the individual and individual action, conscience and enlightenment 
were of central importance (108). 
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Ensor casts Abrahams’s work a prop of black liberal bourgeoisie leadership, a move away 
from Marxian or materialist hermeneutics of Union politics (Abrahams abjures class fractions 
in the Union of South Africa).  
Now: is Abrahams’ objection to communist views a necessary effect of black 
bourgeois liberalism? Do uses of terms with a supposed genealogy of liberal humanism make 
a black writer’s work a necessary prop of [black] petty bourgeois hegemony? What is [black] 
petty bourgeois hegemony anyway? True, a Black writer’s employ of particular discourses 
and their ideological orientation could matter to us, in evaluating their work, their themes. 
None need deny that Abrahams through the 1930s, 1940s 1950s in fact imagines some 
practicality in British liberalism (it matters to him in London that he can move as he pleases). 
Abrahams, what is more, prefers Shirley and Byron over Marx and Lenin (As a writer, 
Abrahams is least interested in political causes than ‘human beings’ and their problems) 
(1953). Still: what does it matter that Abrahams should, for Ensor, root Union politics in a 
Materialist hermeneutic? Will such a hermeneutic or apprehension usher us a proper grasp of 
Union blackness?  
Lest you misread me. I do not dismiss Ensor’s efforts, their use-value and political 
implications: for nearly always, Abrahams’ seeming hope (with little references to structural 
considerations) for love and friendship amongst blacks, between white and blacks is possibly 
self-belying. Yet: seeing in Abrahams a prop of black liberal humanism is a case of Ensor’s 
empirical/materialist/discursive reductionisms, a refusal to sense the irreducibility of black 
longing. 
Tell Freedom mediates a black “political immediacy” and participates in a collage of 
black shouting, the genre of black soul-styling: a black bid to soul-elaboration, a possibility 
of moral responsibility. And Tell Freedom may well be a minor shout (political enunciation) 
– since English writing from an English colony is exemplarily proper to Minor literature42. 
And yet Tell Freedom is beyond the Minority, exceeds the major-minor matrix, in the sense 
that it may not be literature at all (if literature is a determination of he/she that has capacity 
for solitude). Tell Freedom has us apprehend, above all, Black life’s onto-historical status. 
Tell Freedom, I argue, is a simulation of black’s difficult escape (from danger). Tell Freedom 
betrays Blackness as heteronymous (Blackness lives in and outside the black him/herself at 
                                                          
42 See Deleuze & Guattari (1986).  
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the same instant). More: it betrays a  heteronymous blackness alongside the reality of love, 
which is neither a verb nor an object to give another, since the black in Tell Freedom has not 
solitude, has not capacity for giving love to another, black or white. Love for blacks is a 
Subject, I contend. So that a reading of love (though it is not a verb or an object) alongside 
Tell Freedom’s father-son relationship is a generative effort.  
Already we said love is originary, for the black. It is an originary past, the past before 
the coming of the light, of violence, white time. This violence regulates maternal care, or 
more properly, the “love of the grandmother”, the grandmother’s speech. It regulates “the 
memory of the family, the social group, and the community…the re-actualisation of what was 
and what will be again, at one and the same time as testimony and as a game of history” 
(Mudimbe, 1994:197). A game of history: wisdom: the hope in the futureless ‘future’, the 
future that already is past. And what if hope, after love, confronts “all the logical, ontological 
and phenomenological categories”? So that hoping, for a commodity that speaks (the black), 
perhaps is possible through love, the love that neither is an object to give nor a verb, the love 
that is the form or style of hoping itself? And yet all this game of history, to return to 
Mudimbe, all this form or style of hoping has a non-normative force, a non-necessary basis 
for an ethical life in the present43).  
But here we are thinking Tell Freedom. Lee: “He held his right hand out to the fire in 
the centre of the room. With his left he played with the hair of the girl who sat on the floor 
beside his chair … the man said. ‘Come, Lee. Tell us what you see and we’ll make it into 
a story’”. At once we notice in Abrahams an invocation of a time of play, paternal play on 
the female-head. A paternal play beside the fire, a play with ‘nature’ – a daughter’s hair that 
already is growing, a symbol of maternal growth, love as such. More, it is a play on the son, 
his capacity to tell a story beside the fire, to give his version of events (his longings). Why a 
story though, why the demand for a story alongside a play on female hair? Is this a case of 
Abrahams’s emphasis or penchant for myth: the native in Africa by the fire in the middle of a 
hut, telling tales of animal tragi-comedies and such? Perhaps.  
Certainly, though: Abrahams is anxious to present in fire a concrete symbol of 
friendship. Put another way: Fire and friendships in Tell Freedom hover contiguously, a case 
of metonymic order. Fire in Abrahams is a “thing of friendship as it is a thing of warmth” 
                                                          
43 The colonised need not necessarily appeal to or privilege a glorious past to lead an ethical life. At stake is the 
present itself, in which ethical life necessarily subtends politics.   
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(119). So that, for us, a paternal play beside the fire (warmth) – a demand for a story for 
instance – expresses a difficulty of friendship. A difficulty, since Lee is ambivalent towards 
paternal friendship. Lee: “I pushed my nose and lips against the pane and tried to lick a 
raindrop sliding on the other side….. I felt tense and desperate suddenly. I was unsure of this 
man, unsure of what he wanted from me. I turned my eyes from his face […] I turned to the 
man again. And then I knew that he was my father”.  It is as though Lee rejects the father and 
accepts him (his friendship) at once, a possible case of paternal relations confronting all logic 
in which the law of contradiction holds good. 
      *** 
To the extent that Friendship is Abrahams’ key concern, I turn to the (im) possibility 
of friendship among peers (non-paternal friendship) in Tell Freedom. First: let us consider 
Lee’s encounter with the white world-proper in Book one-chapter one/section four. Lee and a 
black male companion, at the mercy of three white boys, for instance. Second, Book one-
chapter two/section four: Lee and three black male companions on the run. On the run for 
trespassing (a coal-collecting adventure) a white zone, from Vrededorp to the world reserved 
for “Europeans Only”. Almost always in these situations, Lee is an escapist. So that 
Abrahams parades patterns of black motions (through companionship), Lee’s restive 
movements and Lee’s apprehensions of danger, perceptive of permanent rat-traps (black-
traps) across the Union. Lee is perceptive of permanent rat-traps (black traps), to the point of 
insinuating himself (or trying to find refuge) in white communist (materialist) circles later on, 
hoping for a socialist friendship 44 . A hoping that ends in utter disappointment, the 
impossibility of reciprocal love between blacks and whites 45 , (and for that matter the 
impossibility of reciprocal love between blacks themselves) in the Union light. An 
impossibility of reciprocal love – owing to the blacks’ incapacity to love another (for blacks, 
love is a neither a verb nor an object to give to another/). My point is this: Lee may have all 
                                                          
44 At once we imagine a difference of spirit in Peter’s socialist white friends, different from a brand of Marx’s 
followers (white workers of Union of South Africa) in the early 1920s. The brand of Marx’s followers in the 
Communist Party of South Africa, the brand that took to Johannesburg streets: “Workers of the world to unite 
and save White South Africa”, the brand in which the white worker does not recognise the black, the brand for 
which the black is a commodity as such (he does not sell his labour power but him/herself) [I don’t follow this 
bit…not sure what you are saying here?]. The black is always (al) ready for exchange. Perhaps Peter’s white 
friends will have asked: what about a black miner, the black South African?  
45 We may add that primary friendship between blacks and whites is unthinkable. Primary friendship is 
impossible between humans (whites) and animal-men (the native).  
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kinds of companions, a way of surviving black traps in the Union. And yet, companionship 
here need not amount to Friendship46, since Friendship (recall Aristotle) presupposes loving 
another47, another who is good (and we know that there is neither a good white nor a good 
black in the Union of South Africa). 
      *** 
Alongside this impossibility of ‘primary friendship’ (friendship between ‘people’) 
Abrahams erects few motions of/for the erotic. An erection: through Lee’s heterosexual 
sensibility, through a trinity of erotic movements, perhaps motions that nonetheless interdict 
Lee’s Fantasy, hope for life in and perhaps beyond the limit of Union Light. But what is the 
erotic when it is at once a determination of another’s Light, white Time? Let us read in Lee’s 
Ellen (the first erotic movement at the end of Book One) portraiture of measure, Lee’s 
measure of things erotic. Abrahams betrays, for instance, Lee’s heterosexual attitude, through 
an interdicted speech: Lee’s difficulty of saying ‘I like you’ to Ellen (a light if beautiful black 
girl). The difficulty of saying ‘I like you’ when he is too dark for a light skin, the case of 
seeing in Ellen a mirror of his soul, quite aside the fact of Ellen’s blackness, the case of Lee’s 
guilt through the light, the condition of Lee’s self-doubt.  
Perhaps this marks Lee’s immaturity of perception, a curable pathology. Yet, to set 
the first iteration of Lee’s erotic passion here (the end of Book one) is quite remarkable. 
Could it be that Lee, for Abrahams, remembers the darkness of his father’s face at the 
beginning of Book one? Is it accidental that Lee’s darkness interdicts the possibility of erotic 
pleasure in the Union light? Abrahams erects a circle, the seeming articulation of light and 
darkness – first their animation of son and father’s (im)possible friendship. Second, the 
impossibility of black boy-girl friendship.  Perhaps this articulation is most violent in Lee’s 
second erotic movement (mid-Book Two). Lee and Anne, the most beautiful girl in 
Vrederdorp, on Abrahams’ romanticist account (Abrahams say nothing of Anne’s 
complexion). “I love you for your brownness/And the rounded darkness of your breast”, says 
Lee (1954:211). And Anne is listening: “I love you for the breaking sadness in your 
                                                          
46 One can survive a black trap, owing to his/her companion’s help for instance. The companion need not be a 
friend per se. We depart from Derrida, in other words, for whom Friendship is a condition for surviving (1995).  
47 The union black has no business in loving another (and Abrahams knows the impossibility of black-white 
friendship in the Union, though he hopes for its possibility {once he is in Britain} – to the point of denouncing 
his blackness: “In a sense, this is my declaration of independence, my deliberate revolt against both black and 
white…here then is my declaration. If it is a spear let it draw my own blood” (Abrahams, 1953) 
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voice/And the shadows where your wayward eyelids rest” (211). Lee’s romantic love aside, 
Lee and black Anne are young and, on their wisdom, must stay clear of the Act, the sexual 
act. Why? Fear of unwanted babies. Still, asks Anne: what if Lee should lose patience? What 
if, after many a black ‘boy’, Lee tires of waiting? What if Lee sleeps “with other girls”? Lee, 
Anne will suggest, ought to speak out if he really wants to Act (if he wants to remain in the 
dark we could say), for Anne’s grandmother could concoct a calculus, a sex aid programme, 
to reduce probabilities of begetting a child, quite an embarrassing state of affairs in the now 
churched Vrederdorp. “I’ll never get tired”, Lee assures Anne. And Abrahams lets the scene 
(The scene of Lee-Anne’s sex talk) break. “We had finished with sex. I lay on my back, my 
head pillowed on Anne’s lap” (211). Lee must say what is really in question, the purpose of 
being with Anne: selling Anne his dreams, the dream of being a writer (a light bearer).   
But, why would Abrahams pit the possibility of sexual pleasure against light-bearing? 
Is selling a dream (becoming a light bearer) a case of groping for white ‘civility’, the sureness 
of repressing Lee’s dark libido? None, of course, need deny the apparent usefulness of Lee’s 
sexual prudence: ‘social functionality’, the subjection of oneself to a morality (the case of the 
young waiting for their turn). And yet: the scene of sharing/selling a dream – a kind of 
fantasy, a simulation of hope for a future – marks Abraham’s thematic fidelity: the complex 
of light and darkness, the light that nonetheless is unachievable for the black in the Union (in 
time Anne will know that the wish for black-white equality is different from the actual black-
white equality). Anne refuses to believe that “we are as good as they are” in reality (214).   
Now: will Lee get another girl, asks Anne? Will he get another (a writer-girlfriend 
perhaps) more educated than her? Anne is a bridge (middle of Book Two) towards the 
beginning of an end, prefiguring Lee’s third erotic movement (the beginning of Book Three): 
a Lee and Jane (a white socialist girlfriend) moment, the finality of the trial at the possibility 
of white-black communion. For Abrahams, Lee and Jane sexual moment is bereft of aesthetic 
allure, perhaps owing to (if Jane is correct on the one hand) Lee’s Christianised inhibitions 
(the refusal to let sexual pleasure be). It is, on the other hand, a moment of “freedom without 
beauty”, for Lee, “liberation without dedication” (1954:248). And lack of beauty and 
dedication, for Lee, is a question of soul-doubt (doubt of personality, to vandalise 
Kierkegaard): am I worth it, the white soul (body and mind), the Light?  
Lee and Jane’s moment ends its beginning – or, to reiterate, begins the end of hoping 
in the possibility of romantic communion between light and darkness, the end of Lee’s 
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thinking a possibility of fully partaking in the Union light. Abrahams’ thematic fidelity (the 
reading of darkness against light) is, through Lee’s trinity of erotic moments gone wrong 
(incomplete), a sign post of Tell Freedom’s key concern: the telling of freedom in the light 
(Abrahams writes Tell Freedom while living in British light). So that Tell Freedom itself 
confounds all manner of hoping (Abrahams’ included) in the possibility of friendship beyond 
the Union, hope in the light beyond the Union light. In sexual love Abrahams betrays the 
problem of freedom, a release (the possibility of a momentary escape), albeit a non pleasant 
site or object of wonder. It is the impossibility of a quasi-Levinasian light beyond light. It is 
the incommensurateness of ‘light’ and ‘darkness’ (animality): analogous to an impossible, 
fulfilling sexual relation between the ‘human’ (white) and an animal-man (the black): the 
impossibility of black-white friendships in the Union.       
     *** 
Tell Freedom or, more precisely, Lee’s erotic movements (sexual agony) echo the 
crisis of black migrant sexuality in the Union. The black sexuality that confounds all hope in 
the possibility of friendship with oneself, with one’s supposed romantic partner. To probe, in 
sociological terms, Black migrant sexuality in the Union is to think Black sexuality alongside 
the Union’s moral (circumstances under which moral judgement of the sexual obtain) and 
political economy (the measure of white civility; the measure of black privation). We may 
cite, in passing, the conditions of black migrant sexuality’s becoming: the necessity of wage 
labour, for the native. Consider blacks in the western Transvaal. By 1920s, many a ‘Union 
black’ had suffered utter humiliation, land dispossession, turned into (Plaatje reminds us) 
Pariahs in their own land. A Bechuanaland black, too, becomes a tax payer. He/she must earn 
a wage consequently. He could, for instance, migrate eastward (Johannesburg), secure 
livelihood, now labouring in a white shop, now in white kitchen, now in white mine (Bozzoli, 
1991:87).  
Quite often migrancy is a “lure of ‘liberty’”, Bozzoli has it (a lure of liberty in the 
measure of black men freeing themselves from chiefly rule). What is at stake here, though? 
Why should liberty “without beauty” (“liberation without dedication”) matter48? The black 
migrant in the city after all confronts the pressures “of the microeconomics of household 
reproduction and communal subsistence with an affective interest in personal relations with 
kin and lovers” (Breckenridge2006:150). Relations marked in the “pain of betrayal and 
                                                          
48 See Abrahams (1954:248). 
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abandonment, made only more intense by the prolonged absences of migrant employment” 
(Breckenridge, 2006:150). This pain: at times an object of mediation, in and through letter 
writing – or, simply, through an amanuensis. Observe a young black migrant’s reminiscence 
of a past sexual encounter, for instance. An encounter in the Reserve (the ‘rural’).  
I am happy to have an opportunity of writing to you. I greet you my friend, 
but I myself believe that you are my wife.  Yes, the days change, I don’t 
know whether we’ll keep it up. I hope you are still very well, my wife, my 
sweet one, by the will of God. Friend, I myself am still well, truly my wife, 
there is nothing wrong…I still think of how we loved each other; I think of 
how you behaved to me, my wife; I did not lack anything that belonged to 
you. All things I did not buy, but I just got them, together with your body; 
you were too good for me, and you were very, very sweet, more than any 
sweet things that I have ever had… our bloods like each other so much in 
our bodies … These letters have got secret matters, you must not lose them, 
if you don’t want to keep them burn them all in the fire (Schapera, 1933:24). 
What is a letter-form? A genre of ethics, to recall Kierkegaard.  So that the migrant’s 
reminiscence, a seeming sexual reciprocity (goodness) between the young man and his 
‘lover’ merits an interrogation. Is it accidental that the black migrant employs the word 
behaviour to measure the sexual relation itself? Could this mark the immediacy or the 
immediate nature of the sexual pleasure, so that the sexual act in itself is purposeless (non-
telic?)? And, what does it mean to recall the presence of a body, a free gift, an unmerited 
favour sweeter than anything in the world, this body (coupled with other things) that the 
young man did not buy?  
The young man’s romanticism hinges, so to speak, on the ideal of total (unmediated) 
enjoyment. Totality of enjoyment: possible, the migrant seems to suggest, when he and his 
wife are of commensurate bloods. Blood: what a metaphor (a concrete metaphor)! Presently 
the migrant’s body is on the Union market. Will it be a stretch, then, to see in the migrant’s 
sexual reminiscence a shout, a wail for respite, a longing for an imagined goodness (outside 
the Union market49)? Is this a wailing of a disenchanted commodity, betraying the fact that 
the commodity is a commodity with blood (a living/bloody commodity)? Put another way: to 
evaluate the sweetest sexual gift, another’s body is an instance of hoping in the future. The 
black hopes in repetition, though – if it is true that the future is already past. All this hoping 
                                                          
49 Consider yet another black male migrant’s erotic anticipation. He sends a potential lover-friend a letter. 
Receives a positive reply.  
“Ha! Once the lady responds favourably [to your letter] you would leave your job and go 
home to your new girlfriend”, (Sogoni in Breckenridge, 2006:150). 
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marks the irreducibility of white Time itself, the time that constitutes (to regulate) black 
sexual relations, by way of the interstices of Union labour and capital.  
For now on the Rand, the migrant continues to reminisce on the encounter (a ‘good’ 
sexual encounter, possibly), possibly. Continues his wage-labour, and then, in few months, 
revisits the friend/sexual partner. This is a migrant’s erotic loop, an expression of romantic 
‘love’/passion mediated by labour and capital: Union violence. Romantic ‘love’ (friendship) 
is the problem of mediate-immediacy/or the immediate in immediacy. Romantic ‘love’ is a 
moment of immediacy mediated by violence {another kind of immediacy}). So that we ask 
whether the migrant is sure (can know) of the love he gives. And: can the wife ever know of 
the love she receives? Is giving a violated love not a case of giving love (or loving) without 
beauty (a site of non-wonder and thus a non object of knowledge)? The migrant, it seems, 
gives something else but love.  
Then: the actually beautiful is the migrant’s memory, perhaps – the very capacity to 
remember, to know that one is a bloody-commodity, and that things on the market is never a 
site of wonder, of goodness itself.  It could be that the beautiful too, for the migrant, is the 
very capacity to ‘write’ (through an amanuensis or not), the very capacity to critique white 
humanism (the white human is he that can write50).  
Let us return to Tell Freedom. Things on the market are non-objects of wonder. Consider Lee 
on his father, once again. “I knew that man. Although I seemed to be seeing him for the first 
time, he was no stranger to me”. The father and son share the immediacy of the cold, you 
will recall. “I turned my eyes from his face […] I turned to the man again. And then I knew 
that he was my father (1954:9). In this immediacy the father is in the realm of the familiar, 
the familiar face against which to turn one’s gaze. Yet wonder is a near-possibility, is 
possible when the non-object of beauty/wonder is the source of the wondrous, the man – the 
sound itself, the very promise of a story: “Come, Lee. Tell us what you see and we’ll make it 
into a story” (9). This is the paternal sound (a determination of pain) that has Lee re-turn the 
gaze (to see the familiar face), perhaps heeding the demand to remember the immediate past, 
the past of hopeless hoping (hope for warmth that is not there). Put differently: what makes 
remembering the past possible, for Lee (or the migrant on the Rand for that matter) is Love 
                                                          
50 Writing is “oft conceived by clowns and intellectuals as the natural attributes of whoever would hope to be 
known as human” (Moten, 2004:12). I reflect more on writing in the next chapter.  
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(the sound) itself. This Love (its expression) is, we need not forget, regulated by colonial 
violence.  
Remembering the past is the black’s moral determination, suffice it to say. Love constitutes 
and styles the black’s moral consciousness/imagination. The black is morally fallible after all, 
for Abrahams. Moral ‘life’, moral struggle in Abrahams, is necessity, a formal determination 
of rational instinct. The black struggles morally (a determination of instinct) to think/struggle 
for the (im) possibility of ‘freedom’. In this struggle, the black reads time in Time, actual 
possibility of black friendship. So that moral responsibility is the demand to befriend time 
itself, the demand to be aware: Blackness has time, Whiteness has Time (Time is the 
becoming of whiteness (without blackness being white, analytically speaking). The black 
experiences its time by way of whiteness. So that ‘history’ itself is the Black’s other, the 
ultimate alterity. A queer history, in a word: now stationary, now moving, neither finite nor 
infinite (though it is transcendent and immanent at the same instant).  
Moral responsibility is a ritual, though – a case of how the black can ‘live’ in the 
Union. For a moment let us return to Peter’s raindrop-word, the “many colours”, and the 
green that he supposes to be “trees and the grass, the brightness, the sun”. Would Lee in his 
raindrop world perceive the green trees and their shadows? When he turns his head toward 
the father, would he in brightness of the fire perceive his fathers’ shadow, would he see his 
own shadow? Abrahams will not have Lee not wander that far. Lee’s ignorance of his shadow 
does not, of course, imply its absence. What could such a picture, the melange of shadow and 
sound betray? Lee’s idea of the possibility of warmth (and solitude) is but unclear and 
indistinct, as though in a dream. Some “night I entered a world in which the dividing line 
between reality and dream was so fine as not to exist.  And I lived many quite moments of 
many years in that strange region that is neither of this world nor out of it” (Abrahams, 
1954:67). Black moral responsibility is nothing but a case of choice-less choosing. Choice-
less choosing, by way a black instinct. Confronting the immediacy of violence, Either/or: the 
black shouts hoarse or remains silent. Either/or: the black moves or remain stationary.  
So that moral responsibility, for the Union black, is as much a case of choice-less 
choice (measure of a black sound (a silence or a shout)) as it is a measure of black bodily 
movement. The measure of bodily movement: since the union black could remain a miner on 
the Rand to earn a livelihood or simply earn enough money to pay Lobola in the name of 
tradition. He could turn a priest or Tsotsi ... he could enlist in a Black Nationalist struggle, 
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say the congress movement. He could, as does Abrahams, escape the Union; he could leave 
behind his family, only to see them a decade or more later.  
Moral responsibility, possible by way of instinct, is an aesthetic (but prophetic) 
moment of Telling (of) an ugly Freedom and its ‘(im)possibility’. Moral responsibility: 
express a moment of ethics, a critique of white humanism, a critique of a possibly 
irrepressible Union Jack (an inescapable light). 
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Gnos-thetics unto Death 
 
Union (white) time is a black moral fact, heteronymous: transcendent and immanent at the 
same instant, a mark/or determinant of black sorrow. Conversely, black sorrow expresses 
national time: to reiterate, the thing that hovers (autonomously of the black him/herself, the 
individual) and self-fashions at the same moment, by way of a dynamic-heterogeneous array 
(random multiplicity) of blacks. Black sorrow in the Union is a quirky form, expressing (so to 
speak) the extension and motion of the soul of the black folk. And to speak of the extension 
and the motion of this soul (a shadow) is, of course, to refer to the blood of the black folk 
itself and its silent shout (actual/substantive death), a possible ‘victory’ over political evil.   
A way of thinking blood-in-the-black is first to rethink the form of the black. I mean the 
commodity form (exchange value), forming the shadow (soul in motion) of the black folk. 
One may at once recoil from “the notion that value [the commodity form] is an inherent part 
of the object”, and, by extension, an inherent part of the soul of the black folk.  Moten here 
(through Marx,) has us imagine a moment of the possibility of this soul’s restiveness: the 
possibility of its speech. Or, rather, we could after Moten see in the soul (the shadow) a kind 
of objection to white (union) time, precisely because the commodity-form is a non-essential 
property of blood-in-black. There is, in a phrase, restive blood in the commodity (the thing on 
the market). Moten cites Marx:  
But, to avoid anticipating, we will content ourselves here with one 
more example relating to the commodity-form itself. If commodities could 
speak they would say this: our use-value may interest men, but it does not 
belong to us as objects. What does belong to us as objects, however, is our 
value. Our own intercourse as commodities proves it. We relate to each 
other merely as exchange-values. Now listen how those commodities speak 
through the mouth of the economist:  
“Value (i.e., exchange-value) is a property of things, riches (i.e., 
usevalue) of man. Value in this sense necessarily implies exchanges, riches 
do not.”  
“Riches (use-value) are the attribute of man, value is the attribute of 
commodities. A man or a community is rich, a pearl or a diamond is 
valuable. . . . A pearl or a diamond is valuable as a pearl or diamond.” 
So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange-value either in a 
pearl or a diamond. The economists who have discovered this chemical 
substance, and who lay special claim to critical acumen, nevertheless find 
that the use-value of material objects belongs to them independently of their 
material properties, while their value, on the other hand, forms a part of 
them as objects. What confirms them in this view is the peculiar 
circumstance that the use-value of a thing is realized without exchange, i.e. 
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in a social process. Who would not call to mind at this point the advice 
given by the good Dogberry to the night-watchman Seacoal? 
“To be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune; but reading and 
writing comes by nature” (Moten, 2003:9). 
 
In question, for Moten, is Marx’s subjunctivity: “if commodities could speak...”. It is a 
question of “knowledge of the future [the commodity’s future speech] in the present”, for 
Moten. Which knowledge Marx unfortunately dismisses, since chemists or anyone else but 
economists are yet to discover “exchange-value either in a pearl or a diamond”. Marx, Moten 
may well imply, is quick to favour the economist, quick to give up or repress the chemists’ 
possible discovery of the substance (exchange value), the essential property of the 
commodity. Marx ignores the conditions of such discovery and its possibility, namely: the 
very “fact of the commodity’s speech”. Chemists or anyone else but economists are yet to 
discover “exchange-value either in a pearl or a diamond”, precisely because of the 
impossibility of the commodity’s speech, for Moten. Hence only he/she (the economist) has 
the capacity for speaking on the commodity’s behalf. The economist has this capacity, I will 
add, since on the question of the commodity he is more competent than chemist or anybody 
else51. Marx, says Moten put another way, is interested in mere ‘ventriloquisations’: Marx 
imputes speech to the ‘dumb commodity’, through the “reproduction” of the economist’s 
speech. But, between the imputation and the “reproduction”, for Moten, Marx ignores the 
conditions of the commodity’s future-actual (non ventriloquised) speech. At “stake [for 
Marx] is not what the commodity says but that the commodity says or, more properly, that 
the commodity, in its inability to say, must be made to say” (Moten, 2003:9).  
 
Moten – and this is the point – wants to think the existential fact of the “(exchange-) value” 
of the commodity prior to the actual exchange on the market. The (exchange-) value “exists 
precisely as the capacity for exchange and the capacity for a literary, performative, 
phonographic disruption of the protocols of exchange”. The (exchange-) value (the existential 
fact) is in fact an objection to being exchanged on the market, so that this objection itself is 
“the exchange [on the market]’s condition of possibility”. He finds in this disruption 
(“objection to exchange) an achievement given”, to reiterate, “in speech, literary 
phonography”. We ought to see in the existential disruption “the condition of an object’s 
resistance”. We ought to see  
                                                          
51 For Marx it seems, a chemist has not the intellectual resources to discover the ‘substance’ of the ‘object’, its 
exchange value. 
69 
 
the secret Marx revealed by way of the music he subjunctively mutes 
(11)…The commodity whose speech sounds embodies the critique of value, 
of private property, of the sign. Such embodiment is also bound to the 
(critique of) reading and writing, oft conceived by clowns and intellectuals 
as the natural attributes of whoever would hope to be known as human... 
what’s at stake in the music [is “its revolutionary force”], the 
universalization or socialization of the surplus, the generative force of a 
venerable phonic propulsion, the ontological and historical priority of 
resistance to power and objection to subjection, the old-new thing, the 
freedom drive that animates black performances (12). 
 
“Resistance to power”, “the freedom-drive” in Black performances. The onto-
historically revolutionary force, “the generative force of venerable phonic propulsion” in 
Moten is, we should add, in the realm of the personhood. So that we should critique…the 
supposed sameness of “personhood and subjectivity”; and see in the object-cum-commodity 
(the person) “the resistance or objection that is always already in excess of the limits of 
subjection/subjectivity”, of politics as such.  
 
What, now, does excess of the mere subjective (the limits of political practice) mean? 
How far can we go with the non-sameness of personhood and the realm of political practices? 
In short, what ‘epistemic’ access do we have of personhood, save (as Moten would have it) 
through the fact of the object’s non-essential property (commodity-hood)? We only know of 
the object’s negative ontological status through the commodity’s actual speech (the 
existential fact), in other words. Moten, it seems to me, gestures toward the space of politics 
relatively autonomous from personhood (blood-hood, possibly a thing in itself), and thus 
existentially irreducible and unreadable. So that “race or sex or gender, of the differences 
these terms mark, form, and reify” are non-categories of personhood. So that blackness is 
what it is, the measureless measure: measure beyond black as race (for race is a mode of 
concretely placing or of a materially-structured representation, a determination of white 
(violent) phantasy). The sensuous sound (the bloody-sound) of the object, of personhood, 
blood-hood as such, exceeds the categories of race, sex, gender and class – the modern day 
sociological categories of analysis.  
 
The disassociation of personhood and subjectivity seems mysterious, though. One 
way of looking into the personhood-politics matrix, this seeming mystery, is through the 
logical moment of an Either/or, I suggest: the disjunctive conjunction of the ethical-in-black 
we proposed in the first chapter. An Either/or of the commodity: 1) either the commodity can 
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speak (shout hoarse) or remain silent; 2) the commodity can speak and remain silent at the 
same instant. The Either/or of speech and silence marks an entry into thinking the nature of 
personhood. The black could read his objecthood (personhood) thorough the sound/the music 
of his/her silence or shout. 
 
How does one read a shout or silence? Can one, for instance, ethically and 
quantitatively read a shout or silence? Partly this question interests me owing to the notion of 
personhood in Moten, a gesture toward the realm of the ethical in art. He peers into Adrian 
Piper’s meta-ethics, the substratum of Piper’s aesthetics. “Piper’s work [which we will not 
discuss here] is not the suspension of the aesthetic but a kind of return to it, precisely by way 
of its materiality. You don’t have to privilege the ethical over the aesthetic in art if the 
aesthetic remains the conditions of possibility of the ethical in art” 52(249). Still, it is unclear 
what Moten means by the ethical in art, what ethical categories Moten has in mind. Is he 
concerned with goodness or evil in art? This question matters – if notions of good and evil 
are thinkable within the realm of politics and its limitations, if good and evil in fact are 
ethico-political categories.   
The political here is the very condition of the ethical in art.  Of course, says 
Kgositsile’s, “there is nothing like art-in the oppressor's sense of art. There is only movement. 
Force. Creative power. The walk of Sophiatown tsotsi or my Harlem brother in Lenox 
Avenue. Field hollers. The Blues. A Trane riff. Marvin Gaye or mba-qanga. Anguished 
happiness”... “creative power, in whatever form it is released”, moving “like the dancer's 
muscles” where “the impulse is personal” (Kgositsile,1968:42). The impulse is personal (the 
realm of personhood): not surprisingly, Moten sees in Piper’s ethics in art the workings of a 
bloody passion – the freedom drive – in the object. Ethics-in-art, then, is an instance of black 
performance, whose condition of possibility is the political, so that the ethical in art expresses 
the moral confrontation of political evil. Moral-hood is an articulation, the median point of 
personhood and politics. It articulates, to recall Peter Abrahams, the instinctual struggle, a 
                                                          
52 “The relationship between object and objectivity in Piper is disjunctive. Think about objectivity as 
universality, as a set of faculties or attributes given in the set of human beings; objectivity is the quality of 
being When Piper speaks aboutwanting to eliminate subjective judgments (i.e., valuative or aesthetic 
judgments, the question of beauty and, even, pleasure—what might have been called the immanent aesthetic) 
from her experience of art, she moves within a certain desire for the objective (i.e., epistemological/ethical, 
the categorical and its imperatives, the transcendental aesthetic as the ideality of space-time) in art. Similarly, 
when Piper turns herself into an object of art she could be said to be moving in the desire for a detachment 
from certain subjective/invalid judgments. What she calls, in her description of the Untitled Performance for 
Max’s Kansas City, the self-consciousness of art-consciousness, especially in that it is shaped by the visual 
pathology of racist categorization, is the Weld of such bad judgment” (Moten, 2003:244). 
71 
 
“struggle” for a ‘beautiful’ freedom. So that evaluations and practices of art (gnos-thetics 
from blackness), the thinking of the space of performance (the moral time of critiquing 
political evil), is a time for diss/play, the play on history (an expression of love itself) and the 
act of dissing (negativity, sorcery, and vandalism) vulgar universality, white humanism: the 
fact of darkness dissing the Light.  
 
Dissing, we should say at once, regulates ‘popular culture, the interpretation of which 
is impossible without the “meanings of freedom and the idiom” of its apprehension (Gilroy, 
1993:74). It suffices here to think Union music of blackness in the first half of the twentieth 
century, for instance. To turn to aesthetics in relation to the idiom of (non) freedom for 
blacks. To be ‘black’ beside the Light (Union of South Africa), to practice or listen or dance 
to Caluza’s spirituals, ragtime and dance music, Ballantine tells us, is to be “moved by 
expressions in the songs of longing for justice, freedom and a universal fraternity of human 
kind” (Ballantine,1993:5; Ansell,2005)). Ballantine’s judgement seems controversial. For: 
how can the trinity of liberalism (justice, freedom and universal fraternity of human kind) be 
an object of longing for blacks? We may put this question another way: why should Union 
blacks long for universal fraternity (if such is possible), for instance, when they and their 
music always are potentially on the Union market (the white market)?  
 
We return to Moten for an answer. What matters, for Moten, is the secret in the music 
(the “shriek” of the commodity), the secret that Marx “subjunctively mutes”. Black speech 
(“resistance to power”, “freedom drive”, “objection to subjection”), a phonic critique of 
phonophobia (the scene of reading and writing), critique of the violence of Light 
(enlightenment), is beyond the market dealer’s aesthetic mapping, for whom the commodity, 
its performance, is an object of consumption, a bridge to self-appreciation. But: perhaps black 
(as) music is relatively autonomous from institutional politics in the way that other forms of 
black stylings (literature for instance) are not (Mphahlele, 1962:28). In any case: in any 
“paradigmatic” reading of the black (as) music: “the necessity…is to leave the bitter…rotten 
and one might add “overly professional or careerist” parts alone (Baker, 1984:111). For, 
recall Du Bois:  
The Music of Negro religion is that plaintive rhythmic melody, with its 
touching minor cadences, which, despite caricature and defilement, still 
remains the most original and beautiful expression of human life and 
longing yet born on American soil. Sprung from the African forests, where 
its counterpart can still be heard, it was adapted, changed, and intensified 
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by the tragic soul-life of the slave, until, under the stress of law and whip, it 
became the one true expression of a people’s sorrow, despair, and hope 
(Du Bois, 2007:80) 
 
The reader of the music must return to the commodity (the music as such) prior its exchange 
on market.  This is to say: soul-life of the black on the Union market conditions our ability to 
sense the hidden in this soul, the secret in the black (as) music.  
 
I carry on with Du Bois’s seeming hyperbole, for a moment. “The Music of Negro 
religion ... that plaintive rhythmic melody … still remains the most original and beautiful 
expression of human life and longing yet born on American soil”. Du Bois’s aesthetics 
abjures historical relativism: he wants to privilege the time of slavery, the coming of the 
modern world. He disses, it seems, vulgar humanism (universalism): American civilisation, a 
moment of the “white unconscious”, the repression of African-human life. So that the act of 
dissing (through a reading of black music) is, in Motenian parlance, “bound to the (critique 
of) reading and writing, oft conceived by clowns and intellectuals as the natural attributes of 
whoever would hope to be known as human”.  
Du Bois leads us back to Ballantine’s aesthetics, the supposed black longing for 
longing universal fraternity of human kind in black music. What if we thought black music 
through the pair of longing and desire (rather than through longing by itself)? The black in 
Ballantine, I suggest here, desires rather than longs for universal fraternity, vulgar humanism 
itself53. The black, we know this through Fanon, desires whiteness, white morality. What he 
longs for, however, is the ethical, an ethical-reversal (the possibility of self-justification).  
Desire for white humanism and longing for the ethical, then, inform our concerns in 
what follows. Consider the workings of desire and longing post-1920 (the cusp of black 
(national) zeal throughout the earth), for instance. I return to Abrahams’s Tell Freedom. All 
faith in the possibility of realising universal brotherhood in the Union becomes groundless, 
for Lee Abrahams, a Negro youth – regretful of leading, by birth, “an empty life”, futureless 
and suffering “the pain of life’s cruel ways”. And yet, the Union black (Lee) could long for 
another kind of fraternity, of course: by way of longing for a concrete relation with the 
diasporic blackness. This else-where of blackness is a pseudo-transcendental signifier, for the 
                                                          
53 For all its generativity, Marabi is a ‘socially restrictive’ and ‘dehumanising’ enterprise (See Peterson, 
2003:33). 
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Union black (Abrahams himself), a potential mediator of an already doubled self. Abrahams 
is a national beyond borders.  
 The world is calling me, 
Over the sea, 
I have no other plea, 
Under the sea. 
Away I must flee (Abrahams in Couzens & Patel, 1982:84) 
Playfully monotonous. This is Abrahams the poet, anticipating Lee in Tell Freedom. Lee is a 
grown up, and could hear of the elsewhere over the sea, the elsewhere of blackness: The 
music of the Negro, Paul Robeson, for instance. Could hear the voice, coming through the 
“velvet quality of organ notes” (192). Lee could whisper to himself: “That was a black man, 
one of us! I knew it. I needed no proof…” Could read the sound of a black folk, Du bois’ 
shrieking ink: “’for this much all men know: despite compromise, war, struggle, the Negro is 
not free” (192). Could then sense, at once, that Robeson is unfree. Could see the else-where 
of black stories and poems: “We were not made eternally to weep” (194?). And he could feel: 
“Something had risen in me: these poems and stories were written by Negroes! Something 
burst deep inside me. The world could never again belong to white people only. Never again” 
(194). He could declare once, but not for all: “I became a nationalist, a colour nationalist 
through the writings of men and women who lived a world away from me. To them I owe 
great debt for crystallising my vague yearnings to write and for showing me the long dream 
was attainable” (197). Over the sea: not only will he read Negro writers, though. He would 
read Shirley, Keats, Lord Byron and other whites (writers) beside. He could not declare 
colour nationalism once and for all, since in time Abrahams could repudiate all nationalisms 
– although he could not (even if he wished) abjure becoming a black national. Blackness 
here, in short, is everywhere beneath the world. The distinction between the here and 
elsewhere of blackness becomes dys-operative.  
Blackness is everywhere. Yet blackness is a vernacular. We could look into Ballantine, once 
again, since in Marabi music (perhaps in much of the urban black music in the Union and its 
influence on the Union popular culture, for example) he traces “roots deep in pre-colonial 
African music”, owing to its “endlessly repeating chord sequence”.  Hence the white 
trombonist (Jasper Cook) could say: “I’ve always loved trains. And Marabi music for me 
always seemed to have that same quality as the sound of a train: it just goes on and on, but as 
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it goes it always changes and you know it’s going somewhere”. Of course, Marabi could be 
an occasion for black-‘bodily’ movement54 (a cryptic repertoire of movement, in which the 
Christianised Union black may sense the sinfulness of untutored leisure and aesthetic 
depravity (Ballantine, 1993; Ansell, 2005). Abrahams remembers a Marabi scene:  
and there were the house maids, dressed in their brightest and best. They 
pranced awkwardly up and down the streets on their high-heeled shoes. 
Their dark mouths and cheeks were brightly painted. They wore hats, white 
gloves, and hid their beautiful legs in cheap, shiny stockings. They laughed 
and chattered loudly. Later, as the night wore on and they found partners, 
they would take off the silly hat, the uncomfortable shoes, the gloves and 
stockings. They would relax and dance till daybreak as some marabi, egged 
on by the thumping noise of a broken-down piano. Till daybreak … That is, if 
the police did not come (Abrahams, 1954:109). 
 
It matters here that the house maids “would take off the silly hat, the uncomfortable shoes, 
the gloves and stockings”, only to “relax” and move themselves “till daybreak” in case the 
white dogs (the police), the agents of evil, do “not come”. It matters that possibly the “silly 
hat, uncomfortable shoes, the gloves and stockings” in Abrahams are allegories of white 
modernising terror and its trappings on the black.  
 
But: relaxed and moving “till daybreak”, what is black’s quality of movement 
analogous to? What is this quality comparable to, when for white ears Marabi music seems to 
exude a sound quality similar to a moving train? It is tempting, in the first place, to trace in 
the moving black (the black dance) “roots deep in pre-colonial African” dance. Consider, for 
instance, a possible trace of a ring shout in a Marabi dance55. A shout in which males and 
females chant, hop up and down in a circle, shifting side to side – a ritual in celebration of a 
rite of passage (an initiation ceremony, say). Men could dance (nearly always clockwise or 
anti-clockwise) in and through the night. Women form a “loose circle”, dance in the direction 
opposite to men (Comaroff, 1985:106). The male dance could signify an initiates’ induction 
into the myth of manhood. The female dance: a consecration of the induction itself. Or, as in 
                                                          
54 For one Union black, of course: “Marabi …was the environment. You get there, you pay your ten cents, you 
get your share of whatever concoctions there and you dance” (Ansell, 2005:38). Marabi dance itself – a cryptic 
repertoire of bodily movements, in which the Christianised Union black may sense the sinfulness of untutored 
leisure and aesthetic depravity (Ballantine,1993) – is possibly a moment of bodily remembrance, by way of the 
body’s rational instinct (body automaticity). 
55 In a South African colonial situation, as in the American South for instance, a Ring Shout could take a form of 
religious chant in a black initiated religious space. So that, to the extent that there are traces of spirituals in 
Marabi improvisations (See Ballantine, 1991).  
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the case of West Africa, death of a loved one could initiate a ring dance, a way of mourning 
the deceased, a soliciting of ancestral kindness to welcome his/her soul (Stuckey, 1987).  
 
Now, the relation between Abrahams’s Marabi dance and its ‘past’ (roots deep in 
“pre-colonial African” dance) is a case of the Union black’s difficulty to remember the past, 
it seem to me. The black after all is un-free to remember, clad in the modernising terror and 
its trappings (the threat of white dogs and such). How, then, can we account for a ‘freedom 
drive’ in black here? In what way could it be that the black in Marabi be a revelatory motion, 
revealing, in Ellison’s words, “that which has been concealed by [onto-historical] time, by 
custom, and by our trained incapacity to perceive the truth” (1986:229)? We confront, yet 
again, the epistemic huddle of ‘African sediments’ in the colony or in the New World.   
 
Of the new world. Richard Wright is anxious, for Houston Baker, quite dismissive of 
sediments for dubious reasons. Unjustifiably Wright, in Baker, gestures towards the value-
lessness of these carry overs, what Wright calls the ““Forms of Things Unknown”” (say, 
“blues, jazz, work songs, and verbal forms such as folktales, boasts, toasts, and dozens”), a 
non-criterion for sensing the beautiful and achieving an egalitarian society; values-less, 
meriting their total “disappearance” from America civility, unless blacks are free (self-
conscious) in America, in which case these sediments could be “raised to a level of self-
conscious art” (See Baker, 1981:4). Wright, for Baker, is enamoured of the “integrationist 
poetics”. So that Wright’s dismissal of the possible aesthetic value of these sediments is an 
object of suspicion. A reading of black art or literature in the New World is, for Baker (partly 
echoing Baraka’s position on “the changing same” of black music), nearly unthinkable 
outside the black vernacular framework of expression, a framework which has for its referent 
by implication (however indeterminately) the past, ante-blackness. Hence Baker proposes 
what he terms “anthropology of art”, an inter-diss-i-plinary motion of art criticism, preparing 
way for Fred Moten’s black operations, the moment of ill-discipline/anti-discipline. 
Vernacular forms of expression (African sediments), Bakers may well be suggesting, have a 
pseudo-transcendental lid (significant) on black memory of the future or past, though (we 
could add) this past in itself is indeterminate and thus lack a normative force.  
 
Sediments in the new world or in the African colony. Fanon, justifiably, senses the 
danger of aesthetic carnality (canalisation of native aggression), of artistic-religio catharsis: 
the colonised finds condolence in trances (singing/dancing, appropriating this or that 
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‘vernacular’ style) when at stake is taking up arms, and assaulting the colony itself (Fanon, 
1965:57)56. So that the form of these practices (their referents to be precise, say, “vampirism, 
possession by djinns, by zombies…”), in Fanon, is a necessary condition for thinking the 
colonised’s capacity for violence57. They are, for the native revolutionary youth (the youth 
“growing up in an atmosphere of shot and fire”), an object of mockery. The revolutionary 
native channels his aggression in a different direction, an armed struggle against the colony.  
 
By no means, though, need this imply an absence of aesthetic practice in the colony. 
While the pre-independence artist may grope for non-representational art, may “set a high 
value on non-figurative art, or more often specialize … in still life”, the post-independence 
artist ought to set value an imaginative (living) art in the direction of the creation of National 
Culture (the non-exoticisation of the already dead customs) (Fanon, 1963:161-162). Put 
another way, the pre-independent and post-independent distinction in Fanon’s aesthetic 
marks a necessary (revolutionary) progression, for the black. So that the very national 
practice (struggle against the coloniser, the struggle to replace colonial symbols) constitutes 
and, to allow circularity here, marks the emergence (throughout the struggle) of ‘national 
culture’.  
 
The aesthetic practice for blacks is at once dialectic and analectic, so that I must 
return to the pair of desire and longing, a kind of a parallelogram, two parallel lines joined by 
an act (line) of sorcery on the one side, and an act (a line) of wisdom on the other. The 
movement of the black in the music (Marabi): at once a sublation (negation and preservation 
of evil) of the past (through longing and a desire). This movement gestures toward a kind of 
gnosis, for the black, revealing, to turn to Ellison once again, “that which has been concealed 
by [onto-historical] time, by custom, and by our trained incapacity to perceive the truth” 
(1986:229). The truth is the secret of black’s struggle drive, a rational instinct. More: this 
movement gestures toward a kind of gnosis, in the related way that Mudimbe suggests gnosis 
in Black Africa beyond episteme. Inter-alia, then, music in dance in the present is the site of 
gnosis, the very site of struggle to remember the past (however indeterminate) and a 
condition of the possibility for perceiving the ‘truth’. No truth, of course, is accessible by way 
                                                          
56 See Samir Amin’s related remark: African ‘survivals’ (cultural or political) have a way of veiling ‘capitalist 
‘social’ relations’ in colonised Africa, for Samir Amin (Mudimbe,1991). 
57 Fanon (1963:57): “…any study of the colonial world should take into consideration the phenomena of the 
dance and of possession. The native's relaxation takes precisely the form of a muscular orgy in which the most 
acute aggressivity and the most impelling violence are canalized, transformed, and conjured away”. 
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of the past in itself, the past of African cultural stylings in themselves, for example. In fact, 
the past in itself has not a normative force. It is no basis for ethical self-evaluation (through 
ethical categories of good or evil, to be precise). You ought to think the past through the 
present: “what seems good and evil”, for the black in Du Bois, is discernible through 
aesthetics in the present, through a study of “Negro religion as a development, through its 
gradual changes from the heathenism of the Gold Coast to the institutional Negro church of 
Chicago” (Du Bois,2007:80).  
 
This is the point: good and evil, for the black, is the realm of political immediacy, the 
present. The “present” (Union times), in Kgositsile’s phrases here, that “is a dangerous place 
to live/… is articulate/and knows no peace…” (Kgositsile, 1974:5). Kgositsile, for whom to 
reiterate, “there is nothing like art-in the oppressor's sense of art. There is only movement. 
Force. Creative power...” for whom “the impulse is personal.” Under normal conditions, this 
force is creative through the ‘body’. The body has consciousness, has a perspective - this is 
its reality58. But, in the Union (the white market), this reality is denied. Denial of this reality, 
Gordon could say, affirms (as does Whiteness in the Union) the absence of the black body 
itself, an absence in which the black is in an endless anguish. He could know the reason for 
his anguish, and then choose to shout hoarsely or remain silent, the meanings of which 
remain a secret to the white world. A secret if silence (say), for Mudimbe, marks the sick soul 
of the black folk’s conscious/unconscious wish for the apocalyptic, a wish for the master, the 
psychoanalyst’s death – a death that in reality is non-sentimental, neither a vulgar hatred or 
love for psychoanalyst59 (192). The soul/shadow as such is an absent body, a double body in 
the “Valley of Humiliation”, the valley of incalculable defeat. And yet, the absent body 
moves in the state of an endless doubt, a rhetorical doubt: “what am I”?   
 
The wish for the psychoanalyst’s death is possible by way of love itself, though this 
love is neither a verb nor an abject to give or share with another. I must return to Kgositsile’s 
poetics. “I do not write protest poetry”, he says, betraying (it seems) literary anxiety, 
defending his art against the imminent charge of “protest literature” from the US’s 
                                                          
58 See Gordon (1995) 
59 This is the case of the patient (the native) believing the psychoanalyst (master)’s guidance, the story of 
progress.  “Lying down on the couch he/she is often silent, like a dead thing, as if waiting for someone who 
could put “it” elsewhere, in its place” (Mudimbe, 1994:192).  The patient is an express case of death, more so 
than the psychoanalyst, for whom attentive silence express the virtue of listening to a free association.   
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mainstream literary establishment. Anxious of being misread, of others misreading his theory 
of time, of black writing. “I do not write protest poetry. My poetry is love poetry…I do not 
Write English…the English give love as a privilege or a means towards some material profit 
– and I have historical evidence [in the Union]”60. Love in black, he may well say, constitutes 
the possibility of memory, for the black, the memory of the “Grandmother”.  
I used to wonder 
Was her grave warm enough 
‘Madikeledi, my grandmother … 
Madikeledi: the mother of tears. Tears which begot the poet himself. But why see in 
Madikeledi‘s grave a space of warmth? Is this the poet’s other-wordily hope, a compensation 
of the always already cold time, the Union of South Africa?  No: 
    The elegance of memory,  
Deeper than the grave 
Where she went before I could  
Know her sadness, is larger 
Than the distance between  
My country and I. Thing more solid 
Than the rocks with which those sinister 
Thieves tried to break our back (Kgositsile, 1968:45) 
 
All this is a gesture towards Love-in-black (generative of the poetry itself), love 
mightier than the Union rock, white weaponry as such. Kgositsile implies the depth of 
indeterminacy (love is an originary subject), confronting “the ontological, phenomenological 
and logical categories”. It is depth deeper than the warmth of the grave, transcending all 
space, “Deeper than grief…Stronger Than the cold enemy … Deeper than the ocean”. All this 
amounts to dissing English-Jesus’s love, supposedly wonderful, high that you cannot get over 
it, low you cannot get under it, deeper than the ocean too, save it sails, by way of an empire, 
across the Atlantic/Indian Ocean, converting the native (by this or that method, at times at 
gun-point when necessary).  
 
All this (love in black) amounts to fighting love with love in black. Once again the 
poet listens to the Grandmother,  
…Her 
Voice clearer now than then: ‘Boykie, 
Don’t ever take any nonsense from them, 
You hear!’ 
… 
Pry your heart open, Brother, mine too, 
                                                          
60 Kgositsile echoes our discussion of British Utilitarianism in the second chapter of this dissertation.    
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Learn to love the clear voice 
The music in the memory pried 
Open to the bone of feeling, no distances (Kgositsile, 1968:45) 
 
Love is a verb here, only a verb when music (not a particular individual) is an object. Brother 
must love (Listen-to) clarity, the music per se. And this love (Listening-to) is possible 
because Brother (no particular individual) is a constituent of love itself. Love in black begets 
love-in-the-black (capacity to Listen). Listening, the black remembers the originairity of 
Love (love simply there, neither self-conscious nor non-self-conscious). So that in sound 
Love lives through black time, the possibility of confronting evil. 
 
 I return to the sound of Marabi music (and dance) here, the moment of anguished 
happiness, now an anguished memory of Louis Armstrong61: Armstrong’s self-propelling 
(unwitting) diss…. by way of August Musarurgwa’s brassed band62 Marabi composition 
(Skokiaan).  
   
Oooooh, Take a trip to Africa 
Take any ship to Africa 
Come on along and learn the lingo 
Beside a jungle bungalow 
Skokiaan, Skokiaan, Skokiaan 
--- 
Oooooh, if you go to Africa 
Happy, happy, Africa 
You live along like a king-o 
Right in the jungle bungalo63 
 
                                                          
61 That Armstrong was the ambassador for American propaganda of goodwill in the ‘developing world’’, and 
that he become an object of ridicule within the more militant circles of the civil rights movement is quite 
revealing. Although he was not politically sophisticated, writes one of his biographers, “he was not so naive as 
to be unable to guess at the State Department's intentions. His position on the matter would have been 
colored by two factors. The first was that his audience, for some time, had been primarily white. It was white 
record buyers and moviegoers who were making him rich and famous, and he felt a good deal of loyalty to this 
audience. Conversely, many blacks, especially young blacks, had not only abandoned him and his music but 
had openly and frequently chastised him for not speaking out on racial discrimination. Armstrong had been 
hurt by the attacks of the militants, and while he certainly opposed segregation and supported efforts to end 
it, he was not entirely in sympathy with the groups who had so frequently accused him 'of tomming” (321).  
62  Armstrong would have found similarities in this brass band and the brass band in New Orleans of his youth. 
In South Africa, “the British and German missionaries” had long introduced brass bands “for the glory of God, 
the advancement of 'civilisation’”. And “Africans soon appropriated the idea for their own, rather different, 
purposes…. [other] Whites, after the missionaries, also continued to establish black brass bands, and for not 
dissimilar reasons” (Ballantine, 1991:137-138).  
63See  http://lyrics.wikia.com/wiki/Louis_Armstrong:Skokiaan 
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Armstrong’s rasping baritone-tenor trudges on, dissing (perhaps unwittingly) the notion of 
happiness itself (needless to say), the idea of ‘happy Africa’. It is a diss on happiness, in a 
related way that Kgositsile confronts English love. So that a ‘happy Africa’, for the black (the 
sick soul/the shadow), is an immediate place of terror (Kgositsile’s Anguished happiness64). 
We should ask, then: who is this “you” in Armstrong’s Skokiaan, the ‘you’ taking a trip to a 
‘happy Africa’? Unwittingly (and not subjunctively), Armstrong need not simply imagine a 
possible ‘you’, a white audience: the British imperialism (“only a British man wants to be 
happy after all”, says Nietzsche), without which present day Zimbabwe is unthinkable. 
Armstrong thinks an actual event, a Briton (or his American descendent) taking any ship, 
brass marching as he/she does to a manifest destiny, whiteness’s indefinite labour time (the 
necessity of producing the artefact, the black, the speaking commodity).  
 
But: Armstrong (the artefact itself) has and is the secret. He is an artefact with speech. 
Although commodities, recall Marx, “relate to each other merely as exchange-values”, they 
apprehend “the future in the present…bound up with what is given in something Marx could 
only subjunctively imagine: the commodity who speaks”. They shout hoarse or remain silent 
whenever they apprehend the present, a “dangerous place to live” (Kgositsile, 1974:5). The 
present is the future in perverse motion. The future, Kierkegaard is correct, is already past 
though the past is yet to come. To apprehend the future in the dangerous present, then, the 
black lives through the “unspeakable and yet an expressive” condition of black sorrow. 
Expressive of the weight of an imposed categorical reality on the black: the animal-man (an 
object of sacrifice) that ‘he/she is’, for Union time. The animal-man, a pre-condition of the 
Union’s little white quarrel (the so called South Africa war). Expressive, hence stylish, for 
the black: the “style” which is not a thing itself, and therefore ““not” a means of 
representation” (Mudimbe, 1994:169).  
 
This style is apprehendible, for the black, apprehendible through “the exchange 
between the” the Union landscape and the animal-proper {the Africanis, say} (169). Recall 
that the landscape is a site of blood spilling (the blood of the animal-proper or the black 
him/herself, at the hand of a white cult. So that black is synonymous with a sublime 
anticipation: a matter of when he will get killed. Hence he will, of moral necessity, negate 
this present. The black (in confronting the sublime present) thinks the past that is yet to come. 
                                                          
64 Kgositsile with the problem, Skokiaan (and Marabi).  “Marabi is a filthy Memory/Marabi is talent stomped in 
stokvel/and smothered in skokiaan fumes” (Kgositsile, 2004:37).  
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He/she thinks this, owing to originary Love (of the Grandmother), thinks at the same instant 
of actual time outside Union Time), the finality of victory against political evil, the time 
he/she is totally, if quantitatively, Silent (realises actual death itself). Without which 
realisation black shouting is merely a sublation of Union times, the case of failure of 
complete destruction of white labour power.  Put another way: the sublation of the present 
(“the ineffable terror” of whiteness) is an anticipation of the future of commodity-hood: that 
although commodity-hood is the black’s non-essential property, it does (or will) not wish 
itself away. Unless, of course, the black calls for Silence, the actual (what Paul Gilroy would 
call “redemptive”) death65.  
 
We follow Gilroy here (the notion of ‘redemptive death, a kind of ‘jubilee’) to 
discredit (render meaningless) utopian notions of freedom within Union time. But we must 
say more about redemptive death. For what calls for Silence (the materiality of death itself) is 
black in formal death (a living death/death-through-life). Du Bois would denote the living 
death in the black “the shadow of death”, a death before actual death, inscribing “the 
worldwandering of a soul in search for itself”, the strivings and the defeats of Union black 
(Abrahams, “Sophiatown tsotsi”, a churchman or a drunkard), strivings “in half despair”, 
through “poverty and starvation”. This death inscribes the moment of national sorrow, 
propelling the black’s hearing the sound of its movement (the secret: inessentiality of 
commodity-hood). Here the black befriends black time itself66 {by way of its hopefulness in 
the present}. It propels the black to struggle for “freedom” in his “life time” (his own time, 
outside union time), to the point of the substantial death, total Silence (in so far as the Union 
time is concerned). Silence: the consummation of the formal death in the soul of the black 
folk. Whether this Silence is really Silence (redemption) remains an object of speculation. 
                                                          
65 In Du Bois, the living death frames Alexandra Grummel’s biography, his resolve against white time. “No 
wonder we point to thief and murderer, and haunting prostitute, and the everending throng of unhearsed 
dead! The Valley of the Shadow of Death gives few of its pilgrims back to the world. But Alexander Crummell it 
gave back. Out of the temptation of Hate, and burned by the fire of Despair, triumphant over Doubt, and 
steeled by Sacrifice against  humiliation, he turned at last home across the waters, humble and strong, gentle 
and determined. He bent to all the gibes and prejudices, to all hatred and discrimination, with that rare 
courtesy which is the armour of pure souls”.   
 
66 James Baldwin goes as far as thinking that music itself is the very condition of friendship with time; which 
seems to suggest that performance is the condition of longing the ethical. The point here is to make peace 
with the fact of potentially being a commodity and then permanently struggling against it; by way of varying 
moral appropriations of the present.  Baldwin: Music is our witness, and our ally. The beat is the confession 
which recognises, changes and conquers time. Then, history becomes a garment we can wear, and share, and 
not a cloak in which to hide: and time becomes a friend” (See Baldwin in Gilroy,1993:203)    
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Silence is an object and moment of black gnosis, possibly a permanent aesthetic practice in 
life and after death. Redemption need not imply a ‘good’/simple life after death.    
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Post-sentiment  
 
 
If you were still alive now, Refentse child of Hillbrow and 
Tiragalong, if you were still alive, all of this that you have 
heard seen heard about felt smelt believed disbelieved shirked 
embraced brewing in your consciousness would still find 
chilling haunting echoes in the simple words … 
  Welcome to our Hillbrow … (Mpe, 2001:62)  
 
The valley of the shadow of death is the substrate (and expression) of subjective 
sorrow, you will recall through Dubois – the sorrow of black folk. So that sorrow for the 
black in, say, a South African post-apartheid (our concern in what follows) is an anticipation 
of death and its aftermath (the possibility of a life-after-black-death).  
The possibility of a post-apartheid life-after-black-death may well be hard to read or 
imagine, I sense – hard to read if none (other than Phaswane Mpe’s Welcome to our 
Hillbrow) in the post-apartheid order has it for a forceful interrogation. And if Welcome to 
our Hillbrow is a force, it is by way of the notion of victory-over-death (the last leap of hope 
in black), by way of Refentse (the protagonist) in other words.  
Refentse (We conquered67) is the very emblem of victory-over-death if in ‘Notes from 
Heaven’ (Welcome to Our Hillbrow’s second chapter) he is an object of a narration in 
subjunctive mood (“If you were still alive…” (Mpe, 2001:62)), as if Heaven is a scene of 
bliss, peace as such. Yet Mpe’s Heaven is an indeterminate infinity, carrying within it a Hell. 
Heaven is not “some far-off place where God sits in judgement, waiting to read out his 
endless, cruel list of offenders on Earth” (2001:47). Rather, it is a nowhere place of victory, 
of restive rest, a place in which one (Refentse on Earth) nonetheless becomes an object of a 
kind-of-judgement.  
A literary judgment if Heaven is an Archimedean point, from which Mpe could 
escape the trap of a literary binary, namely, fiction vs. non-fiction. How? Mpe has us think of 
Refentse’s earthly thoughts, for instance. Refentse “used to think about the scarcity of written 
Hillbow fictions in English and Sepedi” and other official South African languages. Yet Mpe 
(through Du Bois) assures us: “this narrative [writing about Hillbrow] is no fiction”. So that 
                                                          
67 An English translation from Sepedi (mine) 
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Welcome to our Hillbrow is a model of fiction in non-fiction, a kind of imaginative realism. 
For: if Hillbrow (“of milk and honey and bile, all brewing in our collective consciousness …” 
(41)) is non-fictitious place (an object of our disbelief), Mpe pits it against Tiragalong, its 
fictitious counterpart. Tiragalong is a stage68, an ideal metaphor of a possible happening in 
any South African village north of Johannesburg. Hillbrow-the-name and-place (the referent), 
on the other hand, exists in real time.  
Hillbrow-the-name-and-place is a concrete metaphor for the possibility/the reality of 
the seductiveness of black suicide, I contend, a reality through which Mpe signals a writely 
challenge: how can a black write on suicide when he (himself/herself) lives through the 
shadow of the valley of death? How can he write other than through the dialectics of fiction 
and nonfiction? Welcome to Our Hillbrow is clearly a warning to any fiction writer (or a 
social scientist for that matter) on Hillbrow or anyone who writes Hillbrow into being without 
apprehending its indeterminate reality. 
Still, Mpe (the novelist) is less interested in representation-ism (the mere 
representation of reality) than in expressionism (an expression of black death and its 
aftermath, and vice versa), traceable through a penchant for proper names/metaphors, the 
substance of his form/plotting. Think, for a moment, Mpe’s play of names, the 
Refilwe/Lerato/Bohlale/Refentse matrix69. Mpe’s play through names is fairly conventional 
but quite revealing, betraying the near-simple-ness of the narrative progression in Welcome to 
our Hillbrow. In one sub-plot: Refentse must break his love-relation, must break from 
Refilwe (a home girl/a gift from Tiragolong, if you will). For he cannot ‘love’ a sexually lose 
village woman. He will love a Town woman, Lerato (Love as such) if needs be – though he 
would in a while ‘betray’ her (Refentse will sleep with his male friend’s lover 
(Bohlale/Wisdom)), only in time to be an object of betrayal (the day Lerato, in turn, sleeps 
with (Bohlale’s lover). So that Refentse, disappointed by life in Hillbrow, must commit 
suicide. 
 Suffice it to say, though. The seductiveness of suicide is non-scandalous, since 
betrayal (and disappointment, the condition of this seductiveness) in Welcome to Our 
Hillbrow is proper to being “human”. Proper to humanness, albeit difficult to recognise as 
such when one is the betrayed but not the betrayer. Proper to humanness, and easy to 
                                                          
68 Tiragalong is a Sepedi word for Stage/mise-en-scene.   
69 We could transpose the matrix into a phrase: We conquered death to the extent that we have Love and 
Wisdom. Refilwe is a Sepedi name. It has not an English equivalent, to the extent that Refilwe in English is not 
a proper name but a passive-phrase, ‘We are given’; Lerato is a Sepedi name for Love; Bothale is a Sepedi 
name for Wisdom.  
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appreciate when one (Refentse) is the betrayer and not the object/victim of betrayal, so that 
this “humanness...could [in Refentse] be viewed as human only so long as it remained 
uncovered by prying eyes and unpublicised by enthusiastic tongues” (52), so long as the 
betrayed (Refentse’s friend) never finds out. Humanness here becomes a relative idea, 
becomes human when it corresponds to Refentse’s idea of humanity.  
Perhaps Refentse’s seeming self-criticism ought to be an object of our sympathy – if 
only to heap a scorn, unjustifiably it seems to me, on the relativity of Refentse’s idea of 
humanness. Heap a scorn on this idea owing to our political fetish of absolute idea of the 
human (or human nature). Unjustified scorn, in other words, since human nature (humanness) 
is a kind of an illusion. Humanness is unnatural (relative), lest we forget – unnatural, if it is 
“modified in each epoch” (Marx, 1990:759). Put another way: that friends betray each other 
cannot be a determination of absolute humanness. Humanness in Refentse is particular to 
him, though humanness in Refentse and his friend (we may add) are a version of black 
humanness (humanness modified in the new-old South African time).  
Then: saying to Refentse, “Welcome to our Hillbrow”, is to say, ‘Welcome to our 
historically conditioned humanness’. Saying “Welcome to our Hillbrow” is to affirm what I 
know already, the possibility of a historically conditioned suicide. Saying Welcome to our 
Hillbrow is similar to saying: “it was just a matter of time before you got here, Refentse child 
of Tiragalong (the mise-en-scene in black), before you took your own life. It is quite hard not 
to entertain the seductiveness of suicide when you live in post apartheid Hillbrow, when you 
have composite experience: a taste of “milk and honey and bile, all brewing in our collective 
consciousness” (41).  
     *** 
In different terms: Welcome to our Hillbrow is a warning to a literary ethicist: he/she 
who thinks it a novel of mere morals, appealing to a kind of Levinasian “ethics of 
entanglements”, by way of which blacks could have a “consciousness of vulnerability, self-
reflection and [human] imperfection …” (Nuttal, 2008:204), by way of which blacks ought to 
be hospitable and non-judgemental (a condition of justice) among themselves. Welcome to 
our Hillbrow is a warning to the ethicist – aside the noble wish for hospitability among Mpe’s 
blacks. Yet Levinas is an inappropriate aid to our thinking Mpe’s concerns in Welcome to our 
Hillbrow. Levinas’s privileging of ethics (where justice precedes freedom) could not – we 
know this by now – stop the indefinite white labour time (the thing that culminates in a post-
apartheid order, for instance). We need not ride on pure ethics, as if the ethical 
(‘justice’/hospitality) amongst blacks precede/is autonomous from the political 
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(‘freedom’/friend-foe antithesis)70. To do ethics through Welcome to our Hillbrow is to ask 
wisely, following Bohlale: “What kind of friends are we, Refentse, who could lead 
themselves into temptation like that? What friends betray their loved ones in this manner?” 
(52).  
Ethics through Welcome to our Hillbrow is an ethics in black, then, a gesture to 
thinking the impossibility of black friendships in a post-apartheid time. Mpe as such is no 
mere moralist (concerned with ethics bereft of politics or the notion of political evil) but a 
poet/an ironist through politics – a poet who may well sympathise with, say, a non-ethical 
poet in Kierkegaard, for whom sleeping (living in immediacy) and doing nothing is the best 
life-policy, for whom all choices lead to utter regret. Mpe way well sympathise with creative 
‘nihilism’: the futility of Refentse leaving Tiragalong for Hillbrow. For there is possibly a 
Hillbrow/Tiragalong anywhere the black goes (searching for greener pastures).  
In Refentse Mpe has us see more, nonetheless: Refentse’s need to act and strive 
through the ‘valley of the shadow of death’, since merely to sleep in the valley (simply to sit 
by the fictitious-real stage/stay a spectator in Tiragalong) is a refusal to face a possibility of a 
Hillbrowian suicide, the very condition of victory over death, a refusal to mount a place (a 
Hill-top beyond Hillbrow/the real-fictitious stage) from which Refentse could see all the 
black happenings: the fact of blackness everywhere, blackness in Tiragalong echoing the 
coming blackness in (and the coming Welcome  to our) Hillbrow.   
Yet to strive through the ‘valley of the shadow of death’ is not an ethical act per se 
(the merely ethical bereft of politics). Rather, it is an onto-political act (informed by an ethics 
in black), if only because Refentse can only negate to preserve the present (The scene: 
Tiragalong). A move from Tiragalong to Hillbrow (a trial movement away from mere 
immediacy) is nearly akin a maroon act, since to run away from slavery is a wish to become 
free (though such a move is not a mark of slave’s freedom from the master’s perspective). A 
move from Tiragalong to Hillbrow is a wish to become free from the valley of the shadow of 
death, a wish for a life, albeit by way of suicidal death. A wish for life after death betrays the 
fact that existence in black is founded in the idea of the valley of the shadow of death 
(breathing in death), so that real death itself is not at any rate a threat. Death (needless to say) 
                                                          
70 Welcome to our Hillbrow echoes of Peter Abrahams’ Tell Freedom, its account of the impossibility of black 
primary friendships (friendship among blacks/friendship between blacks and whites) in the Union of South 
Africa. Blacks, in Abrahams, lack capacity for ‘joyfulness’ (where love is a verb or an object to give to another). 
Primary friendships are impossibility, if Union blackness is a product of political evil, a determination of a false 
paternity (whiteness as such)). Evil, in other words, cannot produce friends.  
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in Refentse is desirable, a leap (a bracketing of all other considerations) towards a Heaven (a 
place of certainty), betraying (or hence) the threat-lessness of real death, for Refentse.  
Real death is desirable if the desire is the expression of a better (a proper/sonic) sense 
or apprehension of life on earth, a condition for listening to a note, an anguished (blue) note 
from Heaven. It is a condition for listening to a heavenly note before one gets to Heaven. So 
that we ask if and how the living (those on Earth, in Hillbrow/Tiragalong) have capacity for 
note listening. It is no accident that music in “Welcome to our Hillbrow” is Refentse’s solo 
brooding’s background accompaniment. Refentse broods over political evil, listening to 
Stimela’s See the World Though the eyes of a Child, his “favourite song” (“released in 
1994”), “a song about a neglected, homeless child exposed to much street violence and blood, 
and subsequently grown to be scared of darkness” (84). A Song, in Stimelaian signature, in 
which the voice is indispensable, a black man’s anguished tenor – the time of Nana Coyote’s 
coarse breathing, intercepting a lead string, a call for a backing vocal, funereal-like Wu’s: 
Wu, wu, wu… .So that Refentse could brood on, as though anticipating a black funeral (his). 
Music (in this life), in short, is mimicry of (or my cry for) life after death, anticipating 
someone else to say: ‘Welcome to our Hell in Heaven’.   
     *** 
Music/and song in Welcome to our Hillbrow is a call for an analectic listening. Music 
in Welcome to our Hillbrow is an echo of ‘some music’ in the street, what the rapper Tuks 
Sengnga properly names a Ticket to Jozi, or what we may call a Mid-night Train ticket to and 
through Hell (if, says the rapper, “diheleng re a ikisa/ka mollo re a phisa71” (Tuks, 2006)) 
where people fight (gura) “for a dime”, not worth the rapper’s time. For: at stake in the 
rapper’s time is “hunger to be free”, to “keep you on the edge of your [train] seat”. And this 
hunger is the very condition of urgent listening, of listening to a time (less) signature in the 
sound of the moving train. Recall from the preceding chapter the white trombonist’s 
sentiment: the train sound sounds just like a Marabi sound: “it just goes on and on, but as it 
goes it always changes and you know it’s going somewhere”.  
Now, if (say) the ‘substance’ of the thumping Marabi organ or trombone is any 
different from Motswako (Ticket to Jozi) organ/ trombone, it is a different/“changing same”. 
Is not Motswako after all a kind of a post-apartheid Marabi, in the measure of their related 
conditions of emergence? Marabi comes before 1948. Motswako is possible post-1994. All 
point to the insincerity of fetishizing/privileging apartheid (the supposed alpha and omega of 
                                                          
71 To hell we send ourselves/ in the fire we commit ourselves. 
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political evil) in thinking blacks in South Africa, the insincerity of asking tautological 
questions (of whether blacks in apartheid suffered in different ways), or the comedy of seeing 
in the end of apartheid (or any coming epoch) the end of evil. All point to tragedy of failure 
to listen and learn: if the sound of Ticket to Jozi is going anywhere (to Hell, if we are to help 
the white trombonist), it is an expression/determination of blackness. What comes to the 
same thing: if the sound of Ticket to Jozi is going anywhere, it is the sound of the black going 
through Hell (from somewhere, say Mafikeng or Tiragalong, to Jozi). Mafikeng or 
Tiragalong is qualitatively equivalent to Jozi. Going from Jozi to Mafikeng is qualitatively 
similar to going from Jozi to Mafikeng. To leave Mafikeng for Jozi existentially is to leave 
Jozi for anywhere, so that a ticket to Jozi is necessarily a return ticket (Hell in black is 
everywhere).  
Tuks, of course, may prefer us to privilege Jozi/Mafikeng’s quantitative distinction 
(non-equivalence). Going to Jozi (the industrial city as such) in Tuks the rapper is one way of 
finding wisdom72, of hustling, a way of thinking (and seeing) the necessity of struggle to 
keep “you on your feet”, recognition of the sad fact that many things change while “it 
remains the same for people downstairs”. The black must move – even if to move is to go 
nowhere. To move to Jozi could be the impossibility of the black (through wisdom) taking a 
simple fact (“it remains the same for people downstairs”) for granted. A move to Jozi (a 
move through Hell) is a pursuit for simple understanding, since Jozi in Tuks the rapper is “a 
simpler place and time”.  
By no means, I say in passing, is Tuks (in Ticket to Jozi) a romantic, clearly. How can 
Jozi, and not Mafikeng, be a “simpler place and time”? You will know that Ticket to Jozi is 
an arrangement and a sly critique of Gladys Knight’s Mid-night Train to Georgia’. It is 
critique of Knight’s blues-soul (romantic) concern for the force of failure, a black man’s 
differed hopes for stardom in Los Angeles, a critique of the black woman in Knight, the 
woman who sympathises with the nostalgic black man and follows him to a Georgian past, a 
“simpler place and time” – if only she will “rather live in his world than be without him”, in 
hers. Ticket to Jozi is a correction: If Georgian is a simpler place and time, so is Los Angeles 
and Jozi – qualitatively speaking. At stake, then, is an Either/or, in Tuks: the choice of 
simplicity of living in (listening to) the receding past (Georgia/Mafikeng) or simplicity of 
living in (listening to) the difficult present (Jozi/Los Angeles). The past-present matrix is a 
simple idea, if the qualitative distinction between present and past is an ideal distinction. For 
                                                          
72 “Kef a ke ile/ke  o batla mahlale” (Tuks, 2006).  
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the present will now become past. And the past is yet to come, while the future is already past 
(Kierkegaard). To live in the present is to live in the past and the future.  
 Yet: the past-present matrix is a complex, concrete idea. It has political significance, 
the sublation of evil (evil: a pre-condition of foolishness), the acquiring of wisdom 
(understanding that the past and the present are quantitatively distinct) in a practical struggle. 
Of wisdom: hence to leave Mafikeng for Jozi is also a wish not to forget the past, the wish for 
the past not to forget one’s distant commitment to this past (home as such (Mafikeng)). 
Hence Jozi, the present, is quantitatively simpler (than Mafikeng) a call for response to 
become a wise hustler (to “show love still”). Tuks: 
One shot at life, I’ll be damned if I live mine like a candle 
   In the wind 
 Zone 7 maz’ phelele, so what you want bling? 
Show love we all got blood lines of kings and queens… 
Show love still, black got his land back but it’s hard to build 
  But it’s hard to build.  
Jozi becomes the real test of spiritual development when one can succeed to live in it by way 
of going beyond bling (the fight ‘for dimes’)73. Jozi is the real test when one can – a critique 
of Knight aside – show love through an art form: music: through a hearing of, say, Motswako 
notes. Or through hearing a heavenly (blue/brooding) notes in “Welcome to our Hillbrow”, 
through hearing, say, Stimela’s a funereal-like timber and, then, seeing the ‘World’ 
(whiteness as such) though the eyes of a Child. So that we could read in this Child a kind of 
weeping: Stimela’s Nana Coyote’s very voice, the raspy tenor, not so much what it shouts but 
the manner (style) of its shout, an expression of disappointment: the failure of black folk to 
show love or, what is the same thing, the black folk’s failure to build him/her a safe, warm 
place, despite in principle getting back the land. We could read in this Child, too, the voice of 
the rapper, shouting “One shot at life, I’ll be damned if I live mine like a candle/In the wind”, 
suggesting the rapper wants beautiful things (life as such), except (says the rapper elsewhere) 
he will and cannot not for them put his soul on the market place.  
Of course, none (goes on the rapper) apprehends the significance of what he says, 
since he raps “in codes” and is “way ahead” of his time. His voice is a secret.  
Now: rap “in codes” (a mark of a type of childishness) is a kind-of-pure art (in spite 
of Tuks’ political garb/phrases). To practice pure art is to express what one pleases, to please 
                                                          
73 Hence movement is better than stillness, in other words.   
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no audience (at least in the immediate) and, by extension, to risk attack: envy. By envy I 
mean the need for adults to steal what they do not possess. I mean the moment of employing 
“purposely wrong orthography, the use of children’s expression [‘so what you want bling’]”, 
in a philistine bid to avail oneself on the market place. Put another way: “Genuine and 
pseudo-nursery rhymes are combined with purposeful alterations of the lyrics of original 
nursery rhymes in order to make commercial hits”. They are “combined...to make the musical 
product “popular” with the subjects’ consciousness, the distance between themselves and the 
plugging agencies, by approaching them with the trusting attitude of the child asking  an adult 
for the correct time even though he knows neither the strange man nor the meaning of time” 
(Adorno,2002:451). The use of nursery like rhymes to make mere hit songs is anti-pure-art, 
disrespect for an adult black audience’s doubled consciousness, if one produces and listens on 
their behalf (Adorno, 2002). Such disrespect is less distasteful when the audience cares less 
of what they listen to – less distasteful when the audience itself already is a commodity (cares 
not to think of its {non}place in the white world). More sad, however, is the case of 
employing “lyrics characterised by an ambiguous irony in that, while affecting a children’s 
language, they at the same time display contempt of the adult for the child or even give or 
sadistic meaning to” the child’s expression (2002:450). So that to rap “so what you want 
bling” is blasphemous. It is to use the child (the voice) in vain, to use one’s voice to avail 
oneself on the market place. 
To be used in vain (to be an object of contempt) is to be unlistenable when you plead: 
See the World Though the Eyes of a Child or Show love still. The adult has not capacity to 
listen to a childish plead (except for contempt), has not capacity to care. In short, black got 
his land back but it’s hard to build/But it’s hard to build. Then: the child (the voice) is left 
alone in the cold. The child in Welcome to our Hillbrow, you will recall, is homeless, 
“exposed to much street violence and blood, and subsequently grown to be scared of 
darkness” (Mpe, 2001:84). Only he can hear himself in an empty street echo. Yet the child 
hears him/herself without mediation, since the child has not self-consciousness. The child 
hears itself in the immediacy of violence, absence of a show of love. This is the child with the 
soul of the black folk.    
      *** 
What should this absence of a show of love signify in an age of a popular speech-
making, when an adult (a politician) declares conviviality between the soul of South African 
black folk and whites, who supposedly “took the collective decision that we will manage all 
our pains by admitting the wrongs we had done [and] would acknowledge that the wrongs we 
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had done were wrongs”? The we pronoun is a case of a popular composer listening to his 
political song, relishing it on behalf of an adult audience, to whom he could also declare 
South Africa a friend of the world, a friendship “born of mutual respect and a common 
adherence to the vision of freedom and human dignity for all” (Mbeki, 1999:1). So that to 
speak of ideals of freedom and human dignity is to take an adult audience for political 
children, to see in these ideals an object of childlike faith.  
This is a case of a popular stage, an instant and a place of ‘glamour’ in which an adult 
audience ought to feel triumphant for partaking in a new experiment, a South African demos. 
The popular composer and his adult audience must “fight to forgive what could not be 
undone … make a commitment to [themselves] …one to the other, that …[they] would strive 
to work together to build something which, perhaps, no other people had succeeded to 
construct…What remains is that … [they] continue to strive to do what … [they] thought was 
the correct thing to do - to build a better world, free of the pain represented by the graves at 
this place, which are a bitter reminder of a bitter past”. A place of glamour (a condition of the 
new), despite a South African present being an endless chain of onto-political  ‘misfortunes’, 
a place of past-present-future sorrow, the black trial to build children a warm place. It is an 
instant of glamour if decked in a standard jargon of nationalist truth and reconciliation, a 
better way to deal with the politician’s voice: “none of us is without a scar” (Mbeki, 1999:1). 
A necessary jargon, since popular performance of politics requires a childish national 
audience incapable of recognising the truth of a lie: the black capacity of reconciling with 
another (the foe/master) before he could (if he could) reconcile with himself. Requires 
childish audience for a dancer, whose skin peels in the market-place, the dancer – whom this 
truth never hurts. He prefers the ear-tickling after all, distraction of the black’s responsibility 
to see the world through the eyes of the actual child, who (we’ll reiterate) hears himself say: 
‘“black got his land back but it’s hard to build/But it’s hard to build”, the black is a 
commodity, South Africa is proper to white time’74, hence, understandably, the black cannot 
show love.  
Now, commodity-hood is a form of forgetting one’s personhood, the thing that 
conditions a possibility of refusal of not showing love (the refusal of subjection). By 
personhood we mean an object’s existential status, the fact that the commodity-hood is an 
                                                          
74 We may say this in a different way: the jargon is grand-paraphrase of the long-standing charterist chatter: 
South Africa is property, proper to everyone who lives in it, everyone with the capacity to build. So that, in the 
final analysis, the politician’s wish for friendship with the world is not an aporia, since South Africa (by 
definition) belongs to white Time… 
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object’s non-essential property (Moten, 2003). Personhood is a pointer to his/her soul. The 
soul of the black folk forms in the interstices of commodity (the shadow of the valley of 
death) and personhood. The soul, then, can either gravitate towards personhood or 
commodityhood. The rapper has a choice of putting not his soul on the market place. He may 
well imply an existential certainty: there is such a thing as a black soul (the soul on the 
market) if there is such a thing as the soul of the black folk. It is the soul of the black folk 
(short of being necessarily on the market) that can radiate personhood, the consequence of 
which is to show love, a trial at building a child a warm place. It is a trial if the soul of the 
black folk cannot after all get rid of its onto-political status: the black is formed through a 
white Time, so that the soul of the black folk must necessarily show love even if the black 
folk (and the black soul) will fail, must necessarily show love, maternal (originary) care: the 
fact we all got blood lines of kings and queens, the fact that we can rule ourselves even when 
the white world rules.  
     *** 
Against white South African time sits my voice, my child. He/she lives in a hellish-
heaven, in the measure that he is a child in black, a child of Hillbrow and of Tiragalong, in 
the measure that it lives through the (post-apartheid) market place, the University. Yet the 
child, you will recall, is a voice that hears itself without mediation. It is not subjectivity per 
se. It does not use itself. It has not self-consciousness. It is in an expression, a style of 
personhood, and as such beyond representation. It is a determination of the soul of the black 
folk, a form of a radical, rational instinct (regardless of whether or not the black folk are a 
commodity – live in hell that is heaven). The voice, put another way, has an immediate 
capacity to judge, since it is at once an expression of personhood of the black folk in hell (in 
politics). And what is to judge immediately other than a practice of ethics in black, the 
practice of having the soul’s best interest at heart? And what is ethics in black (ethics from 
sorrow) other than my recognition of the (im)possibility of or perversity of black studies? 
Ethics from sorrow is a recognition of the (im) possibility of black studies, since black studies 
are on the market place, in the South African university, say. Black studies have not an 
immediate relationship with an ethics in black as such. Black studies and ethics from sorrow 
(ethics in black) are at war. “You can’t live without our thing”, says the black ‘good’ student.  
 
Responds the ethicist in black: “perhaps, though I am not a thing per se but my own 
style and thus beyond your appropriation, unless you wish to look comical”.    
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